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3 
 INTRODUCTION 
1.1.1. Ownership, institutional environment and subsidiary 
performance 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) have become fundamental 
players in the global economy, significantly increasing their presence 
during recent decades. Their foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows 
reached $1.4 trillion in 2017 (UNCTAD, 2018). This has attracted the 
attention of a large number of researchers (Dunning, 2001; Kim & 
Hwang, 1992; Ramamurti, 2004; Rugman, 2005) who have tried to 
analyze both strategic behavior during internationalization processes 
(Arregle, Miller, Hitt, & Beamish, 2013; Delios & Beamish, 1999) and 
the performance of MNEs and their subsidiaries (Chan, Isobe, & 
Makino, 2008; Geringer, Beamish, & DaCosta, 1989). 
In internationalization processes, two strategic decisions have 
received a great deal of attention, namely the entry mode and the 
ownership level (Xu & Shenkar, 2002). Regarding entry mode, an 
MNE can choose to internationalize using the greenfield method (i.e., 
by establishing a new company in the host country), or through a 
cross-border acquisition (CBA) (i.e., acquiring an existing company) 
(Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; Slangen & Hennart, 2007). Although 
these two entry modes have both been widely used, in recent years 
there has been more growth in CBAs than in greenfield investments 
(UNCTAD, 2018), encouraging researchers to analyze the 
determinants of these acquisition processes further. 
Once the acquisition has taken place, a key decision for the 
company is the appropriate level of ownership, which will be based 
on the level of uncertainty associated with the acquisition. The 
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determinants of this uncertainty and, therefore, of the level of 
ownership that the company acquires have been widely studied in 
recent years (Chari & Chang, 2009; Malhotra & Gaur, 2014; Xie, 
Reddy, & Liang, 2017; etc.). However, the previous literature has 
focused on analyzing the determinants at the country and MNE level, 
while the determinants at the level of the target company have been 
unexplored. This lack of research opens a promising line of 
investigation, which constitutes the first research objective of this 
doctoral thesis (i.e., the analysis of factors at the subsidiary level that 
influence the ownership level acquired). 
Moreover, CBA processes are dynamic, and an MNE can vary its 
decision about the commitment of resources once it has entered the 
host country. It is true that a stream of literature has focused on this 
point in recent years (Petersen, Welch, & Welch, 2000; Puck, 
Holtbrügge, & Mohr, 2009; Swoboda, Olejnik, & Morschett, 2011); 
however, to our knowledge there are no studies that analyze the 
influence of subsidiary-level factors on ownership variations in the 
post-acquisition period. This doctoral thesis also tries to fill this gap 
in the literature. So, our second research objective is the analysis of 
factors at the subsidiary level that influence variations in ownership 
after the initial acquisition.  
In addition, the continuous growth of developing economies has 
transformed the landscape of global business. This has generated 
opportunities both for the entry of companies from developed 
countries into emerging markets and for the creation of MNEs in 
developing countries. During the 1980s and the 1990s, MNEs were 
from developed countries, especially the United States and European 
countries, while MNEs from emerging economies represented only a 
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small part of outward FDI (UNCTAD, 2003). However, this situation 
has changed dramatically during the last two decades. FDI flows from 
developing countries have increased over the past 20 years 
(UNCTAD, 2018). This has led scholars to focus on emerging 
multinational companies (EMNEs), with the aim of delving into the 
strategies they follow (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Rugman & Li, 2007). 
There has been a debate in the literature about whether EMNEs 
(which are conditioned by the specific characteristics of the 
competitive and institutional environment in which the parent 
company develops its activity) follow different strategies from MNEs 
from advanced countries (AMNEs) (Hennart, 2012; Narula, 2012). The 
evidence shows that the specific characteristics of the home country 
influence the overall strategy of a firm (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011; 
Hernandez & Nieto, 2015). In order to study this issue, this doctoral 
thesis analyzes how ownership-level decisions taken by MNEs in 
emerging countries depend on the home country of the MNE.   
Once the establishment of the subsidiary in the host market has 
taken place, its success can be observed in the performance of both the 
MNE and the subsidiary. For this reason, an extensive body of 
literature has concentrated on the study of this performance and its 
determinants. While there are numerous studies examining the 
performance of the parent company (Geringer et al., 1989; Goerzen & 
Beamish, 2003; Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997), a smaller number have 
studied the factors that affect the performance of the subsidiary (Chan 
et al., 2008; Hansen & Gwozdz, 2015). 
The previous literature has shown that one of the main 
determining factors that explain the performance of the subsidiary is 
the institutional environment of the host country (Chan et al., 2008). 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
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The host country environment determines the conditions in which 
firms compete (North, 1990), and influences companies by restricting 
or facilitating their activities (Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & Chen, 2009; 
Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). More importantly, the institutional 
environment in which MNEs perform their activity changes over time 
(North, 1990). For example, in 2018, about 55 economies introduced at 
least 112 measures that affected foreign investment. More than a third 
of these measures introduced new restrictions or regulations 
(UNCTAD, 2019). 
The institutional environment has been widely analyzed in the 
strategy and international business literature in recent years (Peng, 
2003; Peng et al., 2009), but nevertheless, a new trend, namely the 
dynamic institution-based view (Banalieva, Eddleston, & Zellweger, 
2015), has emerged in the analysis of how changes in institutions 
affect strategy and performance. This new theoretical perspective 
does not focus on the depth of the institutional change experienced by 
a market, but on the speed at which that change is carried out. 
Although there are some empirical studies that analyze the impact of 
the speed of institutional change on firm performance (Banalieva et 
al, 2015; Banalieva, Cuervo-Cazurra, & Sarathy, 2018), there are no 
studies that focus on the impact of the speed of institutional change 
on the performance of subsidiaries. Therefore, this doctoral thesis will 
try to provide further evidence on this topic. 
Moreover, not all MNEs have the same characteristics. As we 
have mentioned, previous research has highlighted the importance of 
the home country for the strategies followed by an MNE (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2011). Some firms can develop new capabilities as a result of 
their experience and learning in their home country, and these can be 
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used in the future. This phenomenon is known as home country 
learning (Cuervo-Cazurra, Luo, Ramamurti, & Ang, 2018). When 
MNEs come from emerging or highly competitive countries, they can 
engage in institutional and competitive learning, respectively. This 
learning in the home country will favor the generation of competitive 
institutional advantages for the MNE (Martin, 2014). Because part of 
the success of an MNE derives from the fact that it can share its 
resources with its subsidiaries, it is possible for an MNE to transfer 
these competitive institutional advantages to its subsidiaries. 
Therefore, this thesis also tries to deepen our knowledge of the 
relevance of home country learning for subsidiary performance. 
1.1.2. Research objectives 
Taking into account the gaps in the literature mentioned in the 
previous section, the dissertation reports on three empirical studies. 
Each study tackles one of the main research objectives and is focused 
on answering the unresolved questions to reach a better 
understanding of the strategies followed by MNEs and the 
performance of subsidiaries in international processes. 
The main research objectives are: 
 Research objective 1. To investigate the influence of the target’s 
characteristics on the level of ownership acquired by an MNE in a 
CBA.  
o Research objective 1.a. To investigate the influence of the 
target’s characteristics on the initial level of ownership 
acquired by the MNE.  
Chapter 1. Introduction 
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o Research objective 1.b. To deepen our knowledge of how the 
subsidiary’s characteristics are also important in the variation 
in the level of ownership in the post-acquisition period. 
To tackle these two research objectives, we develop the first 
empirical study (Chapter 2), which is split into two stages. In the first 
stage, the study tries to explain, in a context where there are first-
mover advantages, how the leading time between the entry of the 
pioneer and the entry of the target into the market is a key 
determinant in the decision about the ownership level acquired by the 
MNE. In a second stage, the study focuses on analyzing how this 
leading time is also relevant in the period after the acquisition, 
influencing the MNE’s decisions on variations in the ownership level. 
In addition, during the study we analyze the influence that other 
factors, such as the age of the market or the introduction of new 
technologies by subsidiaries, may have on the ownership decision, 
both at the initial moment of acquisition and during the period after 
the acquisition. 
 Research objective 2. To investigate the influence of home country 
learning on the ownership level acquired in a CBA, by distinguishing 
between emerging and developed home and host countries. 
This research objective is addressed in the second study (Chapter 
3), and demonstrates that the level of ownership that an MNE 
acquires in an emerging country differs according to whether or not 
its home country is an emerging country. This is due to the 
institutional learning that an EMNE can possess. This institutional 
learning can help to reduce the uncertainty that MNEs generally face 
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when entering emerging countries, and increases the ownership 
acquired by EMNEs above the level acquired by AMNEs. 
 Research objective 3. To investigate the influence of the speed of 
institutional change on a subsidiary’s performance, by considering the 
moderating effect of home country learning. 
To address this objective, we design the last empirical study of 
the dissertation (Chapter 4). Our investigation studies whether the 
speed of change in market-supporting institutions can negatively 
affect the performance of subsidiaries, because of the difficulty of 
adapting to the new institutional environment. In addition, the study 
tries to demonstrate the influence of the home country learning of the 
MNE in relation to these changes. Specifically, the study focuses on 
institutional and competitive learning as a source of the competitive 
and institutional advantage that an MNE can transfer to its 
subsidiaries. 
 THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
For the development of the three empirical studies, this thesis is 
based on different theories. Specifically, the first two empirical studies 
(Chapters 2 and 3) are based on the ownership literature. In Chapter 
2, the ownership literature merges with the first-mover advantage 
literature, trying to answer the call of Zachary, Gianiodis, Payne, & 
Markman, (2015) for the establishment of a more integrative 
framework for the entry literature. To provide an answer to the 
second research objective, Chapter 3 complements the ownership 
literature with the literature on institutional theory and home country 
learning. This home country learning literature is also key for the last 
of the empirical studies (Chapter 4), which is also based on the 
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dynamic institution-based view. The integration will allow us to 
address the last research objective.1 
The next subsections are devoted to brief introductions to the 
theories mentioned above that serve as the basis for the development 
of the research objectives. 
1.2.1. Ownership in cross-border acquisitions 
The choice of the initial level of ownership in a CBA is important 
when an MNE enters a foreign market, because this level of 
ownership has a clear economic, financial and strategic impact on the 
acquirer and the target company (Chari & Chang, 2009; Pinto et al., 
2017). 
The initial acquisition of a high level of ownership in the target 
allows complete control over operations, facilitating the management 
functions within the company and providing access to a higher 
percentage of profits, but it also entails greater risks and costs because 
of the commitment of resources and the lack of flexibility (Anderson 
& Gatignon, 1986). By contrast, a lower level of ownership provides 
access to complementary resources that were not previously available 
and facilitates risk diversification (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986), but it 
leads to potential opportunistic costs associated with the post-
acquisition integration, and to a lack of control. 
Previous studies have analyzed the optimal level of ownership 
in terms of costs and benefits, highlighting the role of market 
imperfections in this important decision (Chari & Chang, 2009; Li & 
Li, 2010). Market imperfections, such as adverse selection and moral 
                                                          
1 A brief summary of this structure can be seen in Figure 1.1. 
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hazard, result in higher transaction costs, and arise from a lack of 
knowledge of the host country (Malhotra & Gaur, 2014). When MNEs 
expand into a new host market through cross-border acquisitions, 
they often do not have sufficient knowledge of the new context. The 
environment in the home country may be substantially different, 
which increases the challenge of understanding the complexities of 
doing business in the host country (Kostova, 1999; Mezias, 2002). As 
a result of cultural, normative, political and social structures, and 
economic conditions, companies face difficulties from being foreign 
in the new environment (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). The consequent 
asymmetry of information does not allow them to make a proper 
assessment of the value of the target acquired because of the ex ante 
problem of adverse selection and the ex post problem of moral hazard. 
Once the acquirer has invested in the target company, 
uncertainty can be reduced because the acquirer can obtain direct 
information from the subsidiary, local managers and the 
environment, and this can lead to a variation in the acquirer’s 
commitment in the subsidiary in the post-entry period (Clark, Pugh, 
& Mallory, 1997; Petersen et al., 2000; Puck et al., 2009; Putzhammer, 
Fainshmidt, Puck, & Slangen, 2018; Swoboda et al., 2011). 
Acquirers can vary their ownership in the subsidiary once they 
gain experience and learning. This ability and preparation to change 
ownership in the post-entry period has been conceptualized as 
“strategic flexibility” (Petersen et al., 2000, p. 689). Although research 
in this field is still scarce, some authors have tried to deepen our 
knowledge of the factors that influence ownership changes once entry 
has taken place, in decisions such as the internationalization mode 
(Calof & Beamish, 1995; Petersen et al., 2000), the conversion from 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
12 
joint ventures to wholly-owned subsidiaries (Puck et al., 2009), an 
increase in ownership (Jeanjean, Stolowy, Erkens, & Yohn, 2015), and 
divestments (Petersen et al., 2000). Some determining factors of this 
variation in the commitment of resources after entry are related to the 
internal environment, the external environment, managerial attitudes 
and firm performance (Swoboda et al., 2011). 
1.2.2. First-mover advantages  
First-mover advantages arise when the pioneers in a market 
obtain benefits in terms of profitability, value creation or survival 
(Lieberman & Montgomery, 2013). This field of literature has been 
extensively analyzed since the publication of Lieberman and 
Montgomery’s seminal article in 1988, resulting in the identification 
by researchers of three groups of factors under which entering a 
market early is a profitable strategy (Suárez & Lanzolla, 2007).  
First, resources and capabilities at the firm level, such as 
management skills (Murthi, Srinivasan, & Kalyanaram, 1996) and 
product development skills (Robinson & Chiang, 2002) can favor the 
exploitation of first-mover advantages. Second, environmental 
factors, such as market transparency, environmental uncertainty, and 
the stage of the life cycle of the industry affect the advantages enjoyed 
by the pioneers and the sustainability of those advantages (Suárez & 
Lanzolla, 2007). Third, isolation mechanisms prevent late entrants 
from catching up with pioneers (Rumelt, 1987). The most commonly 
accepted classification of these isolation mechanisms (Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1988) is based on three categories: a) technological 
leadership, through the learning and experience curve or the existence 
of R&D patents; b) the preemption of scarce assets, which includes 
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economies of scale and the advantages of choosing niche markets; and 
c) buyer switching costs derived from the formation of habits in 
buyers and the firm’s reputation. 
Previous research has generally demonstrated the existence of a 
positive relationship between early entrance and firm performance 
(García-Villaverde, Ruiz-Ortega, & Parra-Requena, 2012; Gómez & 
Maícas, 2011; Vanderwerf & Mahon, 1997), but some studies have also 
founded mixed or contradictory results (Boulding & Christen, 2008). 
For this reason, researchers have tried to address the question of 
whether first-mover advantages are static or can be eroded (Ferrier, 
Smith, & Grimm, 1999). There are circumstances that cause the 
disadvantages of being a pioneer to overcome the advantages 
(Lieberman & Montgomery, 2013), because of the negative impact on 
the effectiveness of isolation mechanisms (Boulding & Christen, 2003; 
Gómez, Lanzolla, & Maícas, 2016). 
1.2.3. The institution-based view and the dynamic institution-
based view of strategy 
In recent years, the institutional approach, along with other 
traditional approaches based on industry and resources, has become 
key for understanding organizational phenomena (Peng et al., 2009). 
The institution-based view of strategy argues that the institutional 
environment in which firms compete, that is, the “rules of the game” 
(North, 1990), influences firms’ choices by restricting or facilitating 
their activity (Peng et al., 2008, 2009). Institutions provide stability for 
economic exchanges by reducing uncertainty (North, 1990), and have 
an impact both on firms’ strategic decisions and on their performance 
(Ang, Benischke, & Doh, 2015; Dikova & Brouthers, 2016; Wan & 
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Hoskisson, 2003). Specifically, academics have paid special attention 
to some of these institutions, the market-supporting institutions, 
because they facilitate economic exchanges and promote an effective 
market mechanism (Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009). 
Strong market-supporting institutions can contribute to more 
efficient transactions by reducing the costs of doing business (North, 
1990). For example, the existence of financial intermediaries facilitates 
access to capital and information, which reduces uncertainty and 
promotes the entry of new competitors. An effective judicial system 
allows firms to ensure the protection of their property rights, which 
can promote innovative activities (James, Leiblein, & Lu, 2013). As the 
judicial system improves the protection of property rights, the 
infringement of those rights is less frequent, which reduces the costs 
of litigation for innovative firms (Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2004). In 
addition, market-supporting institutions condition the results 
obtained from key strategies such as diversification (Wan & 
Hoskisson, 2003), radical innovation (Fuentelsaz, Garrido, & Maícas, 
2015) and environmental strategies (Goedhuys & Sleuwaegen, 2013). 
These rules of the game change over time (Peng, 2003). The main 
aim of governments when implementing institutional changes is 
usually to liberalize the market. These changes are generally known 
as pro-market reforms (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Peng, 2003), 
and they usually lead to improvements in national governance and to 
economic liberalization (Dau, 2012). For example, governments 
increase labor flexibility by reducing restrictions on the termination of 
employment (Botero et al., 2004), encourage the protection of property 
rights by improving patent laws (Michel et al., 2013), and reduce 
uncertainty by facilitating the process of enforcing contracts in court 
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(North, 1991). In addition, pro-market reforms generally result in 
price liberalization and the reduction of industrial and commercial 
barriers in a country, which favors competition and the entry of 
foreign investors (Dau, 2012). 
Previous empirical studies do not show conclusive evidence of 
how institutional changes can impact on firm performance (Banalieva 
et al., 2018). Improvements in market-supporting institutions are not 
immediate or without cost (North, 1990). Some studies that focus on 
emerging environments report that pro-market reforms lead to better 
performance (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009), while others do not find 
this positive effect (Chari & Banalieva, 2015). 
This lack of consensus has led to a new trend in the literature, the 
dynamic institution-based view of strategy. This dynamic institution-
based view focuses on analyzing the effect that the speed of 
institutional changes has on firm strategy and performance (Banalieva 
et al., 2015). While previous research had considered institutional 
change as a static event, pro-market reforms may be carried out 
gradually over a long period of time or, alternatively, may be 
developed rapidly (Banalieva et al., 2015; Chen, Cui, Li, & Rolfe, 2017). 
In this perspective, an institutional change implies a multi-stage 
process in which each stage results in a different institutional 
environment and logic (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002; 
Hoffman, 1999) and in which the transition from each stage to the next 
may be at a different speed. Signaling theory indicates that 
governments, through their behavior, send signals to demonstrate 
they are making efforts to introduce reforms (Huang, 2013; Walsh, 
2007). Therefore, some governments promote institutions that 
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support the market quickly, to send signs of market efficiency and to 
show the government’s commitment to market liberalization 
(Banalieva et al, 2018). However, other governments that have already 
undergone a period of intensive pro-market reforms may then 
implement reforms more slowly because of pressure from 
stakeholders or a change in government mandate (Rajan & Zingales, 
2003). From the dynamic point of view, an institutional change is not 
as important as the speed at which this change takes place (Banalieva 
et al., 2015), and this speed may influence firm performance. 
1.2.4. Home country learning 
The literature has shown that companies generate new resources 
and capabilities through learning and experience. An important 
source of learning for MNEs is the home country (Cuervo-Cazurra et 
al., 2018), and this can be key in internationalization decisions 
(Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2018).  
According to Cuervo-Cazurra et al. (2018), we can differentiate 
two types of home country learning for MNEs: institutional and 
competitive learning. We define institutional learning as the 
experience acquired in the country of origin as a consequence of 
facing the peculiarities of home institutions. Subsidiaries of MNEs 
whose home countries have weak institutions have obtained 
institutional learning that can be valuable for competing in host 
countries with institutional gaps, unlike subsidiaries of MNEs from 
countries with more developed institutions (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 
2018). Some MNEs may use their exposure to weak and changing 
institutions in their home country as a source of competitive 
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advantage when expanding abroad (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008), 
which may result in institutional advantage (Martin, 2014). 
In the same way, we define competitive learning as the 
experience acquired in the home country as a result of exposure to 
high levels of competition that force the MNE to improve its 
competitiveness (Cuervo-Cazura et al., 2018). This competitive 
learning leads to the development of capabilities that facilitate the 
interaction with new competitors, products, and consumer 
preferences in the home country. These capabilities can be used in the 
future to face a new environment in the host country.  
 EMPIRICAL CONTEXT: THE MOBILE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 
The empirical analyses in the three main chapters presented in 
this doctoral thesis have been carried out in the global mobile 
telecommunications industry. This is an industry that has 
experienced impressive growth over the past two decades, and has 
been the focus of a growing amount of research (Birke & Swann, 2006; 
Fuentelsaz et al., 2015; Gómez et al., 2016; Kitchen, Martin, & Che-Ha, 
2015). 
The mobile telecommunications industry is especially 
appropriate as a research setting for several reasons. First, it is an 
industry with a high level of internationalization. For example, 52% 
of firms in this industry in the third quarter of 2017 were subsidiaries 
of MNEs. The internationalization of these MNEs has been recent. At 
the beginning of 2000, there were 56 MNEs operating in 142 countries 
with 293 entries, while in 2017, 76 MNEs were present in 205 
countries, with a total of 926 entries. This means that 68.4% of the 
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entries were made during the period analyzed in this thesis. This 
international expansion has occurred mainly through CBAs, because 
of government restrictions. Entry through a greenfield investment is 
only possible when a new license is available in a market. Thus, 
greenfield investments are limited to certain time windows when 
license auctions take place (Claussen, Köhler, & Kretschmer, 2018). In 
addition, the MNEs in this industry carry out their activity across all 
five continents, which assists with our research proposals, since it 
allows a high institutional variability in the host countries in which 
the subsidiaries compete. 
Secondly, although the internationalization in the industry 
began with FDI by MNEs from advanced economies (for example, 
Deutsche Telekom from Germany, Orange from France, Telefónica 
from Spain, and Vodafone from the United Kingdom), during the last 
twenty years MNEs from emerging countries have gained leading 
positions in the industry (for example, América Móvil of Mexico, 
Bharti Airtel of India, and Zain of Kuwait). The same pattern is 
observed in the selection of the host countries, with MNEs increasing 
their presence in emerging economies during recent years. 
Thirdly, it is an industry where first-mover advantages have 
been empirically confirmed (Gómez & Maícas, 2011; Whalley & 
Curwen, 2012). Early entrants have significant advantages, and it is 
difficult for late entrants to overcome these advantages as a result of 
the existence of isolating mechanisms (Atiyas & Doğan, 2007; 
Bijwaard, Janssen, & Maasland, 2008; Whalley & Curwen, 2012). In 
addition, this industry allows us to identify the entry timing of each 
firm in the market. In this way, we can identify the moment of entry 
of the targets and the leading time since the entry of the pioneer. 
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Fourthly, it is an industry that allows us to identify the company 
that introduced a new technology to the market, which is important 
for the development of the study in Chapter 2. The most important 
technological change in the industry, the transition from the second 
(2G) to the third generation (3G), took place during the last decade. 
This technological change allowed consumers to use the Internet on 
their devices and led to the progressive replacement of voice by text 
for data exchange services (Fuentelsaz, Maícas, & Polo, 2008). 
Finally, as competition takes place at the national level, 
geographical boundaries allow a better definition of the scope of 
competition in a market. As the number of competitors in each 
country is generally limited, it is possible to quantify the number of 
direct rivals and their market shares. In addition, the degree of rivalry 
is heterogeneous in all countries, which allows us to prove the extent 
to which the origin of MNEs in countries with high levels of 
competition could be a source of competitive learning to allow those 
MNEs to adapt better to market-friendly reforms.  
Regarding the samples, we employ the GSMA Intelligence 
Database (2018) to build our databases. The GSMA Intelligence is a 
source of mobile operator data, analysis and forecasts. With over 26 
million individual data points (updated daily), the service provides 
coverage of the performance of more than 1,400 operators and 1,200 
MVNOs (mobile virtual network operators) across 4,400 networks, 80 
groups and 237 countries and territories worldwide (GSMA 
Intelligence, 2018). 
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 THESIS STRUCTURE 
This doctoral thesis aims to deepen our knowledge of the 
strategy followed by MNEs. In the next chapters, we focus on the 
main internationalization mechanism adopted by MNEs in recent 
years, namely CBAs, as well as on the key role played by the 
environment of both the host and the home country. Figure 1.1 shows 
a summary of the structure of the thesis, which is explained below. 
The thesis is composed of five chapters. Chapter 1, Introduction, 
explains the main objective and contribution of this thesis, positioning 
it in the strategy and international business literature. This 
introductory chapter also presents the theoretical and empirical 
context in which the research takes place, explaining the theories 
employed and justifying the choice of the mobile telecommunications 
industry for the purpose of the research. 
Chapter 2 is entitled Ownership in Cross-Border Acquisitions and 
Entry Timing of the Target Firm. In this chapter we examine how the 
entry timing of the target influences the initial and the post-entry 
percentage of ownership acquired by the multinational. We argue that 
targets that have entered into the market earlier send signals of lower 
uncertainty in contexts where first-mover advantages exist. As a 
consequence, MNEs are willing to buy higher levels of ownership in 
these early entrant targets, and to increase their participation in the 
subsidiary in the post-entry stage. We find support for these 
relationships and we also confirm how the market age and the 
innovative behaviour of the target reduce the importance of leading 
time as a determinant of the ownership decision. 
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The contribution of this first empirical study is threefold. First, 
while previous studies on ownership decisions have mainly focused 
on ownership determinants at country and MNE level, here we focus 
on an attribute of the target firm, namely the time elapsed between 
the entry of the pioneer and the entry of the target company into the 
market. This is a key factor that influences current and potential 
performance in industries where first-mover advantages exist 
(Gómez & Maícas, 2011). In this way, we integrate the literature on 
first-mover advantages into the analysis of the ownership strategy for 
cross-border acquisitions, responding to the call of Zachary et al. 
(2015) for the incorporation of a broader view in the analysis of market 
entry. Second, we incorporate a dynamic perspective in the study by 
analyzing the effect of the entry timing not only on the initial level of 
ownership acquired, but also on the variation in ownership in the 
post-entry period. Although recent literature has begun to analyze the 
variation of ownership strategies over time, the effect of the entry 
timing on this dynamic process has not previously been analyzed. 
Finally, as the market matures and subsidiaries introduce new 
technologies, the advantages of being a pioneer erode. This will make 
the entry timing less relevant as a determinant of the ownership 
decision. 
Chapter 3, Ownership in Cross-Border Acquisitions by Emerging 
Multinationals, also focuses on CBAs as the most frequent entry mode. 
Although prior studies on CBAs have analyzed the determinants of 
ownership strategies, there is still a quest for evidence on how the 
differences between the characteristics of the home and the host 
markets affect the percentage of ownership. Prior studies have 
acknowledged that entering host countries with greater uncertainty 
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makes multinationals reluctant to acquire high levels of ownership in 
subsidiaries. Nevertheless, EMNEs are usually used to operating 
under greater levels of uncertainty than AMNEs. This may imply that, 
when entering an emerging host country, an EMNE will be more 
likely to acquire a higher level of ownership than an AMNE. We use 
the mobile telecommunications industry as our research setting to 
provide empirical evidence of the interaction effect of the advanced 
versus emerging nature of the host and home countries on the 
ownership percentage acquired in CBAs. Our results confirm that the 
characteristics of both the home and the host countries are relevant in 
explaining the ownership strategies of MNEs. 
The main contribution of Chapter 3 is twofold. First, we provide 
empirical evidence for the recent debate on whether the 
internationalization strategies followed by EMNEs are similar to the 
traditional patterns of AMNEs (Guillen & Garcia-Canal, 2009; 
Ramamurti, 2012), and analyze the extent to which EMNEs differ 
from AMNEs in their ownership strategies in emerging countries. 
Secondly, our research centers on the global mobile 
telecommunications industry, and includes a large number of telecom 
MNEs and countries. This allows us to expand the prior studies in two 
ways – first, by considering how the effect of the level of development 
of the host and the home countries determines an MNE’s ownership 
strategy in a regulated industry, and second, by extending the 
analysis to an international setting. Previous studies have usually 
been limited to a few firms or countries (Jakopin, 2008). Our study 
includes 53 mobile groups that come from 35 home countries and 
have invested in 82 host countries. 
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Chapter 4, the third empirical study, is entitled Speed of 
Institutional Change and Subsidiary Performance: The Impact of Home 
Country Learning. This chapter examines the role played by home 
country learning in the relationship between the speed of institutional 
change and subsidiary performance. Building our reasoning on the 
literature on the dynamic institution-based view and institutional 
advantages, we argue that a higher speed of change in market-
supporting institutions reduces subsidiary performance. We posit 
that some subsidiaries can take advantage of the institutional and 
competitive learning that their parent multinational enterprises have 
obtained in their home countries to face institutional changes. 
Specifically, our analysis focuses on the origin of multinationals – 
either in highly competitive countries or in emerging countries. Our 
research takes a wide approach by including the effect of the speed of 
institutional change in 144 countries in the mobile 
telecommunications industry. 
The contribution of Chapter 4 is twofold. First, under the lens of 
the dynamic institution-based view, we analyze the importance of 
home country learning in reducing the negative effect of rapid 
institutional change on subsidiary performance. We respond to the 
call to incorporate the home country conditions in the institutional 
change research, as well as the need to deepen our understanding of 
the relationship between institutional changes and firm performance 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, Gaur, & Singh, 2019). To our knowledge, our 
research is the first attempt to analyze the extent to which subsidiaries 
can benefit from the institutional advantages developed by their 
parent MNEs in their home countries as a consequence of their 
competitive and institutional learning. Second, we provide additional 
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empirical support for the dynamic institution-based view of 
ownership strategy. While prior studies have focused on emerging 
economies (Banalieva et al., 2018) or subnational regions (Banalieva et 
al., 2015), we use a wide sample that includes 352 subsidiaries from 
77 MNEs located in 144 developed and emerging economies from 
2001 to 2017.  
Figure 1.1. Global structure of the doctoral thesis 
 
Finally, Chapter 5 contains our Summary and Conclusions and 
gives a general review of the arguments and results obtained in the 
doctoral thesis. In addition, Chapter 5 presents the conclusions and 
practical implications deriving from the dissertation that may be 
useful for policy makers and managers. 
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Cross-border acquisitions (CBAs), as key mechanisms in the 
internationalization of multinational enterprises (MNEs), have 
received increasing attention from international business literature 
(Cuypers, Ertug, & Hennart, 2015; Lahiri, Elango, & Kundu, 2014; 
Powell & Rhee, 2016). One of the most important decisions that firms 
have to take when they face a CBA is the level of equity ownership, 
as it has implications in terms of control, risk and resource 
commitment (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986) and the likelihood of 
survival (Li, 1995). In order to select the adequate level of ownership, 
MNEs should balance the expected benefits and the costs derived 
from different levels of ownership (Chari & Chang, 2009), assessing 
the contribution of the acquisition in the generation of competitive 
advantages and the subsequent risks. These risks increase in contexts 
where assessment of the potential value provided by the acquisition 
is more complex. In contrast to domestic acquisitions, MNEs that 
expand abroad through CBAs have to cope with higher levels of 
uncertainty derived from the differences in economic, social and 
political structures compared to their home countries (Shimizu, Hitt, 
Vaidyanath, & Pisano, 2004). This uncertainty can be seen both from 
an ex ante and an ex post perspective (Chari & Chang, 2009). Ex ante 
uncertainty is related to information asymmetries and adverse 
selection problems, while ex post uncertainty refers to problems of 
moral hazard and opportunism related to managers’ discretion in 
post-acquisition decisions. Both types of uncertainty make it difficult 
for MNEs to assess the potential of value creation in CBAs, and reduce 
the incentives to acquire high levels of ownership in the new 
subsidiary (Chari & Chang, 2009). 
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Identifying the factors that influence the uncertainty that 
acquirers face will help companies to improve their decision-making 
process. Previous studies have identified several external and internal 
factors that influence the percentage of ownership held by MNEs (Xie, 
Reddy, & Liang, 2017). Malhotra and Gaur (2014) demonstrate how 
geographic distance influences both ex ante and ex post uncertainty. 
Similarly, other authors demonstrate that environmental distance 
favours or diminishes the level of uncertainty that affects the firm in 
its decision (Dow, Cuypers, & Ertug, 2016; Liou, Chao, & Yang, 2016). 
Other external factors, such as country risk (Chari & Chang, 2009), 
institutional pressures (Chan & Makino, 2007) and political influences 
(Pan et al., 2014), have been considered. The literature has also 
analysed the role in the ownership decision of MNE-level factors, 
such as international experience in different environments (Powell & 
Rhee, 2016) and the adoption of English as an external reporting 
language in the company (Jeanjean et al., 2015). However, these prior 
studies have mainly focused on characteristics of home and host 
markets and on the attributes of the acquirer firm, ignoring the study 
of one of the key parties influencing the level of uncertainty—the 
target firm. Except for one study (Chari & Chang, 2009), the influence 
of the target firm’s characteristics in the decision on level of 
ownership acquired by the MNE has been underexplored.  
Targets possess attributes that can impact the ex ante and ex post 
uncertainties of the acquisition process and thus influence MNEs’ 
incentives to acquire a higher or lower level of ownership. In contexts 
where first-mover advantages exist, earlier entrants obtain a higher 
performance than late newcomers (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988, 
1998). The entry timing of the target firm can act as a signal for its 
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potential to be profitable in the future, reducing uncertainty and thus 
increasing the MNE’s willingness to hold a higher level of ownership. 
To our knowledge, an analysis of entry timing has not been 
previously integrated into the study of equity ownership in CBAs. 
Furthermore, previous studies have adopted a static viewpoint 
by focusing on the initial ownership acquired by MNEs. In contrast, 
this research insists on the importance of considering the CBA as a 
dynamic process that begins with selection of the target and 
negotiation of the initial level of equity to acquire, and continues with 
the post-acquisition period during which the MNE should integrate 
the subsidiary into its organizational structure (Shimizu et al., 2004). 
After the initial acquisition, where ex ante and ex post uncertainties can 
be seen as key factors in determining the ownership initially acquired, 
MNEs’ perception of the potential of the target to generate value may 
change as a consequence of learning; thus, MNEs might adapt their 
levels of ownership to the perceived uncertainty. For instance, Inkpen 
and Beamish (1997) posit that partial ownership is usually turned into 
full ownership as MNEs gain knowledge of the local conditions and 
as partner dependency decreases. Other studies show that companies 
complete acquisitions sequentially, not all in one go at the outset (Xu, 
Zhou, & Phan, 2010). In this vein, studies have recently started to 
analyse the changing position of MNEs’ commitment when 
developing CBAs to gain strategic flexibility. As MNEs face initial ex 
ante and ex post uncertainty, they prefer to enter through low-
commitment modes. Once they have gained experience and 
information from the new market and partners, they can decide to 
increase their commitment (e.g. establish a wholly owned subsidiary), 
to decrease it or even to terminate the relationship (Petersen, Welch, 
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& Welch, 2000). Although recent studies have shed light on this topic 
(Li & Li, 2010; Puck, Holtbrügge, & Mohr, 2009; Putzhammer et al., 
2018; Santangelo & Meyer, 2011; Swoboda, Olejnik, & Morschett, 
2011), prior studies have not considered the role of entry timing of the 
target firm in signifying potential performance that can affect post-
entry ownership variations.  
The objective of our study is to analyse the effect of the entry 
timing of the target firm on the level of ownership held by the MNE 
when a CBA takes place by integrating the equity ownership and first-
mover literatures through a dynamic perspective. Firstly, we propose 
that, as the time elapsed between the entry of the pioneer and the 
target—the leading time—increases, the ownership of that target 
initially acquired by the MNE will be lower. Secondly, with the aim 
of incorporating a dynamic perspective into the study, we also 
analyse the effect of leading time on variations in the level of 
ownership after the initial acquisition. Finally, given that first-mover 
advantages erode with market age and the introduction of new 
technologies (Gómez, Lanzolla, & Maícas, 2016), we expect that these 
two moderating factors will weaken the relationship between leading 
time and initial ownership and post-entry variations of ownership. 
The contribution of this article is twofold. Firstly, while previous 
studies on ownership equity have mainly focused on country-level 
and MNE-level determinants, we focus on a key target attribute—
namely, the leading time between the entry of the pioneer and that of 
the target into the market. This is a key variable that influences current 
and potential performance in those industries where first-mover 
advantages exist (Gómez & Maícas, 2011). In this way, we integrate 
the first-mover advantages literature into the analysis of ownership 
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strategy in CBAs, responding to the Zachary et al.’s (2015) call for a 
broader view of business entry. These literatures have usually been 
treated independently, with the exception of Isobe, Makino, and 
Montgomery (2000), who find a negative relationship between the 
degree of a foreign firm’s control over a joint venture and the early 
entry of this foreign firm in an emerging market.  
Secondly, we incorporate a dynamic perspective into the study 
by analysing the effect of leading time not only on the initial level of 
acquired ownership, but also on the variation in ownership level in 
the post-entry period. Although prior literature has recently started 
to analyse variation in entry modes and ownership strategies over 
time, the effect of leading time on this dynamic process has not 
previously been analysed. Moreover, as the market matures and 
subsidiaries introduce new technologies, first-mover advantages are 
eroded. This will make leading time less relevant as a determinant of 
the ownership decision.  
2.2.  LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.2.1. Initial ownership level in foreign market entry 
Choosing the initial level of ownership in a CBA is an important 
decision when MNEs enter into foreign markets. Acquisition of a 
higher level of ownership in the target firm allows complete control 
over operations, facilitating carrying out the functions of management 
within the company and access to a greater percentage of the profits; 
but it also entails greater risks and costs due to the commitment of 
resources and a lack of flexibility (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). 
Alternatively, a lower level of ownership provides access to 
complementary resources that were not previously available and 
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facilitates the diversification of risks (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). 
The flip side of a lower level of ownership is that it leads to potential 
opportunistic costs associated with the post-acquisition integration, 
and to a lack of control. Previous studies have analysed the optimal 
percentage of ownership held by MNEs in terms of these costs and 
profits, highlighting the role of market imperfections in this important 
decision (Chari & Chang, 2009; Li & Li, 2010). Market imperfections, 
such as adverse selection and moral hazard, result in higher 
transaction costs and arise from a lack of knowledge of the host 
country (Malhotra & Gaur, 2014). 
When MNEs expand to a new host market through a CBA, they 
often lack sufficient knowledge of the new context. The environment 
in their home country may be substantially different, which increases 
the challenge of understanding the complexities of doing business in 
the host country (Kostova, 1999; Mezias, 2002). Because of differences 
in culture, norms and regulations, political and social structures, or 
economic conditions, companies face the difficulties inherent in being 
foreign in the new environment (Hymer, 1960, 1976; Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977). The consequent information asymmetry does not allow 
them to assess properly the value of the acquired target and is 
manifested in two forms: the ex ante problem of adverse selection and 
the ex post problem of moral hazard. 
Ex ante uncertainty, rooted in the information economics 
literature (Akerlof, 1970), arises because acquirers need to gather 
information about the target firm, the industry in which it operates 
and the country where it is established (Shimizu et al., 2004). This 
information helps acquirers to evaluate and then manage the target 
firm. In an acquisition, targets have better information about 
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themselves than the acquirer has. The target company has greater 
incentives to disclose positive information to potential acquirers, 
which leads to an adverse selection problem (Balakrishnan & Koza, 
1993; Reuer & Koza, 2000). As a possible solution to asymmetric 
information, MNEs may buy a small share in the target firm. Prior 
shareholders of the subsidiary will retain higher levels of equity to 
transmit a credible signal of confidence about the quality of the target 
(Chen & Hennart, 2004).  
The ex post argument is grounded in the literature on 
transaction costs economics (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Hennart, 
1991; Williamson, 1979). After the MNE has acquired a subsidiary, the 
latter has tacit knowledge about the business that can be critical to 
working effectively in the local environment, and thus to the success 
of the firm. Local managers have an understanding of suppliers and 
governments, have prior experience in managing relationships with 
the local workforce, and are familiar with the preferences of 
consumers. Therefore, MNEs prefer to delegate responsibilities to 
them (Kogut & Singh, 1988). The acquirer has to face the risk of a 
change in the motivation and behaviour of local managers after the 
acquisition. This lower motivation comes from the erosion of 
managers’ incentives (Williamson, 1985) since, in the previously 
independent local company, they were subject to the discipline of the 
stock market and now they do not benefit from their direct interest in 
the ownership (Chari & Chang, 2009). In addition, Chen and Hennart 
(2004) point out that since acquisition contracts cannot be fully 
specified, managers of target firms may behave in an opportunistic 
way after the acquisition. Managers may delay the transfer of critical 
tacit assets such as knowledge and relationships with the local market 
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to continue to be useful to the acquirer. Anderson and Gatignon (1986) 
posit that to confront this internal uncertainty, the acquirer should 
know how to evaluate managers’ results and incentivize them. This 
may be easier in domestic acquisitions, but in a CBA it is necessary to 
have prior international experience to be able to identify and confront 
managers’ opportunistic behaviour. When international experience is 
low or home and host institutional contexts differ, low control levels 
can be more efficient (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). As a consequence, 
the acquirer will prefer to take less equity to preserve the incentives 
of the target company's managers to continue working with the same 
self-demanding levels as before the acquisition (Dow et al., 2016). 
In sum, when companies are faced with high uncertainty, shared 
ownership structures can be employed to reduce the problem of 
adverse selection and moral hazard, and MNEs will tend to acquire 
lower levels of ownership (Malhotra & Gaur, 2014). Shared ownership 
encourages the acquired firm to disclose accurate information and 
enhances co-operation in the post-acquisition phase.  
Previous literature has analysed factors that influence 
uncertainty and the subsequent ownership decision. For instance, 
geographic, institutional, linguistic and religious distances have been 
shown to increase uncertainty and reduce the level of ownership held 
by MNEs (Cuypers et al., 2015; Demirbag, Glaister, & Tatolu, 2007; 
Malhotra & Gaur, 2014), while MNE international experience 
increases the level of equity ownership (Powell & Rhee, 2016). 
However, these prior studies have mainly focused on characteristics 
of home and host markets and on the attributes of the acquirer firm, 
ignoring the study of one of the key parties influencing the level of 
uncertainty, the target firm. The influence of the characteristics of the 
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subsidiary in the decision on the level of ownership acquired by the 
MNE has been underexplored.  
2.2.2. Ownership variation during the post-entry time 
Once the acquirer has invested in the target firm, uncertainty 
may be reduced because the former can obtain direct information 
from the company, the local managers and the environment, which 
can lead to post-entry variation in its resource commitment in the 
subsidiary (Clark, Pugh, & Mallory, 1997; Petersen et al., 2000; Puck 
et al., 2009; Putzhammer et al., 2018; Swoboda et al., 2011). Therefore, 
acquirers that entered with low control modes can vary their 
ownership in the target firm once they gain experience and learning. 
This ability and preparedness to change ownership in the post-entry 
time has been conceptualized as “strategic flexibility” (Petersen et al., 
2000, p. 689). Although research in this field is still scarce, some 
authors have tried to determine the factors that influence post-entry 
changes in internationalization mode (Calof & Beamish, 1995; 
Petersen et al., 2000), in conversion from joint ventures to wholly-
owned subsidiaries (Puck et al., 2009), in increased ownership 
(Jeanjean et al., 2015; Song, 2017), or in divestment and termination 
(Belderbos & Zou, 2009; Petersen et al., 2000). Based on organizational 
learning and experiential learning theories, we can group the 
determinants of this variation in the resource commitment during the 
post-entry time into four categories: internal environment, external 
environment, managerial attitude and performance (Swoboda et al., 
2011). 
The internal environment refers to factors that are potentially 
under the control of a firm, such as strategy and resources (Calof & 
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Beamish, 1995). After entry, the MNE obtains direct information from 
the activity of the target and is able to better evaluate its performance 
and managers’ behaviour (Petersen et al., 2000), and the sources of 
uncertainty that existed prior to the entry tend to disappear. With this 
additional information, the MNE could decide to increase its resource 
commitment. It should be noted that the knowledge the MNE gains 
from the target can also be negative (e.g. because the MNE becomes 
aware that the initial valuation of the target was overestimated) and 
decide on disinvestment and even termination of the venture 
(Driffield, Mickiewicz & Temouri, 2016; Petersen et al., 2000). 
Regarding the external environment, changes in factors that are 
outside the direct control of the MNE, such as political stability, 
government policy or competition, could cause changes in ownership 
levels. Deterioration of environmental factors could lead to 
disinvestments, while their improvement could result in a greater 
commitment of resources (Calof & Beamish, 1995).  
Swoboda et al. (2011) also discuss about managerial attitudes as 
determinants of changes in ownership levels, where attitudes are 
defined as managers’ intentions, beliefs and feelings about 
commitment (Calof & Beamish, 1995). Decisions are not always made 
rationally. Sometimes, managers’ decisions are based on intuition, 
which can be equal to or more efficient than rational decisions (Dane 
& Pratt, 2007). The motivation to increase the commitment of 
resources may derive from managers’ personal perception of 
favourable conditions (Boddewyn, 1985), or by personal attitudes 
(Fletcher, 2001).  
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Finally, the performance achieved by the target firm can also 
influence the level of commitment (Swoboda et al., 2011). The current 
and potential performance of the target is a decisive variable to 
change their ownership level in the post-entry time. If MNEs estimate 
that the target has great potential performance in the future, the 
probability of increasing the resource commitment will be higher; 
however, if they estimate low future performance, the effect may be 
the opposite (Petersen et al., 2000). 
2.2.3. Entry timing and first-mover advantages 
The literature on entry timing has been extensive since the 
publication of Lieberman and Montgomery's seminal article in 1988. 
First-mover advantages arise when the pioneers in a market obtain 
benefits in terms of profitability, value creation or survival 
(Lieberman & Montgomery, 2013). These advantages derive from the 
exploitation of scale and learning economies and reputation 
advantages, the creation of customers’ switching costs, or the ability 
to create links with key stakeholders such as local government or 
suppliers (Gómez & Maícas, 2011; Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). 
There is also a literature that focuses on the existence of first-mover 
disadvantages (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988) that derive from the 
ability to ‘free-ride’ in first-mover investments, the resolution of 
technological and market uncertainty, the existence of technological 
discontinuities that provide ‘gateways’ to new entrants, and early 
entrants’ difficulties adapting to environmental changes (Lieberman 
& Montgomery, 1988). 
Focusing on a context where first-mover advantages exceed the 
disadvantages, academic research has identified three groups of 
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factors under which early entry is a profitable strategy (Suarez & 
Lanzolla, 2007). First, resources and capabilities at the firm level, such 
as management skills (Murthi, Srinivasan, & Kalyanaram, 1996) and 
product development skills (Robinson & Chiang, 2002) favour the 
exploitation of first-mover advantages. Second, environmental 
factors, such as market transparency, environmental uncertainty and 
the stage of the industry lifecycle determine the initial first-mover 
advantages enjoyed by the pioneer and their sustainability (Suarez & 
Lanzolla, 2007). Thirdly, isolating mechanisms prevent late entrants 
from catching up with the pioneers (Rumelt, 1987). The most widely 
accepted classification of isolating mechanisms (Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1988) is based on three different categories: a) 
technology leadership, through the learning and experience curve or 
the existence of R&D patents; b) the pre-emption of scarce assets, 
which includes the advantages of choosing niche markets or 
economies of scale derived from investment in equipment; and c) 
switching costs and buyer choice under uncertainty arising from the 
formation of habits in buyers and the firm’s reputation. 
Previous research has usually demonstrated the existence of a 
positive relationship between early entry and firm performance 
(García-Villaverde, Ruiz-Ortega, & Parra-Requena, 2012; Gómez & 
Maícas, 2011), but mixed or contradictory results can also be found. 
For this reason, researchers have tried to address the question of 
whether early-mover advantages are static or can be eroded (Ferrier, 
Smith, & Grimm, 1999). There are circumstances that cause the 
disadvantages of being early entrants to outweigh its advantages 
(Lieberman & Montgomery, 2013). External factors can undermine the 
persistence of first-mover advantages through their negative impact 
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on the effectiveness of isolating mechanisms (Gómez et al., 2016). 
Boulding and Christen (2003, 2008) show that, in more mature 
markets, the costs associated with late entry are compensated by some 
advantages associated with being a late entrant and conclude that 
pioneer advantages erode over time, usually after twelve to fourteen 
years. Similarly, Gómez et al. (2016) demonstrate that a technological 
discontinuity can reduce the sustainability of technological leadership 
or the effectiveness of resource pre-emption, negatively affecting the 
persistence of first-mover advantages.  
2.3.  HYPOTHESES 
2.3.1. Subsidiary entry timing and initial ownership level 
As noted, decisions about the initial level of acquired ownership 
are strongly conditioned by the existence of ex ante and ex post 
uncertainty resulting from information asymmetries. Information 
economics literature suggests that acquisitions are hazardous due to 
the adverse selection problem between acquirers and potential targets 
(see, for instance, Reuer & Ragozzino, 2008). Another source of 
uncertainty in these decisions is the existence of moral hazard because 
of managerial opportunism. In order to reduce this uncertainty, 
MNEs may choose to acquire lower levels of ownership in the target 
company (Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993; Chari & Chang, 2009). 
One way to deal with this uncertainty is to pay more attention to 
the characteristics of target firms. Recent studies have emphasized the 
importance of taking into account the role of the target company in 
strategic decisions (Cuypers, Cuypers, & Martin, 2017). Some target 
attributes may help MNEs to assess the potential of the company to 
generate future profitability better, decreasing ex ante and ex post 
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uncertainty. In a context of asymmetric information, and according to 
signalling theory (Spence, 1974; Riley, 2001), signals can be launched 
by companies to convey private information and improve the existing 
information imbalance. Empirically, Reuer and Ragozzino (2012) 
show that taking into account the signals launched by target firms 
reduces asymmetric information problems and allows MNEs to make 
better decisions about the level of ownership. MNEs should therefore 
pay attention to the attributes of the subsidiary with the aim of 
reducing the level of perceived uncertainty, which will increase the 
incentive to take higher control of the target company. 
In a context where first-mover advantages exist, one signal for 
MNEs of the potential of the target company will be its entry timing 
into the market. Early entrants are able to outperform late entrants in 
terms of profitability and market share (Lieberman & Montgomery, 
2013). The leading time between the entry of the pioneer and the entry 
of the target company provides valuable information for MNEs when 
they decide the level of ownership to acquire in the target firm. If the 
acquired firm is an early entrant, MNEs receive valuable additional 
information about its greater expected performance, which reduces 
the cost associated with obtaining information to overcome the 
problem of adverse selection. In addition, early entrants usually enjoy 
a better reputation (Kerin, Varadarajan, & Peterson, 1992). As a 
consequence, the problem of adverse selection will be reduced. On the 
one hand, a better reputation decreases the acquiring company’s costs 
derived from obtaining information about the target. On the other 
hand, the target firm enjoys a positive image, so it does not have as 
strong an incentive to retain ownership to transmit confidence to the 
acquirer. Therefore, when the subsidiary is an early entrant, MNEs 
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will perceive lower ex ante uncertainty than when it is a late entrant. 
Consequently, the initial ownership acquired will be lower as the 
leading time increases.  
When first-mover advantages exist and the target firm is an early 
entrant, its advantage will depend on resources and capabilities that 
have been built over time, such as technological leadership, exclusive 
access to strategic geographical locations, reputation and pre-emption 
of scarce resources, among others (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). 
Thus, the success of the company will depend more heavily on the 
entry timing than on the specific skills of local managers and their 
incentives to collaborate after the entry. Even the resignation of a local 
manager in the post-entry period would not reduce the value of the 
assets acquired, reducing the moral hazard linked to ex post 
uncertainty. Therefore, when the subsidiary is an early entrant, MNEs 
will perceive lower ex post uncertainty. Thus, the initial ownership 
acquired will be lower as the leading time increases. 
As a consequence, ex ante and ex post uncertainties surrounding 
ownership acquisitions increase with the leading time—that is, the 
time elapsed from the entry of the pioneer and the entry of the 
subsidiary into the focal market. Consequently, MNEs will acquire a 
lower level of ownership when the target has entered later into the 
market than when it was an early entrant. 
Hypothesis 1. The percentage of ownership initially acquired is 
negatively related to the leading time between the entry of the pioneer 
and the entry of the target.  
Chapter 2. Ownership in CBAs and Entry Timing of the Target Firm 
52 
2.3.2. Subsidiary entry timing and ownership variation during 
post-entry time 
The extant literature has shown that many acquisitions are 
carried out sequentially to deal with information asymmetries (Xu et 
al., 2010). Although MNEs commit resources at the initial acquisition, 
they can change its ownership over time, either increasing or reducing 
it according to the information obtained from the new subsidiary and 
its environment (Belderbos, Tong, & Wu, 2019; Putzhammer et al., 
2018; Song, 2017). During post-entry time, MNEs will obtain more 
precise information about the internal conditions and the external 
environment of the subsidiary, which can allow MNEs to better assess 
its potential to take advantage of the new opportunities available. This 
new information may lead to positive or negative variations in the 
ownership held by the MNE in the target firm (Swoboda et al., 2011). 
First, with regard to the internal conditions of the target firm, the 
possession of first-mover advantages is observed by the MNE before 
the initial acquisition based on the available market information and 
the data that the target provides to the acquirer. Nevertheless, adverse 
selection may bias this information (Petersen et al., 2000). In the post-
entry period, the MNE obtains direct information about the target, 
helping it to assess the existence and scope of first-mover advantages 
and the resources and capabilities that can help to maintain them over 
time. For example, MNEs can better assess the level of explorative 
capabilities possessed by subsidiaries, which previous studies have 
shown to be positively related to potential performance (Lisboa, 
Skarmeas, & Lages, 2011). Subsidiaries that entered earlier in the 
market and enjoy first-mover advantages possess specific skills, 
knowledge and greater experience and, therefore, they have 
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developed higher explorative capabilities than later entrants in both 
market and product development. The confirmation of the existence 
of explorative capabilities constitutes a signal of positive expected 
performance. Subsequently, MNEs are willing to increase their 
resource commitment in these subsidiaries. Likewise, the existence of 
key intangible assets possessed by early entrants, which could not be 
previously observed (just inferred) -such as technological capabilities 
that lead to first-mover advantages (Lieberman and Montgomery, 
1988)- may also be confirmed. These explorative capabilities and 
intangible resources possessed by early entrants are a source of future 
market value and financial performance (Tahat, Ahmed, & Alhadab, 
2018), which can motivate MNEs to increase their ownership once 
they are verified. 
Second, after the initial acquisition, the acquirer also obtains 
direct information regarding the external environment in which the 
subsidiary develops its activity. Since a lack of familiarity with the 
host country conditions is one of the reasons of initially acquiring 
lower levels of ownership in CBA (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986), once 
the MNE gains experience in the host country and confirms its 
positive expectations about the subsidiary, we can expect that MNEs 
will be willing to acquire higher levels of ownership (Song, 2017). 
However, it should be noted that host countries differ in terms of their 
environmental stability (Makino, Isobe, & Chan, 2004). According to 
Swoboda et al. (2011), MNEs change their ownership positions 
depending on the evolution of environmental conditions, such as 
government regulations (Puck et al., 2009), corruption levels (Driffield 
et al., 2016) and labor costs (Song, 2017). Although these external 
changes can create shocks in the market, Vecchiato (2015) posits that 
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early entrants have been able to develop dynamic capabilities to 
anticipate and better adapt to the environmental shocks than late 
entrants as they have been competing in the market for a longer time 
and so have greater experience. For this reason, MNEs will have more 
incentives to increase their ownership in early entrants once first 
mover advantages have been confirmed since the dynamic 
capabilities developed serve to counteract the uncertainty that comes 
from a changing environment.  
To summarize, after the initial acquisition, MNEs can better 
evaluate the potential of the subsidiary to generate future profitability 
and to counteract environmental changes that could diminish it. 
Driffield et al. (2016) insist on the importance of a target’s 
characteristics to explain changes in ownership levels. Our logic is 
that those subsidiaries that are early entrants in a market may have 
developed valuable skills and resources that launch signals 
concerning higher future profitability. Among them, we can mention 
explorative capabilities that facilitate the identification of market 
opportunities, technological capabilities to exploit these opportunities 
and dynamic capabilities to identify and better adapt to 
environmental changes. Although MNEs can infer the possession of 
these valuable assets at the moment of the initial acquisition based on 
the target’s financial statements, MNEs can only corroborate the 
existence of these resources after the initial acquisition. When first-
mover advantages exist and MNEs verify them, MNEs will be willing 
to commit more resources to early entrants than to late entrant 
subsidiaries during the post-entry period since the sources of 
uncertainty are reduced. In this context, the size of these first mover 
advantages are often linked to the leading time between the entry of 
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the pioneer and that of the subsidiary. Conversely, the advantages 
diminish when the subsidiary delays its entrance into the market, 
which reduces the incentives to buy higher shares of ownership. 
Hypothesis 2. The variation in the percentage of ownership after the 
initial acquisition is negatively related to the leading time between the 
entry of the pioneer and the entry of the subsidiary. 
2.3.3. The moderating effect of market age 
Previous studies have found that early entry advantages 
dissipate over time (Brown & Lattin, 1994; Huff & Robinson, 1994; 
Robinson & Fornell, 1985). The main reason for this is that the 
isolating mechanisms that allow first-mover advantages (i.e. pre-
emption of scarce assets, switching cost and technological leadership) 
(Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988) weaken over time as the market 
matures. If isolating mechanisms fail and first-mover advantages are 
eroded, the leading time will lose its value in reducing uncertainty 
and signalling potential performance. 
Isolating mechanisms might lose value with market age for 
different reasons. Firstly, early-mover targets can pre-empt scarce 
assets. This confers early entrants a strong market position that, at the 
same time, constitutes an obstacle for followers to overcome 
(Boulding & Christen, 2003). Nevertheless, the appearance of new 
consumers and a change in preferences will widen the market and 
weaken the initial position of early entrants, thus decreasing first-
mover advantages. Secondly, switching costs, which arise when 
consumers face additional costs to change from early entrants to a 
new firm due to procedural, financial and relational costs (Burnham, 
Frels, & Mahajan, 2003), might also decrease over time. Late entrants 
Chapter 2. Ownership in CBAs and Entry Timing of the Target Firm 
56 
have to invest resources and time to attract established consumers, 
which reduces their performance. However, when the market 
matures, consumers are more familiar with the products and the 
competitors that supply them, which will erode the existing first-
mover advantages. Thirdly, early entrants can enjoy technological 
leadership in terms of the experience curve (Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1988). As a consequence of learning economies, early 
entrants are able to produce more efficiently due to an increase in 
cumulative production. This allows early entrants to reduce costs in 
comparison to late entrants and enjoy higher profitability (Ghemawat 
& Spence, 1985). However, as time passes, later entrants also learn and 
are able to develop their own experience curves. Therefore, first-
mover advantages derived from experience decrease progressively, 
finally disappearing. Thus, the advantages of early entrants may be 
eroded over time.  
As a consequence, leading time loses importance as a 
determinant of uncertainty and potential performance because 
isolating mechanisms are weakened and first-mover advantages are 
eroded. Consequently, although MNEs could have more incentives to 
hold higher levels of ownership in subsidiaries with lower leading 
time (both at the initial entry and during the post-entry period), this 
negative relationship will be less negative as the market matures. 
Hypothesis 3a. Market age positively moderates (i.e. weakens) the 
relationship between the percentage of ownership initially acquired by 
an MNE and the leading time between the entry of the pioneer and the 
entry of the subsidiary. 
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Hypothesis 3b. Market age positively moderates (i.e. weakens) the 
relationship between the variation of percentage of ownership after the 
initial acquisition and the leading time between the entry of the pioneer 
and the entry of the subsidiary. 
2.3.4. The moderating effect of the introduction of a new 
technology 
In addition to market age, the increasing dynamism of many 
industries makes first-mover advantages hard to maintain (Suarez & 
Lanzolla, 2007). For example, previous studies agree that rapid 
technological evolution makes it difficult for early entrants to 
maintain any advantage (Fosfuri, Lanzolla, & Suarez, 2013). The 
introduction of a new technology constitutes an important factor that 
can erode first-mover advantages (Lavie, 2006), impairing the 
effectiveness of isolating mechanisms. There are several reasons for 
this erosion. Firstly, new technologies reduce the likelihood of the pre-
emption of scarce assets being sustained. The emergence of new 
technologies may, for example, change the relationship of the 
company with its current providers, modifying the value of important 
resources, even leading to a change in these providers (Gómez et al., 
2016). Secondly, the effectiveness of switching costs will also be 
adversely affected. A new technology can affect experience 
(Wernerfelt, 1985) and the formation of preferences (Carpenter & 
Nakamoto, 1989), two antecedents of switching costs (Suarez & 
Lanzolla, 2007). New generations of products or services will appear 
and the existing ones will become obsolete (Anderson & Tushman, 
1990). Thirdly, technological leadership is probably the isolating 
mechanism that can fail most often as a result of the introduction of a 
new technology. Firms that entered the market first will have gained 
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advantages derived from experience or learning curves, obtaining a 
privileged position. However, the introduction of a new technology 
decreases the value of prior experience and can result in advantages 
for those companies that introduced the technological discontinuity 
into the market (Christensen, 2013), even if they were late entrants. 
The innovative behaviour of a subsidiary through the 
introduction of a new technology provides a signal about its potential 
for obtaining future profitability, thus reducing uncertainty. If the 
new technology is successful, the subsidiary that first exploits it can 
achieve extraordinary results by destroying the benefits of prior 
technologies. This explains why companies that have advantages in 
old technologies are usually reluctant to introduce technological 
changes that can cannibalize the previous profitability (Christensen, 
1997; Hill & Rothaermel, 2003). A subsidiary that introduces a new 
technology into the market assumes risks, but it can achieve a 
technological leadership to obtain extraordinary profits in the future 
by eroding the advantages of prior entrants. As a consequence, the 
introduction of a new technology by a subsidiary launches a positive 
signal that increases its attractiveness for current and potential 
investors (Reuer & Ragozzino, 2012).  
In sum, the introduction of a new technology erodes first-mover 
advantages and reduces the negative impact of leading time on the 
level of ownership in a subsidiary held by MNEs. Target companies 
that introduce new technologies will be especially attractive for the 
acquiring MNE, with the subsequent incentive to acquire higher 
levels of ownership initially and to increase the level of ownership 
held in these targets, even if they are late movers.  
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Hypothesis 4a. The introduction of a new technology by a subsidiary 
positively moderates (i.e. weakens) the relationship between the 
percentage of ownership initially acquired by a MNE and the leading 
time between the entry of the pioneer and the entry of the subsidiary. 
Hypothesis 4b. The introduction of a new technology by a subsidiary 
positively moderates (i.e. weakens) the relationship between the 
variation of the percentage of ownership after the initial acquisition and 
the leading time between the entry of the pioneer and the entry of the 
subsidiary. 
2.4. SAMPLE, METHODS AND VARIABLES 
2.4.1. The mobile communications industry 
The empirical analysis is carried out in the mobile 
communications industry. The available data offer the quarterly 
evolution from 2000 to 2016 in the ownership structure of 59 
subsidiaries in which 36 MNEs participated as a result of 90 CBAs in 
50 countries.2 Accordingly, we have a total of 90 observations of the 
initial ownership acquired and 2,231 observations referring to the 
ownership held by MNEs in each one of the subsidiaries for each 
period after the initial acquisition. Our information comes from 
multiple sources, but the main one is the GSMA Intelligence (2018) 
dataset. This publication gathers information on several variables of 
interest, such as the existing telecommunications MNEs, the 
ownership held in each subsidiary, and the date of entry of each 
subsidiary into each market and technology. The information about 
                                                          
2 See Appendix 1 for a detailed list of the different host and home countries included in the 
sample. It should be noted that GSMA only provides information at the national level. As 
a consequence, countries where competition takes place at subnational level, such as the 
United States, Canada, Brazil or India, cannot be included in our sample of host countries. 
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CBAs and entry timing is complemented by industry and corporate 
reports. Other sources of information, such as the Heritage 
Foundation and the World Development Indicators databases, have 
been used for control variables. 
 The mobile communications industry has seen impressive 
growth in the last two decades, and it has been the focus of attention 
of an increasing number of researchers (Birke & Swann, 2006; 
Fuentelsaz, Garrido, & Maícas, 2015; Gómez et al., 2016; Kitchen, 
Martin, & Che-Ha, 2015). This industry is especially appropriate for 
our research purposes for several reasons. Firstly, it is an industry 
with a high level of internationalization. For instance, 52 per cent of 
firms in the third quarter of 2017 were subsidiaries of 
telecommunications MNEs. The internationalization of these MNEs 
has been recent. At the beginning of 2000, there were 56 MNEs 
operating in 142 countries with 293 entries, while at the end of 2016, 
76 MNEs were present in 205 markets, with a total of 926 entries. This 
means that 68.4 per cent of entries have taken place during the period 
under analysis. Moreover, this international expansion has mainly 
taken place through CBAs because of government restrictions.3  
Secondly, first-mover advantages have been demonstrated to 
exist in an industry where competition takes place at the national level 
(Gómez & Maícas, 2011; Whalley & Curwen, 2012).4 It has been 
                                                          
3 In this industry, governments usually determine the number of competitors. Companies 
that operate in each national market must obtain a licence to develop their activity, since 
the radio spectrum is considered a scarce resource (Gruber, 2005). The government decides 
the number and types of licences. At the European level, for instance, usually only three or 
four firms operate in each country. This means a restriction to the entry of new competitors 
through greenfields and makes CBAs the most frequent entry mode in this industry. For 
the countries included in our sample, only 35 per cent of entries were greenfields. 
4 Consumers can only choose between competitors that operate in the same geographical 
market where they are located. This explains why the analysis of first-mover advantages 
in this industry has been limited to country-level competition (Gómez & Maícas, 2011). 
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argued that early movers possess significant advantages that late 
entrants have found difficult to overturn as a consequence of isolating 
mechanisms (Atiyas & Doğan, 2007; Bijwaard, Janssen, & Maasland, 
2008; Whalley & Curwen, 2012).5  
Thirdly, this industry allows a detailed identification of the entry 
timing of each firm from the beginning of the industry in the 1990s. 
We are thus able to identify the entry timing of subsidiaries and the 
leading time from the entry of the pioneer in each market. Moreover, 
this industry allows identification of the firm that introduced a new 
technology into the market. Over the last decade, the most important 
technological change in the industry has been the transition from the 
second (2G) to the third generation (3G), which allowed consumers to 
use the internet on their devices, and the progressive substitution of 
voice and text services by data exchange (Fuentelsaz, Maícas, & Polo, 
2008).  
2.4.2. Methods 
The empirical analysis is developed in two stages that consider 
the target firm of each CBA as the unit of analysis. In the first stage, 
we analyse the effect of leading time on the percentage of initial 
ownership acquired by a MNE when it enters a market (Hypothesis 
1) and the moderation effects of market age and the introduction of a 
new technology on this relationship (Hypotheses 3a and 3b). As the 
percentage of initial ownership is a limited dependent variable subject 
to an upper (100%) and a lower (10%) bound, a classic ordinary least 
squares regression model will give biased and inconsistent estimates 
                                                          
5 A robustness analysis (not shown) has been carried out to confirm the existence of early-
mover advantages in our sample. This analysis concludes that early entrants enjoy better 
results in this industry. 
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(Maddala, 1983). In this case, a Tobit regression analysis is 
recommended (Greene, 1993). This estimation technique has been 
adopted in prior studies that analyse the determinants of ownership 
levels (Chari & Chang, 2009; Cuypers et al., 2015; Dow et al., 2016; 
Malhotra & Gaur, 2014; Pan et al., 2014). 
The second stage analyses the effect of leading time on variation 
in the percentage of ownership during the post-entry period 
(Hypothesis 2) and the moderating effect of market age and the 
introduction of a new technology on the prior relationship 
(Hypotheses 3b and 4b). As we will explain in the next subsection, 
ownership variation is also a limited dependent variable subject to an 
upper (90%) and a lower (-90%) bound. This variation is analysed for 
each subsidiary over time, so we have a panel dataset with a limited 
dependent variable. To avoid the problem of unobservable 
heterogeneity, we use a random-effects Tobit estimation with panel 
data (Arellano, 2003). 
2.4.3. Dependent variables 
The dependent variable in the first stage is the percentage of 
initial ownership that the MNE (acquiring firm) acquires in the 
subsidiary (target firm). In line with recent studies (Cuypers et al., 
2015; Dow et al., 2016; Malhotra & Gaur, 2014), we use a continuous 
variable that is bounded between 10 per cent and 100 per cent.6  
Our dependent variable for the second stage is the variation in 
the percentage of ownership (ownership variation) that MNEs have 
                                                          
6 We follow the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) by considering the existence of a foreign direct 
investment when the multinational enterprise owns at least 10 per cent of the subsidiary’s 
equity.  
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after the initial acquisition. This variable is calculated quarterly for 
each subsidiary after the initial entry until the last quarter of 2016. The 
variable is measured as the difference between the percentage that the 
MNE held in that quarter and the initial percentage of ownership 
acquired by the MNE. It takes the value 0 if the MNE has not changed 
its investment in the subsidiary, a positive value when the MNE has 
increased its participation, and a negative value when the MNE has 
decided to sell some of its investment in that subsidiary. 
Consequently, the variable is bounded between -90 per cent and 90 
per cent. 
2.4.4. Independent variables 
Leading time. This variable is calculated as the number of quarters 
between the entry of the pioneer into the market and the entry of the 
subsidiary.7 We consider that a firm was the pioneer if it was the first 
entrant into the market. Market pioneers show a time lag of zero, with 
positive values for followers or late entrants. Leading time is a 
constant variable over time. This measure has been previously used 
for similar purposes (see, for instance, Deng & Wang, 2016; Jakopin & 
Klein, 2012; Lieberman & Montgomery, 2013; Zachary et al., 2015).  
Market age. This continuous variable reflects, in each period, the 
number of quarters elapsed since the emergence of the industry in 
each country—or, in other words, since the entry of the pioneer.8  
                                                          
7 As the market pioneer, we select the company that first entered into the second generation 
of mobile communications, given the scarce acceptance among consumers of the first 
generation (1G or analog), that only achieved a penetration rate of 0.92 per cent at the 
beginning of 1990 (Gómez & Maícas, 2011).  
8 For example, imagine that the pioneer enters the market in the first quarter of 2002 and a 
second operator enters in the first quarter of 2005. The variable market age will take the 
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New technology introduction. This variable is defined through a 
dummy that takes the value 1 if the subsidiary was the first firm to 
introduce 3G services and 0 otherwise. As we work with panel data 
in the second stage, this variable can change its value from 0 to 1 from 
the period that the target launched 3G services (if this happened 
during the post-entry time).9 
2.4.5. Control variables 
As in previous studies, our models control for subsidiary-, MNE- 
and market-specific characteristics that can influence the level of 
ownership held in the two stages, that is, at the time of entry and in 
the post-entry period. With regard to subsidiaries’ characteristics, we 
control for the subsidiary size, defined as the number of connections (in 
thousands) of the target firm in the market. Foreign firms will seek 
lower levels of ownership in local firms when these firms are larger 
than when they are smaller (Chari & Chang, 2009). We also control for 
the subsidiary performance measured through the EBITDA margin.10 
MNEs will tend to acquire higher levels of ownership in subsidiaries 
that show better performance, since this represents less uncertainty 
for the acquirer. In addition, previous literature has shown that 
subsidiary performance could be a determinant of the increase or 
decrease in the commitment of resources after the initial acquisition 
(Swoboda et al., 2011). 
                                                          
value 12 when the second operator enters the market. Market age is a time-varying variable 
that increases each quarter after the entry of the pioneer. 
9 If two or more subsidiaries in the same market introduced 3G services at the same time, 
this variable takes the value 1 for the two companies from the period in which they 
introduced 3G.  
10 The EBITDA margin is a ratio where the numerator is the total EBITDA obtained by the 
firm (total operating profit in the period before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization) 
and the denominator is the total revenue. 
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With regard to MNE characteristics, we control for prior presence 
in a given country since it is expected to positively influence the level 
of ownership held in subsequent entries into the same market (Kogut 
& Singh, 1988). Chen and Hennart (2004) consider that previous 
experience in the market can help MNEs to evaluate target firms 
better, which is expected to reduce uncertainty. To consider this 
possibility, we use a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the 
MNE had at least one subsidiary operating in the target firm’s country 
before the acquisition and 0 otherwise (Chari & Chang, 2009; Dow et 
al., 2016; Malhotra & Gaur, 2014). We also take into account the 
number of countries in which the MNE was operating as a measure 
of international experience. We expect that companies with more 
international experience will better manage the risks of foreign 
operations and will therefore prefer to acquire higher levels of 
ownership (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Kogut & Singh, 1988). 
Moreover, different levels of international experience can influence 
the subsequent decision to commit resources in the post-acquisition 
period (Putzhammer et al., 2018). Given that larger firms may 
perceive lower uncertainty in ownership decisions because of their 
greater product diversity, market power, experience or other resource 
endowments (Scherer & Ross, 1990), we also control for parent size, 
defined as the number of connections11 of the MNE in all markets 
where it is present.  
Referring to market characteristics, we have included variables 
that control for the conditions of the country where the subsidiary is 
located, as well as variables that control for the distance between the 
                                                          
11 Connections are measured by the number of SIM cards registered in the network of the 
subsidiary at the end of each period (GSMA Intelligence, 2017).  
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conditions of the host and the home country of the acquirer. With 
regard to the variables that refer to the host country where the CBA 
takes place, we first include the GDP per capita (in thousands), 
provided by the World Development Indicators (WDI) database 
(World Bank, 2018). Countries with higher GDP per capita are usually 
considered as having lower uncertainty, thus being more attractive to 
international investment (Chan & Makino, 2007). In order to control 
for the country risk that can influence the ownership decision 
(Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Dutta, Malhotra, & Zhu, 2016), we 
include the GDP per capita growth provided by the WDI database as a 
measure of economic fluctuations, as well as the political stability 
provided by the Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank, 
2018). Additionally, as the industry is more mature and the 
knowledge is widespread, MNEs have fewer incentives to acquire 
higher levels of ownership to protect innovations and specific assets 
than in early stages in the industry (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). To 
control for the maturity of the industry in the host market, we include 
demand growth (Li & Li, 2010) and level of competition by counting the 
number of firms present in each market at any given time (Gómez & 
Maícas, 2011; Gómez et al., 2016). We also control for the occurrence 
of a technological change in the market, because uncertainty increases 
when a shock occurs in the market. We understand that a 
technological change took place when 3G was introduced into the 
market, so the variable takes the value 0 before the introduction of 3G 
into the country and 1 thereafter. Finally, we proxy the level of 
regulatory restrictions on performing business in a country through 
one factor resulting from the three dimensions of the market openness 
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category of the Index of Economic Freedom obtained from the 
Heritage Foundation (Cebula & Clark, 2012).12  
We also control for the distance between home and host market 
conditions through different variables. Firstly, we include the 
geographic distance between home and host countries. Distance 
increases firms’ perceived uncertainty, as well as the agency and 
transaction costs for the acquirer (Malhotra & Gaur, 2014). In line with 
prior studies (Malhotra & Gaur, 2014; Malhotra, Sivakumar, & Zhu, 
2009; Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010), we measure geographic distance, 
according to the Geobytes database, as the distance in kilometres 
between the capital cities of the acquiring and the target country. We 
also include geographic distance squared because the cost and benefit 
trade-off of full versus partial ownership varies at different levels of 
geographic distance (Malhotra & Gaur, 2014).  
Secondly, it has been shown that when the linguistic and 
religious distances between the acquirer’s home country and the 
target’s home country are higher, the acquirer will tend to seek a 
lower equity share in the target (Dow et al., 2016). Accordingly, we 
include linguistic distance and religious distance measures in the 
analysis. Similar to previous studies (Dow et al., 2016), we use a 
composite index created by Dow and Karunaratna (2006) based on the 
distance between the main languages/religions of the two countries 
and the incidence of the main languages/religions of a country in 
another country (for more details, see Dow & Karunaratna, 2006; Dow 
                                                          
12 The Index of Economic Freedom focuses on four key aspects of the economic 
environment over which governments typically exercise policy control. This index is based 
on 12 quantitative and qualitative factors, grouped into four broad categories, or pillars, of 
economic freedom. One of these pillars is the open markets category that includes trade, 
investment and financial freedom. 
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et al., 2016).13 Thirdly, we include a measure of institutional distance 
(Xu, Pan, & Beamish, 2004). Following previous studies, we computed 
institutional distance as the absolute value of the difference between 
the Index of Economic Freedom of the home and the host countries 
(Jiang, Holburn, & Beamish, 2014). Finally, we include economic 
distance to control for differences between the GDP per capita in the 
home country of the MNE and the host country (Caves, 1996). 
Additionally, in the second stage model, we include a dummy 
variable to control for whether the MNE has a majority or minority 
initial ownership of the subsidiary. The incentives to increase the level 
of ownership may be different in the two cases. We can expect that 
once the MNE has reached a majority ownership—and control—in 
the initial acquisition, the incentives to increase the equity level will 
be lower than in cases where the MNE has entered through minority 
ownership and wishes to gain control. As the ownership variations 
will depend on the information and experience that the acquirer gains 
from the target firm after the initial entry (Petersen et al., 2000), we 
control the number of periods that have elapsed since the initial 
ownership acquisition through the variable post-acquisition time. As 
the last effect could be not linear, we include the second order variable 
post-acquisition time squared. Finally, we also include time and group 
effects, thus controlling for different business environments over time 
and groups. 
                                                          
13 Data were obtained 18 December 2018 from 
https://sites.google.com/site/ddowresearch 
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2.4.6. Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the initial ownership and ownership 
variation stages are shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. As can 
be seen in Table 2.1, the average initial ownership for the 90 CBAs in 
our sample is 63.98 per cent, with a standard deviation of 32.6 per 
cent, in line with previous studies (Chari & Chang, 2009; Malhotra & 
Gaur, 2014). During the post-entry time, on average, there is a positive 
ownership variation of 10.7 per cent, with values ranging between 
divestments of almost 20 per cent and increases of up to 78 per cent. 
Leading time from the entry of the pioneer ranges from 0 (for market 
pioneers) to 88 quarters (for market followers). The average values of 
independent variables and control variables are similar in both stages.  
Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics for the initial ownership model (N=90) 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Initial ownership 63.98 32.64 10.3 100 
Leading time 17.14 20.17 0 88 
Market age 49.59 18.56 18 89 
New technology introduction 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Subsidiary size 48.69 76.99 0.08 323.8 
Subsidiary performance 0.15 0.64 -3.43 0.81 
Prior presence 0.03 0.18 0 1 
International experience 14.06 9.64 1 43 
Parent size 81.99 100.2 0.07 480.1 
GDP per capita 21.69 25.65 0.55 111.9 
GDP per capita growth 2.96 3.33 -5.99 16.23 
Political stability -0.05 1.17 -2.30 1.52 
Demand growth 0.46 1.42 -0.13 13.57 
Competition 6.19 3.02 3 18 
Technological change 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Market openness 0.37 1.19 -2.90 2.11 
Geographic distance 0.39 0.38 0.02 1.70 
Geographic distance2 2.92 5.15 0.00 28.90 
Linguistic distance -0.78 1.51 -3.87 0.53 
Religious distance -0.31 0.97 -1.55 1.53 
Institutional distance 10.10 9.21 0.30 36.70 
Economic distance 22.82 20.45 0.12 95.90 
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Table 2.2. Descriptive statistics for the ownership variation model 
(N=2,231) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ownership variation 10.73 18.09 -17.2 78.3 
Leading time 14.13 16.81 0 88 
Market age 66.71 18.98 19 118 
New technology introduction 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Subsidiary size 96.02 158.6 0.06 1,526 
Subsidiary performance 0.13 3.92 -105 0.94 
Prior presence 0.02 0.16 0 1 
International experience 19.53 12.62 1 49 
Parent size 169.6 162.0 0.18 655.7 
Majority ownership 0.83 0.37 0 1 
Post-acquisition time 24.09 14.69 2 64 
Post-acquisition time2 795.8 850.9 4 4,096 
GDP per capita 22.10 23.89 0 109.04 
GDP per capita growth 2.41 3.98 -29.89 24.67 
Political stability 0.02 1.01 -2.68 1.53 
Demand growth 0.16 0.25 -0.38 1.77 
Competition 6.25 3.03 3 18 
Technological change 0.84 0.37 0 1 
Market openness 0.50 1.12 -2.91 2.23 
Geographic distance 0.36 0.41 0.02 1.88 
Geographic distance2 2.96 6.68 0.00 35.48 
Linguistic distance -0.92 1.58 -3.87 0.53 
Religious distance -0.50 0.88 -1.55 1.53 
Institutional distance 8.86 8.00 0 36.80 
Economic distance 23.72 19.23 0.001 111.9 
 
Correlations are shown in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. Table 2.3 shows the 
correlations for the initial ownership model, while Table 2.4 shows the 
correlations in the ownership variation model. The level of ownership 
initially acquired by an MNE and the ownership variation are 
negatively correlated with the leading time from the entry of the 
pioneer in the market. The correlation between independent variables 
remains moderate in most cases. Before estimating the regression 
models, we carried out a test for potential multicollinearity and found 
that the variance inflation factor in our models in the two stages was 
below 10 (the maximum VIF is 7.76 in the initial ownership model and 
6.98 in the ownership variation model), being the rule of thumb that 
suggests the presence of multicollinearity (Neter, Wasserman, & 
Kutner, 1990). Multicollinearity does not therefore pose a problem.  
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Table 2.3. Correlations for the initial ownership model (N=90) 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1 Initial ownership 1.00  
                     
2 Leading time -0.16 1.00  
                    
3 Market age -0.07 0.62* 1.00  
                   
4 New technology introduction -0.31* 0.02 0.11 1.00  
                  
5 Subsidiary size -0.21* -0.10 0.38* -0.04 1.00  
                 
6 Subsidiary performance 0.17 -0.63* -0.23* 0.01 0.20* 1.00  
                
7 Prior presence -0.00 -0.05 0.13 -0.06 0.34* 0.11 1.00  
               
8 International experience -0.07 -0.21* 0.13 0.10 0.33* -0.01 0.10  1.00  
              
9 Parent size 0.02 -0.15 0.28* 0.22* 0.30* 0.12 0.05  0.59* 1.00  
             
10 GDP per capita 0.20* 0.09 0.06 0.25* -0.15 -0.03 -0.05  -0.04 -0.02 1.00  
            
11 GDP per capita growth 0.05 -0.15 -0.04 0.09 -0.02 0.12 0.00  -0.04 -0.10 -0.42* 1.00  
           
12 Political stability 0.21* -0.07 -0.16 0.24* -0.20* 0.01 -0.08  -0.08 -0.01 0.65* -0.27* 1.00  
          
13 Demand growth -0.12 -0.10 -0.13 -0.09 -0.08 0.04 -0.04  0.05 -0.01 -0.18* -0.02 -0.21* 1.00  
         
14 Competition 0.10 0.09 0.15 -0.15 0.15 -0.03 0.32* -0.21* -0.13 -0.28* 0.24* -0.33* -0.04 1.00  
        
15 Technological change -0.10 0.36* 0.60* 0.32* 0.36* -0.17 0.07  0.21* 0.37* 0.16 -0.15 0.05 -0.20* 0.08  1.00  
       
16 Market openness 0.13 0.00 -0.01 0.28* -0.09 -0.01 -0.02  0.08 0.07 0.67* -0.48* 0.75* -0.16 -0.38* 0.10 1.00  
      
17 Geographic distance -0.29* -0.11 -0.06 0.33* 0.01 -0.05 -0.16  0.22* 0.29* -0.12 -0.07 -0.01 0.09 -0.10  -0.05 0.06 1.00  
     
18 Geographic distance2 -0.22* -0.10 -0.01 0.41* -0.02 -0.04 -0.10  0.23* 0.41* 0.06 -0.15 0.14 0.02 -0.11  0.00 0.20* 0.93* 1.00  
    
19 Linguistic distance -0.19* -0.03 -0.01 -0.14 0.25* -0.04 -0.01  0.04 -0.10 -0.10 -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.00  0.12 -0.09 -0.21* -0.30* 1.00  
   
20 Religious distance -0.37* -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 0.09 -0.06 0.04  0.05 0.13 -0.34* 0.15 -0.29* 0.03 0.01  0.04 -0.35* 0.16 -0.02 0.31* 1.00  
  
21 Institutional distance -0.40* 0.16 0.18* 0.12 0.01 -0.25* 0.12  0.05 -0.12 -0.18* 0.26* -0.21* 0.13 0.14  0.13 -0.16 0.08 -0.02 0.33* 0.43* 1.00  
 
22 Economic distance 0.01 0.17 0.29* 0.08 0.18* 0.04 -0.11  0.09 0.16 0.21* -0.05 0.08 -0.02 -0.07  0.32* 0.04 -0.12 -0.13 0.21* -0.01 0.11  1.00 
*p<0.1  
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Table 2.4. Correlations for the ownership variation model (N=2231) 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
1 Ownership variation 1.00  
                        
2 Leading time -0.03* 1.00  
                       
3 Market age 0.04* 0.45* 1.00  
                      
4 New technology 
introduction 
0.06* -0.01 0.17* 1.00 
                     
5 Subsidiary size 0.18* -0.02* 0.13* 0.01 1.00  
                    
6 Subsidiary performance 0.02 -0.11* 0.01 0.02 0.02* 1.00  
                   
7 Prior presence -0.05* 0.00 0.08* -0.06* 0.09* 0.01 1.00  
                  
8 International 
experience 
0.03* -0.12* 0.24* 0.11* 0.16* 0.04* 0.00  1.00 
                 
9 Parent size 0.06* -0.11* 0.33* 0.25* 0.23* 0.03* 0.01  0.65* 1.00  
                
10 Majority ownership 0.18* -0.01 0.10* -0.02* -0.12* -0.03 0.02  0.13* 0.05* 1.00  
               
11 Post-acquisition time 0.27* -0.11* 0.46* 0.24* 0.09* 0.05* -0.11* 0.22* 0.35* 0.14* 1.00  
              
12 Post-acquisition time2 0.26* -0.10* 0.48* 0.22* 0.05* 0.02* -0.09* 0.21* 0.21* 0.13* 0.95* 1.00  
             
13 GDP per capita -0.02 0.11* 0.06* 0.04* 0.01 0.00 0.03* 0.14* 0.05* 0.08* 0.05* 0.09* 1.00  
            
14 GDP per capita growth 0.02 -0.06* -0.03* -0.01 -0.03* -0.01 -0.01  -0.07* -0.06* -0.09* -0.10* -0.05* -0.11* 1.00  
           
15 Political stability 0.00 -0.01 0.03* 0.10* -0.05* 0.02* 0.01  0.01* -0.00 0.12* 0.08* 0.09* 0.63* 0.04* 1.00 
          
16 Demand growth -0.09* -0.09* -0.15* -0.16* -0.05* -0.01 -0.03* -0.13* -0.13* -0.14* -0.32* -0.10* -0.17* 0.09* -0.15* 1.00  
         
17 Competition -0.00 0.11* -0.04* -0.14* 0.03* -0.04* 0.14* -0.05* 0.03* -0.02* -0.06* -0.05* -0.12* 0.08* -0.25* 0.04* 1.00  
        
18 Technological change 0.06* 0.12* 0.45* 0.30* 0.31* -0.01 0.06* 0.31* 0.38* 0.10* 0.42* 0.29* 0.24* -0.12* 0.16* -0.31* 0.12* 1.00  
       
19 Market openness 0.08* 0.05* 0.12* 0.17* -0.05* 0.02* -0.04* 0.16* 0.07* 0.15* 0.17* 0.16* 0.62* -0.10* 0.60* -0.17* -0.18* 0.26* 1.00  
      
20 Geographic distance -0.13* -0.07* -0.10* 0.04* 0.03* -0.00 -0.09* 0.14* 0.18* -0.06* -0.08* -0.10* -0.15* -0.02* -0.06* 0.01* -0.12* -0.07* -0.06* 1.00  
     
21 Geographic distance2 -0.11* -0.04* -0.07* 0.03* 0.02* -0.00 -0.06* 0.13* 0.18* -0.04* -0.02* -0.04* 0.01 -0.02* 0.07* -0.01 -0.11* -0.00 0.06* 0.93* 1.00  
    
22 Linguistic distance 0.12* -0.07* -0.09* -0.07* 0.10* 0.00 0.01  0.07* -0.06* -0.14* -0.09* -0.09* -0.09* 0.08* -0.08* -0.01 -0.06* 0.00 -0.08* -0.03* -0.13* 1.00 
   
23 Religious distance -0.11* -0.06* -0.09* -0.12* 0.12*  0.02* 0.06* -0.01 0.14* -0.24* -0.19* -0.15* -0.36* 0.13* -0.33* 0.08* 0.06* -0.10* -0.41* 0.28* 0.12* 0.38* 1.00 
  
24 Institutional distance 0.03* -0.01 -0.05* -0.05* 0.07* 0.00 0.01  0.11* 0.25* -0.23* -0.03* -0.08* -0.18* 0.01* -0.25* 0.09* 0.03* -0.08* -0.29* 0.29* 0.21* 0.09* 0.24* 1.00 
 
25 Economic distance 0.03* 0.02 0.09* 0.07* 0.07* 0.03* -0.07* 0.27* 0.27* -0.08* 0.04* -0.01* 0.01 0.00  -0.09* -0.07* -0.00 0.17* -0.02* 0.11* 0.07* 0.10* 0.01 0.37* 1.00 
*p<0.1 
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2.5. RESULTS 
2.5.1. Analysis of the effect of the leading time on the initial 
ownership acquired 
Table 2.5 provides the results of the Tobit regression for the first 
stage analysis (Models 1 to 5). Model 1 only considers the influence of 
the control variables in the initial ownership acquired by the MNE, 
while Model 2 introduces the effect of leading time (Hypothesis 1). 
Models 3 includes the interaction effect of market age on the main 
relationship (Hypothesis 3a), while Model 4 considers the interaction 
effect of new technology introduction (Hypothesis 4a). Finally, Model 
5 is the full model that includes the two interaction terms. The 
likelihood ratio test shows that Model 4 is the model that best fits our 
data. That is why we employ it in interpreting the results of the main 
independent variables. 
The effect of control variables on initial ownership remains quite 
stable in Models 1 to 5. As can be observed, the level of ownership 
initially acquired in CBAs is higher in those countries with higher 
levels of GDP per capita, political stability, GDP per capita growth, 
demand growth and competition. The ownership initially acquired in 
the subsidiary is also higher when the acquirer has a greater size. 
However, the initial percentage acquired tends to be lower when 
greater institutional and economic distance exist, and when the target 
firm is smaller. However, other control variables, such as the 
international experience of the acquirer and the performance of the 
target firm, remain insignificant across the five models. 
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Table 2.5. Results for determinants of initial ownership 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Leading time  -1.569*** -1.865** -2.564*** -3.045*** 
  (0.330) (0.715) (0.582) (0.917) 
Leading time x Market age   0.006  0.009 
   (0.012)  (0.013) 
Leading time x New technology introduction    3.084** 3.127** 
    (1.221) (1.209) 
Market age 0.738** 1.853*** 1.736*** 2.617*** 2.413*** 
 (0.344) (0.428) (0.476) (0.682) (0.731) 
New technology introduction -100.9*** -83.53*** -79.73*** -131.8*** -126.4*** 
 (18.54) (16.04) (17.77) (32.03) (32.31) 
Subsidiary size -0.242*** -0.350*** -0.342*** -0.399*** -0.393*** 
 (0.089) (0.082) (0.083) (0.098) (0.098) 
Subsidiary performance 12.44 -10.98 -9.958 -13.99 -13.18 
 (6.982) (7.820) (8.100) (7.793) (7.900) 
Prior presence -26.76 -11.74 -10.59 -34.98* -32.01 
 (21.02) (18.06) (18.13) (20.01) (20.27) 
International experience 1.460 -0.059 -0.037 0.667 0.659 
 (1.263) (1.073) (1.071) (1.109) (1.100) 
Parent size 0.438*** 0.371*** 0.392*** 0.216* 0.254* 
 (0.138) (0.118) (0.126) (0.122) (0.133) 
GDP per capita 0.736** 0.660** 0.681** 0.154* 0.192 
 (0.312) (0.278) (0.280) (0.300) (0.302) 
GDP per capita growth 10.533*** 8.173*** 8.012*** 11.615*** 11.293*** 
 (2.661) (2.336) (2.344) (3.159) (3.128) 
Political stability 11.30* 12.15** 11.70** 19.56** 18.14** 
 (6.298) (5.377) (5.389) (7.512) (7.717) 
Demand growth 6.123** 4.144* 4.178* 8.846** 8.757** 
 (2.826) (2.401) (2.389) (3.505) (3.455) 
Competition 5.666*** 3.847** 3.799** 3.502** 3.381* 
 (1.967) (1.641) (1.626) (1.719) (1.713) 
Technological change 21.62 24.63** 21.91 55.94*** 51.94** 
 (13.63) (11.90) (13.19) (19.50) (19.96) 
Market openness -6.073 -2.792 -3.072 -1.750 -2.320 
 (6.385) (5.433) (5.456) (6.681) (6.801) 
Geographic distance 13.46 61.73 57.58 -118.3 -122.3 
 (49.41) (44.47) (45.24) (77.18) (76.59) 
Geographic distance2 -4.953 -7.640 -7.514 6.389 6.432 
 (3.819) (3.409) (3.412) (5.765) (5.701) 
Linguistic distance 4.066 5.778 5.588 16.55** 16.34** 
 (4.400) (3.723) (3.713) (7.635) (7.527) 
Religious distance -4.332 -9.806 -9.277 -3.331 -2.969 
 (6.972) (6.065) (6.154) (6.583) (6.585) 
Institutional distance -2.659*** -2.847*** -2.814*** -4.223*** -4.223*** 
 (0.669) (0.585) (0.588) (1.112) (1.095) 
Economic distance -1.073** -0.678* -0.653 -1.454** -1.405** 
 (0.471) (0.410) (0.411) (0.661) (0.652) 
Dummy group Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
_cons -8.400 -10.407 -1.238 57.015 73.179* 
 (28.083) (24.611) (30.983) (34.030) (40.957) 
sigma      
_cons 20.676*** 17.752*** 17.699*** 16.558*** 16.485*** 
 (2.002) (1.700) (1.697) (1.581) (1.574) 
N 90 90 90 90 90 
LL ratio test versus Model 1  22.19*** 22.41*** 33.16*** 33.65*** 
LL ratio test versus Model 2   0.22 10.97*** 11.46*** 
LL ratio test versus Model 3     11.24*** 
LL ratio test versus Model 4     0.49 
Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Hypothesis 1 states that leading time negatively influences the 
percentage in the subsidiary that MNEs initially acquire. Our results 
in Model 4 show that the higher the leading time between the entry of 
the pioneer and the entry of the subsidiary, the lower the percentage 
initially acquired (=-2.564; p<0.01). This effect remains negative and 
significant in all models. As a consequence, Hypothesis 1, showing 
that MNEs tend initially to buy higher levels of equity in subsidiaries 
that have entered into the market earlier, is supported. 
With regard to the moderating effect of market age on the 
relationship between leading time and the level of ownership initially 
acquired, our results do not find support for Hypothesis 3a. As we 
can see in the likelihood ratio test, the introduction of the moderating 
effect in both Model 3 and Model 5 does not contribute to explain the 
initial ownership decision. Conversely, results from Model 4 support 
Hypothesis 4a, which states that the negative effect of leading time on 
the initial ownership acquired is positively moderated by the 
introduction of a new technology by the subsidiary. Our results show 
that the moderating effect between leading time and new technology 
introduction is positive and significant (=3.084; p<0.05), confirming 
that the erosion of early-mover advantages makes late entrants more 
attractive under these circumstances at the time of the initial 
acquisition.  
A graphical illustration of this moderating effect is provided in 
Figure 2.1. We can observe a negative relationship between leading 
time and the ownership initially acquired (as stated by Hypothesis 1). 
However, the slope of this negative relationship is less pronounced 
for those subsidiaries that have been first to introduce a new 
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technology into the market. 14As subsidiaries introduce technological 
changes, first-mover advantages are eroded and the leading time 
loses importance as the determinant of the ownership decision. 
Figure 2.1. Initial ownership:  
Interaction between leading time and new technology introduction 
 
2.5.2. Analysis of the effect of the leading time on the ownership 
variation 
Table 2.6 provides the results of the random-effects Tobit 
estimations for panel data for the ownership variation during the 
post-entry time (Models 6 to 10). Model 6 only includes control 
variables; Model 7 incorporates the effect of leading time (Hypothesis 
2); Model 8 considers the interaction between leading time and market 
age (Hypothesis 3b); and Model 9 considers the interaction between 
leading time and new technology introduction (Hypothesis 4b). 
                                                          
14 Although Hypothesis 4a is supported, our result may (at least partially) also be due to 
boundary effects. As shown in Figure 1, when leading time is low, the initial ownership 
level for companies that introduce a new technology is much lower than for companies 
that do not do it, which may be a reason to observe a less pronounced downward slope for 
the former. We acknowledge a reviewer for noticing us this point. 
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Model 10 is the full model, including the two interaction terms. The 
likelihood ratio test shows that Model 10 is the model that best fits our 
data. That is why we employ it in interpreting the results of the main 
independent variables. 
Once MNEs have acquired an initial percentage in a subsidiary, 
they can change their levels of participation. Models 6 to 10 in Table 
2.6 show that the effect of control variables on ownership variation is 
quite stable. The effect of the MNE’s international experience on the 
ownership variation is always positive and significant. The time 
elapsed after the acquisition has a positive and significant direct 
effect, and a negative and significant effect in the quadratic term. 
Thus, acquirers tend to acquire higher levels of ownership after the 
initial acquisition as they gain direct experience from the target firm, 
although they are less likely to increase the level of their ownership 
soon after the initial acquisition or when they have been established 
for a very long time. Similarly, the institutional distance has a negative 
and significant effect initially, but influences the ownership variation 
in a positive and significant way. Thus, once the acquirer has gained 
experience in the host country whose institutional conditions greatly 
differ from those of its home country, it is more likely to increase its 
ownership of the subsidiary. Moreover, acquirers tend to acquire 
higher levels of ownership in the post-acquisition time when they 
initially entered with majority levels of ownership, as well as when 
the market is growing in terms of GDP per capita and demand. 
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Table 2.6. Results for determinants of ownership variation 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Leading time  0.184 -0.315** 0.135 -0.291** 
  (0.119) (0.138) (0.118) (0.137) 
Leading time x Market age   0.007***  0.006*** 
   (0.001)  (0.001) 
Leading time x New technology introduction    0.331*** 0.242*** 
    (0.063) (0.064) 
Market age 0.115* 0.078 0.100 0.074 0.094 
 (0.067) (0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) 
New technology introduction -1.509* -1.441 -1.425 1.603 0.801 
 (0.881) (0.882) (0.872) (1.052) (1.051) 
Subsidiary size 0.002 0.002 -0.004** 0.002 -0.004* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Subsidiary performance 0.117 0.159 0.150 0.150 0.145 
 (0.123) (0.124) (0.125) (0.123) (0.124) 
Prior presence -8.839 -8.047 -5.482 -9.328 -6.694 
 (9.155) (8.968) (9.087) (8.888) (8.978) 
International experience 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.152*** 0.187*** 0.180*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) 
Parent size -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Majority ownership 20.28*** 20.26*** 20.21*** 20.44*** 20.33*** 
 (1.152) (1.151) (1.140) (1.142) (1.135) 
Post-acquisition time 0.512*** 0.570*** 0.499*** 0.563*** 0.503*** 
 (0.103) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) 
Post-acquisition time2 -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDP per capita -0.143** -0.142** -0.146** -0.151** -0.152** 
 (0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) 
GDP per capita growth 0.116*** 0.115*** 0.099** 0.098** 0.089** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Political stability 0.215 0.207 -0.132 0.118 -0.155 
 (0.522) (0.521) (0.517) (0.518) (0.515) 
Demand growth 2.953*** 2.931*** 1.949** 2.679*** 1.880** 
 (0.933) (0.933) (0.931) (0.929) (0.929) 
Competition -0.208 -0.036 -0.123 0.072 -0.033 
 (0.569) (0.567) (0.574) (0.562) (0.568) 
Technological change 1.353* 1.327* 1.467** 1.030 1.232* 
 (0.698) (0.698) (0.690) (0.696) (0.691) 
Market openness 0.123 0.189 0.415 0.222 0.416 
 (0.571) (0.572) (0.567) (0.568) (0.565) 
Geographic distance 4.361 5.056 9.085 -1.055 4.146 
 (15.79) (15.44) (15.64) (15.35) (15.50) 
Geographic distance2 -0.862 -0.958 -1.176 -0.612 -0.898 
 (0.957) (0.938) (0.950) (0.931) (0.941) 
Linguistic distance 0.983 0.775 0.587 1.012 0.781 
 (1.495) (1.468) (1.487) (1.455) (1.469) 
Religious distance -2.106 -1.626 -1.264 -0.780 -0.683 
 (2.870) (2.822) (2.859) (2.800) (2.827) 
Institutional distance 0.361*** 0.366*** 0.247*** 0.343*** 0.245*** 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.066) (0.064) (0.066) 
Economic distance 0.009 0.009 0.015 0.011 0.016 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Dummy year Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Dummy group Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
_cons -24.678** -30.483*** -23.209** -28.655*** -22.753** 
 (9.677) (10.22) (10.33) (10.14) (10.23) 
sigma_u (_cons) 12.696*** 12.398*** 12.572*** 12.281*** 12.407*** 
 (0.989) (0.981) (0.995) (0.970) (0.981) 
sigma_e (_cons) 5.396*** 5.398*** 5.330*** 5.366*** 5.316*** 
 (0.083) (0.083) (0.082) (0.082) (0.081) 
N 2231 2231 2231 2231 2231 
LL ratio test versus Model 6  2.33 54.23*** 29.54*** 68.30*** 
LL ratio test versus Model 7   51.90*** 27.21*** 65.97*** 
LL ratio test versus Model 8     14.07*** 
LL ratio test versus Model 9     38.76*** 
Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Hypothesis 2 posits that leading time is negatively related to 
variation in the percentage of ownership after the initial acquisition. 
As observed in Model 10, leading time presents the expected negative 
sign (=-0.291; p<0.05). This means that, even after the initial 
acquisition, the leading time between the entry of the pioneer and the 
entry of the subsidiary influences the variation in MNEs’ participation 
in the target firm. However, this negative effect is only significant in 
those models that include the interaction with market age, partially 
supporting Hypothesis 2.  
Results from Model 10 also support Hypothesis 3b, which states 
that the negative effect of leading time on ownership variation is 
positively moderated by market age as a consequence of the erosion 
of early-mover advantages. Our results show that the interaction 
between leading time and market age is positive and significant 
(=0.006; p<0.01), confirming that the erosion of early-mover 
advantages makes late entrants more attractive.  
 
Figure 2.2. Post-entry time:  
Interaction between leading time and market age 
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A graphical illustration of this moderating effect is provided in 
Figure 2.2, where we can observe the negative relationship between 
the leading time between the entry of the pioneer and the subsidiary 
and ownership variation (Hypothesis 2). As shown in the figure, the 
negative relationship between leading time and ownership variation 
in younger markets becomes positive in more mature markets 
(Hypothesis 3b). This confirms that, in more incipient markets, the 
leading time acts a key signal of potential performance, which reduces 
uncertainty about potential performance and makes parent firms 
more willing to increase their ownership level in the subsidiary. 
However, as markets mature, first-mover advantages are eroded and 
late-mover advantages can be even more important in the ownership 
variation decision.  
Hypothesis 4b states that the introduction of a new technology 
by a subsidiary after the initial acquisition positively moderates the 
relationship between leading time and ownership variation. Results 
from Model 10 support Hypothesis 4b, showing a positive coefficient 
for the interaction between leading time and the introduction of a new 
technology in the post-acquisition time (=0.242; p<0.01). We 
illustrate this moderation effect in Figure 2.3, which shows the 
negative relationship between leading time and the variation of 
ownership after the initial acquisition (Hypothesis 2). We observe that 
this negative relationship is weaker for subsidiaries that have been the 
first to introduce a new technology. Thus, as subsidiaries introduce 
new technologies that erode existing first-mover advantages, the 
leading time loses importance as the determinant of the ownership 
decision. 
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Figure 2.3. Post-entry time:  
Interaction between leading time and market age 
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and the entry of the target, the higher the uncertainty of the MNE, 
with a subsequent reduction in the level of ownership initially 
acquired.  
Additionally, our study incorporates a dynamic perspective into 
the analysis. After the initial acquisition, MNE’ perception of the 
potential of the target to generate value may change as a consequence 
of learning. As a result of information that is obtained directly from 
the firm, the acquirer is able to verify the existence of first-mover 
advantages and the potential of the target to generate future 
performance. Thus, the leading time will be a useful signal for 
acquirers to vary their levels of ownership. In fact, our results show 
that MNEs tend to increase their levels of ownership after their initial 
entry into subsidiaries that entered into the market earlier. As in the 
decision about initial ownership, a higher leading time is perceived as 
a negative signal that makes MNEs reluctant to increase their equity 
in subsidiaries.  
Nevertheless, this negative relationship between leading time 
and ownership is not independent of the circumstances, but is 
contingent on two important elements that can erode first-mover 
advantages: market age and the introduction of a new technology by 
the target company. Our logic is that the passage of time and the 
innovative character of the target company weaken the isolating 
mechanisms that protect first-mover advantages, reducing the 
importance of leading time as a signal to counteract uncertainty. Our 
findings corroborate that the introduction of a new technology that 
erodes the existing first-mover advantages reduces the negative effect 
of leading time on the initial ownership acquired, as well as on the 
ownership variation during the post-entry time. The innovative 
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character of the subsidiary sends a positive signal about its potential 
to generate value in the future that makes entry timing less relevant. 
However, an unexpected result that should be mentioned at this point 
is the negative (direct) effect that the introduction of a new technology 
has on the initial ownership acquired. Although our analysis confirms 
that the innovative nature of the target company erodes first-mover 
advantages, one would expect that the direct effect of the introduction 
of a new technology positively impacts the initial ownership 
acquired. New technologies may lead to obtaining higher levels of 
growth, with a subsequent increase in expected performance. So, the 
negative sign of this variable seems to be surprising. One possible 
explanation is that innovation and growth also entail additional risks. 
Innovative firms face challenges such as size, internal turmoil and 
higher resource needs (Hambrick & Crozier, 1985) that should be 
balanced with future expected performance. Regardless, this 
relationship does not seem to be clear and should receive further 
attention in future research. 
Furthermore, our findings show that market age also lowers the 
negative effect of leading time on the ownership variation, because 
late entrants are perceived as a less risky option when the market is 
more mature. However, market age does not have a significant effect 
as a moderator in the relationship between leading time and the level 
of initial ownership. A possible explanation can come from the fact 
that, when MNEs develop CBAs, they try to determine the scope of 
first-mover advantages based on the available information about the 
market and the target firm. Contrary to the case of the innovative 
character of the subsidiary, the effect of time on first-mover 
advantages erosion could be less perceptible to foreign investors since 
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they do not possess a broad perspective of the evolution of the scope 
of these advantages over time in the target market. After the initial 
acquisition, the MNE obtains direct and regular information on the 
market that helps the acquirer to verify not only the existence of first-
mover advantages, but also their erosion as the market gets older. 
Consequently, market age may have a significant moderating effect 
on the relationship between leading time and ownership variation, 
but not on the relationship between leading time and the initial 
ownership. 
The main contribution of this research has been the integration 
of entry timing literature into analysis of the level of ownership in 
CBAs by examining how the entry timing influences the ownership 
strategy in CBAs. In this way, this study answers Zachary et al.’s 
(2015) call for the development of a more unifying framework of entry 
strategy that integrates entry timing with other important 
dimensions. Moreover, we focus on a target-level variable—namely, 
its leading time. Previous studies have tended to focus on country-
level and MNE-level determinants of ownership. In a context where 
first-mover advantages exist, the leading time between the entry of 
the pioneer and the entry of the target is confirmed to be a key 
determinant of the ownership decision in CBAs.  
Secondly, we incorporate a dynamic perspective into the 
analysis by considering that ownership can vary over time. This paper 
explores how the leading time influences not only the initial 
ownership acquired in CBAs, but also the ownership variation during 
the post-entry period. Finally, we analyse the effect of the erosion of 
first-mover advantages on prior relationships. In doing so, we 
consider how market age and the introduction of new technologies by 
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the target erode first-mover advantages, making leading time a less 
important determinant of the ownership held by an MNE. 
Our study has some implications from a managerial point of 
view. Firstly, MNEs should take into account the importance of first-
mover advantages enjoyed by the target company before deciding on 
the acquisition of a foreign subsidiary. When first-mover advantages 
exist, the target firm is more attractive if it has entered into the market 
earlier; but this attractiveness is influenced by other variables, such as 
the stage of development of the market and the innovative character 
of the target firm. In mature markets, first-mover advantages will be 
reduced, and investing in a late entrant will not be as risky. The 
subsidiary’s attractiveness will also be reduced if a late entrant shows 
an innovative profile. When the target firm introduces a key 
innovation—which may even replace the technology that originated 
the first-mover advantages—the entry timing of the subsidiary 
becomes less important in the ownership decision. Secondly, entering 
with lower levels of ownership allow MNEs to gain strategic 
flexibility in order to revise their risk position in the future and adjust 
the level of ownership held in the subsidiary. For this reason, it is very 
important that MNEs verify the existence of first-mover advantages 
after the acquisition of a new subsidiary to adapt the resource 
commitment to the expected profitability that comes from the 
existence of these advantages.  
Our study is not without limitations. Firstly, the empirical 
analysis focuses on a single industry. With this decision, we avoid the 
influence of industry-specific variables that previous studies have 
shown to influence ownership decisions, such as industry 
technological level or industry R&D level (Chari & Chang, 2009; Dow 
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et al., 2016). Future studies should develop this analysis in other 
industries where first-mover advantages are important in order to 
corroborate and go deeper into the analysis of the effect of entry 
timing on equity ownership. Secondly, we focus on a context where 
first-mover advantages have been demonstrated to outweigh first-
mover disadvantages. It is possible that the same analysis in a context 
where there are late-mover advantages may report different results. 
Future research should explore this possibility. Thirdly, although we 
incorporate the yearly performance of the subsidiary as a control 
variable in the analysis, we should be conscious that when selecting 
the target firm, MNEs will use additional information such as long-
term profitability or brand strength, information that is not available 
for our research purposes. Finally, the study focuses on two factors—
market age and technological discontinuities—that weaken isolating 
mechanisms and thus erode first-mover advantages. Although their 
importance has been highlighted in prior studies, there are other 
factors that can make isolating mechanisms less effective, such as 
changes in consumer preferences and regulation. Future research 
should pay attention to these factors that may also influence the 
equity ownership decision.  
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APPENDIX 
HOST AND HOME COUNTRIES INCLUDED 
Host Countries (50 countries) 
Australia Egypt Kazakhstan Nigeria Switzerland 
Bangladesh Estonia Kenya Norway Turkey 
Belgium Greece Korea, South Poland Uganda 
Bulgaria Hong Kong Laos Saudi Arabia Ukraine 
Chile Indonesia Latvia Serbia United Kingdom 
Colombia Iran Luxembourg Singapore Uruguay 
Congo, Democratic 
Republic Ireland Malta Slovenia Uzbekistan 
Croatia Italy Morocco Spain Venezuela 
Côte d'Ivoire Japan Nepal Sri Lanka Yemen 
Denmark Jordan New Zealand Sweden Zambia 
 
Home Countries (24 countries) 
Australia India Saudi Arabia 
Austria Italy Singapore 
Belgium Japan South Africa 
Denmark Kuwait Spain 
Egypt Malaysia Sweden 
France Norway USA 
Germany Qatar United Arab Emirates 
Hong Kong Russian Federation United Kingdom 
 
  
Chapter 2. Ownership in CBAs and Entry Timing of the Target Firm 
100 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
OWNERSHIP IN CROSS-BORDER 
ACQUISITIONS BY EMERGING 
MULTINATIONALS 
  
 
  
Chapter 3. Ownership in CBAs by Emerging Multinationals 
103 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) have substantially increased 
their contribution to economic activity in the last couple of decades 
and currently they generate almost one-third of the world’s total 
production (OECD, 2018). In their internationalization process, MNEs 
should make two key strategic decisions, namely entry mode and 
ownership (Xu and Shenkar, 2002). Regarding the former, they can 
internationalize through greenfield investments—establishing the 
new company from scratch—or by performing cross-border 
acquisitions (CBAs)—acquiring an existing company in the new 
country. The two modes of entry have some advantages and 
disadvantages (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; Slangen & Hennart, 
2007). Nevertheless, in the last few years, CBAs show a stronger 
growth than greenfield investments do (UNCTAD, 2018), 
encouraging researchers to analyze deeper the determinants of CBAs. 
When MNEs enter a country through a CBA, the second key 
decision to adopt is the percentage of ownership to acquire in the 
target company (Chari & Chang, 2009). The evidence shows that 
CBAs of MNEs significantly vary in respect of the ownership acquired 
(Chari & Chang, 2009; Gerpott & Jakopin, 2008). According to prior 
literature, the choice of ownership acquired is determined by factors 
such as resource commitment, the expected control by the MNE on 
the target company, or the risks and performance of the acquisition 
(Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Delios & Beamish, 1999). Literature 
from the transaction costs theory traditionally suggests that 
environmental uncertainty increases the difficulty of the foreign 
buyer to seek, negotiate and monitor the market transaction partners 
(Williamson, 1981). In contexts with higher environmental 
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uncertainty, MNEs prefer to acquire lower levels of ownership in 
order to gain flexibility to answer to environmental changes (Yiu & 
Makino, 2002). Empirical studies have opened a debate about how the 
ownership strategy of MNEs varies depending on whether they 
expand to advanced or to emerging countries, which are 
characterized by different levels of uncertainty (Liou, Chen-Ho Chao, 
& Yang, 2016).  Emerging countries are characterized by 
underdeveloped financial intermediaries and weak securities 
regulation, which increase the perceived uncertainty of doing 
business in these countries (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). As a result, 
MNEs usually choose a greater ownership percentage when entering 
advanced countries, where the level of uncertainty tends to be lower 
than in emerging countries (Delios & Beamish, 1999; Yiu & Makino, 
2002).  
Prior studies have primarily focused on the institutional 
conditions of the host countries as determinants of uncertainty. 
Nevertheless, the institutional conditions in the home country are also 
relevant to explain the ownership strategy in CBAs (De Beule, Elia, & 
Piscitello, 2014; Liou, Lee, & Miller, 2017). Recent research suggests 
that, when expanding abroad, the strategies and performance of 
MNEs that come from emerging countries—emerging MNEs, 
EMNEs— are different from those that come from advanced ones—
advanced MNEs, AMNEs— (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; De Beule et al., 
2014; Guillén & García-Canal, 2009). EMNEs face weak institutions 
and economic underdevelopment in their home countries (Cuervo-
Cazurra & Genc, 2008), so they are expected to manage uncertainty 
better than AMNEs do. As a consequence, the uncertainty that MNEs 
perceive in the host country will depend on the level of development 
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of their home countries. Thus, host country characteristics are relevant 
in explaining the ownership strategies of MNEs, but the inclusion of 
home country characteristics is also necessary to fully comprehend 
these strategies. In spite of this, to our knowledge, prior studies have 
underexplored the interaction of host and home countries’ 
characteristics in the ownership level decision.  
Besides the home and the host countries’ characteristics, the 
ownership strategy followed by MNEs can be conditioned by the 
characteristics of the industry where CBAs take place as well. 
Previous studies have analyzed the internationalization strategies in 
different contexts, such as R&D intensive industries (Chari & Chang, 
2009; Prashantham & Birkinshaw, 2015; Qian, Li, & Qian, 2018), the 
hotel industry (Romero-Martínez et al., 2019) or the tire industry 
(Rose & Ito, 2009). Our research focuses on one regulated industry, 
the mobile telecommunications industry, which has special features 
that make it an interesting context where analyzing the ownership 
strategies followed by MNEs. In particular, regulated industries are 
subject to a greater political risk that may require firms a strong 
commitment of resources (García-Canal & Guillén, 2008). This might 
imply that the interaction effect of the home and the host countries’ 
characteristics is highly relevant when determining the ownership 
strategies of MNEs in regulated industries. We pay attention to this 
and analyze how host and home countries’ characteristics determine 
the ownership percentage acquired by telecom MNEs. 
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, we pay attention to host 
countries’ characteristics and analyze the ownership percentage 
acquired by MNEs when designing a CBA in emerging or in advanced 
countries. Second, we incorporate the characteristics of the home 
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country and analyze the extent to which the ownership strategy in 
emerging countries differs between EMNEs and AMNEs. Our 
findings confirm that both home and host countries’ characteristics 
are relevant in understanding the ownership strategies of MNEs. We 
show that telecom MNEs tend to acquire lower levels of ownership in 
emerging countries. Nevertheless, the origin of the MNE significantly 
moderates this relationship. EMNEs acquire higher levels of 
ownership in emerging countries than AMNEs do. 
The contribution of this study is twofold. Firstly, we provide 
empirical evidence on the recent debate on whether the 
internationalization strategies followed by EMNEs are similar to the 
traditional patterns of the AMNEs (Ramamurti, 2012, Guillen & 
Garcia-Canal, 2009). We shed light on this and analyze to what extent 
EMNEs differ from AMNEs in their ownership strategies in emerging 
countries. In doing so, we argue that the integration of home and host 
countries’ characteristics is necessary to comprehend fully the 
ownership strategies of MNEs in CBA. Secondly, our research centers 
on the global mobile telecommunications industry and includes a 
wide number of telecom MNEs and countries. This allows us to 
expand prior studies in two ways. First, by considering how the effect 
of the level of development of the host and the home countries 
determines MNEs’ ownership strategies in a regulated industry. 
Second, by extending the analysis to an international and cross-
cultural setting. Previous studies have usually been limited to a few 
firms or countries (Jakopin, 2008). Our study simultaneously includes 
many firms and countries. In particular, we include 53 mobile groups 
that come from 35 home countries and 82 host countries. 
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The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. First, we 
present the theoretical framework and the hypotheses of this study. 
Second, we develop an empirical analysis to test these hypotheses. In 
particular, this section begins with a detailed description of the 
ownership strategies that are made by telecom MNEs in CBA. In 
doing so, we pay attention to the developed or emerging nature of the 
host countries where CBA are made and, afterwards, we center on the 
developed or emerging nature of telecom MNEs. This allows us to 
obtain some interesting findings about the ownership strategies of 
telecom MNEs. Nevertheless, we go one step further and also perform 
a regression analysis to test our hypotheses. Thus, we present the 
sample, variables and the methodology that is used in this second 
analysis. Finally, we comment the results of this research and offer a 
discussion on the main conclusions and future research directions that 
are derived from our study. 
3.2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
3.2.1. The ownership level in CBAs: emerging vs. advanced host 
countries 
The percentage of ownership acquired by an MNE is a key 
decision when performing a CBA, since it determines its control and 
resource commitment in the subsidiary (Chari & Chang, 2009; Ellis et 
al., 2018). Selection of the appropriate level of ownership may 
determine the success and survival of acquiring firms (Contractor et 
al., 2014; Delios & Beamish, 2001). A mistake in the ownership level 
may result in high integration costs that may destroy the CBA’s 
performance (Lahiri, Elango, & Kundu, 2014). As a consequence, 
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MNEs should carefully evaluate the ownership level to acquire when 
developing a CBA.  
This decision is even more difficult when the CBA takes place in 
an emerging country characterized by institutional voids that increase 
the perceived level of uncertainty (Lebedev, Peng, Xie, & Stevens, 
2015). Prior research has coined the term ‘institutional voids’ to refer 
to the absence of those market-supporting institutions that are usually 
requested by foreign investors to develop investments in a new 
country (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). Emerging economies are 
characterized by underdeveloped capital and labor markets, where a 
lack of financial and other specialized intermediaries makes it more 
difficult to accomplish key activities for developing activities abroad, 
such as information searching or negotiating with partners, 
customers, and suppliers (Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009). 
Moreover, these markets suffer from a weak legal infrastructure, 
insufficient protection of property rights, and weak judiciary systems 
to enforce contracts (Contractor et al., 2014). It has also been observed 
that corruption tends to be higher in emerging markets, so the 
opportunistic behavior of market agents is more likely to occur 
(Judge, McNatt, & Xu, 2011).  
Previous studies have shown that confronting higher levels of 
uncertainty makes MNEs acquire lower levels of ownership in order 
to obtain greater levels of flexibility (Delios & Beamish, 1999). Less 
resource commitment will allow them to leave the investment more 
easily if their expectations are unsatisfied. Moreover, emerging 
countries lack specialized intermediaries that facilitate the 
development of economic activities. Thus, informal business 
networks become crucial in these countries to find customers, 
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suppliers, and partners that help firms to develop their activities 
there. MNEs could encounter some problems entering informal 
business networks: these problems are labelled the ‘liability of 
outsidership’ (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). The liability of outsidership 
may make MNEs that expand to emerging countries acquire lower 
levels of ownership, local investors retaining a higher percentage of 
equity to facilitate the MNE’s introduction into the informal business 
network. The greater the uncertainty in the host market, the greater 
the likelihood of taking minority shares instead of acquiring majority 
percentages (Gerpott & Jakopin, 2008).  
In contrast, when MNEs perform CBAs in advanced countries, 
the institutional void tends to weaken. Advanced countries usually 
have strong financial systems that facilitate economic exchanges, and 
strong legal and judiciary regimes that enforce contracts and protect 
property rights. Additionally, advanced countries usually have 
formal systems that enable foreign investors to develop their 
economic activities with lower levels of uncertainty and information 
asymmetries (Meyer et al., 2009). As formal procedures are explicit 
and market intermediaries work properly, it is easier for MNEs to 
obtain information and to negotiate contracts and enforce them. In 
other words, it is easier to develop activities in advanced than in 
emerging countries. Thus, the level of uncertainty is lower in 
advanced countries, which allows MNEs to make a better assessment 
of the potential value and costs derived from the CBA, encouraging 
them to acquire a higher level of ownership. This reasoning leads us 
to posit our first hypothesis: 
Chapter 3. Ownership in CBAs by Emerging Multinationals 
110 
Hypothesis 1: The level of ownership acquired is lower when a CBA 
takes place in an emerging host country than in an advanced host 
country. 
3.2.2. The ownership level in emerging countries: EMNEs vs. 
AMNEs 
Previous theories on firms’ internationalization, including 
those that are used to explain ownership level decisions, have usually 
been tested by analyzing the behavior of AMNEs. In many industries, 
the internationalization process of AMNEs started earlier than that of 
EMNEs. As has been previously shown in the descriptive analysis, 
this also occurred in the mobile telecommunications industry, where 
MNEs came initially from Europe and the United States. However, 
some years later, EMNEs appeared, and showed an accelerated pace 
of internationalization. In this context, a recent debate in the 
international business literature discusses whether prior theories, 
primarily applied to AMNEs, can also be used to explain the behavior 
of EMNEs (Luo & Tung, 2007). Even when motivation to 
internationalize and the pace of internationalization differ between 
AMNEs and EMNEs (Guillén & García-Canal, 2009), there is an 
increasing claim that prior theories can also explain EMNEs’ 
behavior. Nevertheless, this stream of the literature also recognizes 
that EMNEs significantly differ from AMNEs in their resources and 
capabilities, and thus in their sources of competitive advantage 
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Ramamurti, 2012). 
The main differences between EMNEs and AMNEs are 
explained by the different levels of development of their home 
countries. EMNEs usually lack key resources at home, such as 
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advanced technologies and access to capital markets. Their familiarity 
with these market conditions gives them a greater understanding of 
customer, supplier, and competitor behavior in other emerging 
countries compared to AMNEs. The former are accustomed to face 
higher levels of uncertainty that come from the existing institutional 
voids (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Lall, 1983); in contrast, AMNEs 
are accustomed to a proper functioning market system and may 
therefore be unsure about how to operate in emerging countries. 
Thus, home country characteristics allow EMNEs to generate a 
valuable skill to manage unfavorable institutional conditions in other 
emerging countries (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Meyer, Mudambi, 
& Narula, 2011). This will make them perceive lower uncertainty 
when making CBAs in other emerging countries, with the subsequent 
acquisition of higher levels of ownership. This reasoning suggests that 
EMNEs acquire higher levels of ownership in CBAs in emerging 
markets than AMNEs due to their lower levels of perceived 
uncertainty. Our second hypothesis posits that:  
Hypothesis 2: Being an EMNE positively moderates the negative 
relationship between the level of ownership acquired and the emerging 
nature of the host country. 
 
3.3. RESEARCH SETTING, SAMPLE, VARIABLES AND 
METHODS 
3.3.1. The mobile telecommunications industry 
Our analyses are made in the mobile telecommunications 
industry. Many reasons make this industry highly suitable for the 
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purposes of this study. First, it is a very important sector that 
significantly contributes to the global economy. In 2016, the revenues 
of the mobile telecommunications industry amounted to US$ 3.3 
trillion or 4.4 percent of world GDP (GSMA, 2017). Second, it is an 
industry where mobile groups have substantially expanded abroad in 
the last decades and, additionally, CBAs are the most frequent entry 
mode. The growing number of entries and the preference of CBA as 
the mode of entry make this industry highly suitable to analyze the 
ownership strategies that MNE follow when performing CBA. One of 
the key reasons for the fast internationalization of telecom firms was 
the adoption of the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) 
as the standard of digital mobile networks in the 1990s, which allowed 
the exploitation of economies of scale and learning around the world 
(Fuentelsaz, Maícas, & Polo, 2008; Gerpott & Jakopin, 2005). 
According to GSMA Intelligence (2018), nearly 70 percent of 
international entries developed by telecom MNEs took place from 
2000 to 2016. Additionally, 65 percent of the total entries taking place 
between 2000 and 2016 were developed through CBAs in this 
industry. The reason is that the entry of a telecom MNE to enter 
through a greenfield is only possible when a new license is available 
in a market. Thus, greenfield investments are limited to certain time 
windows when license auctions take place (Claussen, Köhler, & 
Kretschmer, 2018). For this reason, CBAs are the most frequent entry 
mode in the mobile telecommunications industry. Third, in this 
industry, there is a wide diversity in terms of the origin of telecom 
MNEs and the countries where they have entered. This allows us to 
analyze better the interaction effect between home and host countries’ 
characteristics. Initially, telecom MNEs came from advanced 
economies in Europe and the United States and primarily entered 
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other advanced countries. However, nowadays we find high 
variability in terms of the economic development of both the home 
and the host countries of mobile groups (Claussen, et al., 2018). 
3.3.2. A descriptive analysis of the ownership strategies in the 
mobile telecommunications industry 
With regard to the ownership strategy, the evidence shows that 
CBAs of mobile groups significantly vary in respect of the ownership 
acquired (Gerpott & Jakopin, 2008). Previous studies have primarily 
mentioned the restrictions imposed by the regulation on foreign 
direct investment (FDI), the stage of telecom liberalization, the 
reaction of former monopolistic operators, and the strategic alliances 
of incumbents as determinants of the ownership percentage acquired 
by telecom MNEs making CBAs (see Jakopin, 2008, for a review).  
However, prior studies have not analyzed whether the 
ownership strategy in the mobile telecommunications industry varies 
between advanced and emerging host countries, and between 
AMNEs and EMNEs. We offer a descriptive analysis of the ownership 
strategy followed by telecom multinationals with the aim of 
identifying the main relationships between the ownership strategies 
and the emerging nature of the home and host countries of MNEs. In 
particular, we carry out a descriptive analysis of the 183 CBAs that 
took place in the industry between 2001 and 2016. The 53 MNEs that 
carried out these CBAs came from 35 home countries and expanded 
to 82 host countries.  As can be seen in Table 3.1, the average 
percentage acquired was 65.8 percent. AMNEs made a total of 77 
CBAs during this period, being 42 percent of the total. The average 
ownership acquired by AMNEs was 64.4 percent. EMNEs made 106 
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CBAs (58 percent of the total), with an average 66.8 percent 
ownership. Thus, EMNEs and AMNEs acquired similar levels of 
ownership. This may suggest that, on average, they follow similar 
ownership strategies. However, if we go deeper into the analysis, we 
can see that the ownership percentage acquired varies depending on 
the level of host country development. As can be observed in the last 
column of Table 3.1, the ownership percentage acquired in advanced 
countries is slightly higher than that in emerging countries (67.0% vs. 
65.4%). Additionally, significant differences were found when 
considering the origin of the MNE. While the average ownership 
percentage acquired by AMNEs was much higher in advanced host 
countries than in emerging ones (72.5% vs. 57.2%), EMNEs acquired 
higher levels of ownership in emerging countries than in advanced 
countries (68.8% vs. 42.4%). 
Table 3.1. The ownership acquired depending on the level of 
development of the host and the home countries 
 
AMNE EMNE Total  
Advanced 
host country 
72.5 42.4 67 Average percentage acquired 
36 8 44 Number of CBAs 
Emerging host 
country 
57.2 68.8 65.4 Average percentage acquired 
41 98 139 Number of CBAs 
Total 
64.4 66.8 65.8 Average percentage acquired 
77 106 183 Number of CBAs 
 
There is an additional point that should be highlighted from 
Table 3.1. Whereas AMNEs entered emerging and advanced host 
countries equally (36 advanced and 41 emerging host countries), 
EMNEs primarily focused their expansion on emerging economies: 
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only eight out of 106 CBAs took place in advanced countries during 
the period under analysis. To sum up, Table 3.1 allows us to infer two 
main conclusions: the level of the ownership percentage acquired is, 
on average, slightly higher in advanced countries; and EMNEs and 
AMNEs acquire higher levels of ownership in countries that have a 
similar economic development to those of their origin.  
Table 3.2. AMNEs’ acquisitions by year 
Year 
Number of 
acquisitions 
in advanced 
host 
countries 
Average 
percentage 
acquired 
Number of 
acquisitions 
in emerging 
host 
countries 
Average 
percentage 
acquired 
 
Total 
number of 
acquisitions 
 
2001 6 50.6 7 52.6 13 
2002 4 100 2 55.1 6 
2003 0 - 3 53.1 3 
2004 0 - 3 100 3 
2005 3 50.8 3 31 6 
2006 5 99.9 5 69.6 10 
2007 2 95 8 42.8 10 
2008 1 100 3 56.9 4 
2009 5 73.4 1 100 6 
2010 2 75 2 45.5 4 
2011 0 - 2 59.5 2 
2012 0 - 0 - 0 
2013 1 89.7 1 100 3 
2014 1 60 0 - 1 
2015 3 100 1 45 4 
2016 2 31 0 - 2 
Total 36 72.5 41 57.2 77 
 
We now go a step further and present a more detailed analysis 
of the evolution of the percentage acquired by mobile groups from 
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2001 to 2016, differentiating between their home countries. Table 3.2 
shows the CBAs carried out by mobile groups from advanced 
countries, while Table 3.3 presents this information for EMNEs. As 
can be seen in Table 3.2, AMNEs made a total of 77 CBAs. Almost 
three out of four of the CBAs made by AMNEs (55 out of 77) took 
place in the first half of our observation window—that is, from 2001 
to 2008. During these years, AMNEs entered both advanced and 
emerging countries with a slight predominance of the latter. With the 
exception of the period between 2009 and 2013, AMNEs acquired 
higher levels of ownership in advanced countries. In these countries, 
they acquired, on average, 72.5 percent of operators’ equity. In 
contrast, the mean value of the ownership acquired in emerging 
countries was 57.2 percent. 
Regarding EMNEs, Table 3.3 provides some interesting 
information about the evolution of CBAs in emerging and advanced 
host countries. As can be observed in the last column of Table 3.3, 
EMNEs primarily made their international expansion from 2004 to 
2010. Although they started their internationalization process later 
than AMNEs, EMNEs made many CBAs as well. In fact, EMNEs have 
been involved in an accelerated internationalization process since 
2004 and have primarily used CBAs as their entry mode to build faster 
resources and the capability to compete globally (Bonaglia, Goldstein, 
& Mathews, 2007; Liou et al., 2016; Mathews, 2006). Another 
interesting point that derives from Table 3.3 is that EMNEs tend to 
acquire a substantially lower ownership percentage when entering 
advanced countries than when expanding to an emerging host 
country (42.4% vs. 68.8%).  
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Table 3.3. EMNEs’ acquisitions by year 
Year Number of 
acquisitions 
in advanced 
host 
countries 
Average 
percentage 
acquired 
Number of 
acquisitions 
in emerging 
host 
countries 
Average 
percentage 
acquired 
 
Total 
number of 
acquisitions 
 
2001 0 - 1 43.8 1 
2002 0 - 2 72.8 2 
2003 0 - 3 78.5 3 
2004 1 100 10 82.5 11 
2005 2 13.2 25 66.2 27 
2006 0 - 10 72 10 
2007 1 12.3 7 40.7 8 
2008 0 - 7 74.3 7 
2009 0 - 3 71.8 3 
2010 0 - 13 85.8 13 
2011 1 100 3 43.6 4 
2012 0 - 1 100 1 
2013 0 - 0 - 0 
2014 1 100 4 42.3 5 
2015 0 - 6 95 6 
2016 2 39 3 40 5 
Total 8 42.4 98 68.8 106 
 
Besides this, we can also obtain interesting findings by paying 
attention to the number of CBAs and ownership levels per groups. 
Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 provide further information about how many 
CBAs were made by each mobile group and the ownership that was 
acquired when making them. Once again, we pay attention to the 
origin of mobile groups and differentiate between EMNEs and 
AMNEs. Table 3.4 refers specifically to EMNEs and Table 3.5 to 
AMNEs.  
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With regard to AMNEs, Orange, Telia, and Vodafone, which 
made eight, seven, and seven CBAs respectively, were the mobile 
groups with the greatest number of CBAs, as shown in Table 3.4. 
Looking at where CBAs took place, we find significant differences in 
the ownership percentage that is acquired by AMNEs. In advanced 
countries, AMNEs acquired an average of over 50 percent, with the 
exception of NTT DoCoMo, and it was often close to 80 percent. 
However, the heterogeneity in the ownership percentage acquired by 
AMNEs was much higher when entering emerging countries. In this 
case, the percentage was often below 50 percent, with the exception of 
Orange, Telefónica, and Vodafone, which acquired, on average, 
between 70 percent and 80 percent in emerging countries. The fact 
that Orange, Telefónica, and Vodafone are some of the groups with 
the highest levels of international experience may explain this result, 
since prior experience can influence firm behavior. 
Regarding EMNEs, Table 3.5 shows that seven groups stand out 
as primarily responsible for the CBAs made by EMNEs (67 out of 106 
acquisitions). These groups are Bharti Airtel (which made 12 CBAs), 
Zain (11), VimpelCom (11), Etisalat (9), Global Telecom (8), Maroc 
Telecom (8), and MTN (8). Table 3.5 also shows that almost all CBAs 
carried out by EMNEs took place in emerging countries. Furthermore, 
the few acquisitions that took place in advanced countries were made 
by groups that had previously completed acquisitions in emerging 
countries.15 On average, the ownership acquired by EMNEs is higher 
in emerging countries (68.8%) than in advanced countries (42.4%). 
                                                          
15 In fact, groups that had previously made CBAs in emerging countries carried them out 
many times and not just once. 
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Table 3.4. AMNEs’ acquisitions by group 
GROUP 
Acquisitions 
in advanced 
host 
countries 
% 
Average 
acquired 
Acquisitions 
in emerging 
host countries 
% 
Average 
acquired 
Total 
number of 
acquisitions 
Orange Group 2 64.7 6 70.1 8 
Telia Group 3 100 4 48.5 7 
Vodafone Group 5 60.3 2 70 7 
Singtel Group 1 100 4 34.3 5 
Telefónica Group 2 100 3 83.5 5 
Wind Telecom Group 
(Merged Q2 2011) 
2 81.4 2 24.1 4 
Telenor Group 2 55.9 2 60.2 4 
Softbank Group 4 94.7  -  - 4 
AINMT Group (Access 
Industries Group) 
3 88.3 - -  3 
NTT DOCOMO Group 2 13.5 1 30 3 
Tele2 Group 1 100 2 70.5 3 
Telekom Austria Group  - -  3 73 3 
Trilogy International 
Partners Group 
1 52 2 85.8 3 
Altice Group 2 80  -  - 2 
Millicom International 
Cellular Group 
-   - 2 74.5 2 
PHAROL Group - - 2 28.8 2 
Telekom Slovenije Group  -  - 2 72.5 2 
CK Hutchison Group  -  - 1 29.8 1 
NJJ Group 1 100 -   - 1 
Orange Belgium Group 1 90  -  - 1 
OTE Group -  -  1 13 1 
Proximus Group 1 100  -  - 1 
TDC Group 1 76.5  -  - 1 
Telecom Italia Group  - 
 
1 54.8 1 
Telstra Group 1 60  -  - 1 
Vivendi Group  -  - 1 26 1 
Liberty Global Group 1 50 - - 1 
Total  36 72.5 41 57.2 77 
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Table 3.5. EMNEs’ acquisitions by group 
GROUP 
Acquisitions 
in advanced 
host 
countries 
% 
average 
acquired 
Acquisitions in 
emerging host 
countries 
% 
average 
acquired 
Total number of 
acquisitions 
Bharti Airtel Group - - 12 88.75 12 
Zain Group - - 11 79.4 11 
VimpelCom Group 2 75 9 71.8 11 
Etisalat Group - - 9 51 9 
Global Telecom Group 1 13.7 7 68.6 8 
Maroc Telecom Group - - 8 84 8 
MTN Group 1 100 7 81.4 8 
Axiata Group 1 12.6 4 59.6 5 
MTS Group - - 5 90.8 5 
América Móvil Group - - 4 100 4 
Oi Group 1 100 3 24.8 4 
Emirates International 
Telecommunication - - 3 38.2 3 
Batelco Group - - 2 58 2 
LetterOne Group 1 28.1 1 43.8 2 
Ooredoo Group 1 12.3 1 40.8 2 
Turkcell Group - - 2 65.5 2 
Abu Dhabi Group - - 1 15 1 
Africell Group (Lintel 
Group) - - 1 95 1 
Digicel Group - - 1 100 1 
Maxis 
Communications 
Group (Binariang 
Group) 
- - 1 51 1 
Megafone Group - - 1 75 1 
NMTC Group - - 1 38 1 
Oger Telecom Group - - 1 22.1 1 
Orascom Telecom 
Media and Technology 
Group 
- - 1 34.7 1 
STC Group - - 1 51 1 
Telekom Srbija Group - - 1 65 1 
Total 8 42.4 98 68.8 106 
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However, three groups—MTN, Oi, and VimpelCom—
performed CBAs with higher levels of ownership in advanced 
countries than in emerging ones. MTN and VimpelCom are again two 
of the groups with the highest international experience of performing 
CBAs. 
3.3.3. Sample, variables and methodology 
The previous section is based on a descriptive analysis that 
takes into account the behavior of EMNEs and AMNEs when 
expanding abroad. Although this analysis provides us with an 
interesting perspective, we now deepen in the interaction between the 
level of development of the home and the host countries and its effect 
on the level of ownership acquired in CBAs in order to acquire better 
knowledge. 
We test our hypotheses in the same sample that was used in the 
descriptive analysis—that is, 183 CBAs carried out in 82 host countries 
by 53 MNEs from 35 home countries in a time frame that covers 2001 
to 2016. Our data come from different sources, but the main one is 
GSMA Intelligence (2018). To obtain our control variables, we use the 
Heritage Foundation and the World Development Indicators. 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the percentage of ownership that an 
MNE (the acquirer firm) acquires in a subsidiary (the target firm). In 
line with recent studies, we use a continuous variable that is bounded 
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between 10 percent and 100 percent (Cuypers, Ertug, & Hennart, 2015; 
Dow, Cuypers, & Ertug, 2016; Malhotra & Gaur, 2014).16  
Independent variables 
Emerging country. We introduce a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 when the country where the CBA takes place is an emerging 
country, and 0 otherwise. Following previous studies, we use the 
official classification of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to 
classify countries as advanced or emerging (De Beule et al., 2014).17  
Emerging multinational enterprises (EMNEs). To account for the 
origin of the MNE, we also use a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 when the MNE comes from a country that is classified as an 
emerging country in accordance with the IMF classification, and 0 
otherwise.  
Control variables 
Similar to previous studies, our model controls for some firm and 
market characteristics. We control for subsidiary size, since smaller 
subsidiaries may need more resources and therefore may be 
susceptible to being acquired with greater levels of ownership. We 
measure the subsidiary size as millions of connections.18 We also 
control for the previous experience that mobile groups have in 
                                                          
16 We follow the guidelines of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) that consider the existence of an FDI 
when the MNE owns at least 10 percent of the subsidiary equity. Otherwise, MNEs may 
not exercise effective management control. 
17 This classification is dynamic, which means that some countries, such as Cyprus or 
Malta, changed their status during the observed period. However, in most of the cases 
(96.5%), countries maintained their status of emerging or advanced over the whole period. 
18 Connections make reference to the number of SIM cards (or phone numbers, where SIM 
cards are not used), excluding cellular M2M, that were registered on the mobile network 
at the end of the period (GSMA Intelligence, 2018). 
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internationalizing (group international experience). We measure this 
variable by counting the number of countries—other than the original 
one—where the MNE has a presence. Greater international 
experience is associated with greater knowledge about the 
internationalization process, and therefore with lower perceived 
uncertainty. The lower the uncertainty, the higher the level of 
ownership acquired (Chari & Chang, 2009).  
With regard to market characteristics, we control for host and 
home country characteristics. In particular, we include the opening 
level of host countries (open markets). This variable is calculated as the 
average value of the trade, investment, and financial freedom 
dimensions from the Heritage Foundation indicators. The resulting 
measure is between 0 and 100. Higher values of this variable indicate 
greater openness of the market. Greater opening of the host country 
facilitates CBAs (Kandogan & Johnson, 2016) and is positively related 
to the acquired level of ownership. Similar to previous studies, we 
also control for the size of the host country (host country size) through 
its population in millions of habitants. Additionally, countries with 
lower levels of competition are expected to be more attractive for 
firms to enter. We approach competition through host country 
concentration, including the Herfindahl-Hirschman index on a scale 
from 0 to 10,000. Similarly, we control for the size and the competitive 
level of the home country by including home country concentration and 
home country size. 
Finally, we also include some variables that relate to the home 
and host countries. In particular, we control for geographical distance, 
since it may cause firms to perceive greater uncertainty (Malhotra & 
Gaur, 2014). In line with prior studies, we measure this according to 
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the Geobytes database, which gives the kilometers between the capital 
cities of the home and host countries (Malhotra, Sivakumar, & Zhu, 
2009; Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010). We also include geographical 
distance2, because the cost and the benefit trade-off of full versus 
partial ownership varies at different levels of geographical distance 
(Malhotra & Gaur, 2014). Finally, we include time effects with dummy 
variables. 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.6 shows the descriptive statistics of our sample. The 
mean value of ownership is 65.8 percent with a standard deviation of 
33.2 percent. In accordance with our measure, the minimum 
ownership that mobile groups acquired in the observed period was 
12 percent, the maximum 100 percent. Regarding our independent 
variables, emerging country has a mean value of 0.8 with a standard 
deviation of 0.4. This means that the CBAs that are included in our 
sample took place more often in emerging countries than in advanced 
ones. Similarly, the mean value of EMNEs is 0.6, which indicates a 
greater prevalence of CBAs made by EMNEs over those that were 
carried out by AMNEs. However, the standard deviation of this 
variable is 0.5, which indicates high variability regarding the home 
country of companies involved in CBAs. EMNEs such as Bharti Airtel 
or Zain carried out a high number of acquisitions in comparison to 
other groups such as NMTC. Similarly, AMNEs such as Orange made 
eight acquisitions, while other companies, such as Liberty Global, 
made only one in the whole period. Regarding control variables, we 
note that, on average, the subsidiary size is 4.5 million connections. 
However, the high standard deviation (8.9) reveals important 
differences between firms, which is reflected in the maximum (51) and 
Chapter 3. Ownership in CBAs by Emerging Multinationals 
125 
minimum (0.01) values of this variable. MNEs also show great 
differences in their levels of internationalization, as is shown by the 
high value of the standard deviation of group international experience. 
On average, mobile groups expanded to 12 countries. Some groups, 
such as LetterOne and Softbank, only expanded to one foreign 
country, while others, such as Orange, entered more than 40 
countries.  
Table 3.6. Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ownership 183 65.8 33.2 0.12 100 
Emerging country 183 0.8 0.4 0 1 
EMNEs 183 0.6 0.5 0 1 
Subsidiary size 183 4.5 8.9 0.01 51 
Group international experience 183 12.7 9.3 1 44 
Host country concentration 183 4380 1526 1485 10000 
Home country concentration 183 3970 1901 1453 10000 
Host country size 183 43.5 65.4 0.4 317.7 
Home country size 183 134.7 300.3 0.4 1335 
Open markets 183 56.68 16.17 13.33 90 
Geographical distance 183 3.80 2.92 0 17 
Geographical distance2 183 22.96 33.12 0 289 
 
Regarding market characteristics, home and host countries show 
similar values of competitive level. In particular, the mean value of 
host country concentration is 4,380 and the mean value of home country 
concentration is 3,970. The two also have similar standard deviation—
1,526 and 1,901, respectively. Nevertheless, this does not occur when 
we compare the size of the home and the host countries. Home 
countries tend to be bigger than host countries. While the mean value 
of host country size is 43.5 million habitants, home country size has a 
mean value of 134.7 million habitants. Home countries also show 
greater variability in their size, as is shown by the value of its standard 
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deviation. In addition, the mean value of open markets is 56.68, with a 
maximum of 90 and a minimum value of 13.3. Finally, we can observe 
that home and host countries, on average, face a distance of 3.8 
thousand kilometers, as is shown by the mean value of geographical 
distance. Nevertheless, this variable shows a high standard 
deviation—2.92—which indicates great variability in the distance 
between the home and the host countries. 
Table 3.7. Correlations 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Ownership (1) 1 
           
2 Emerging country (2) -0.02 1 
          
3 EMNEs(3) 0.04 0.45* 1 
         
4 Subsidiary size (4) -0.39* -0.26* -0.02 1 
        
5 Group international experience (5) 0.08 -0.06 -0.23* 0.10 1 
       
6 Host country concentration (6) -0.01 0.31* 0.11 -0.30* -0.02 1 
      
7 Home country concentration (7) -0.13* 0.15* 0.26* -0.11 -0.19* 0.08 1 
     
8 Host country size (8) -0.37* 0.00 -0.05 0.49* -0.06 -0.30* -0.01 1 
    
9 Home country size (9) 0.11 0.13* 0.24* 0.08 0.11 -0.09 -0.43* 0.05 1 
   
10 Open markets (10) 0.02 -0.43* -0.36* 0.19* 0.06 -0.18* -0.10 -0.13* -0.12 1 
  
11 Geographical distance (11) -0.09 0.14* 0.09 -0.05 0.23* 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.24* -0.13* 1 
 
12 Geographical distance2 (12) -0.09 -0.03 -0.05 0.00 0.19* -0.05 -0.03 0.10 0.19* 0.05 0.91* 1 
 *p < 0.1 
Table 3.7 shows the correlations between the variables that are 
included in our analysis. Generally speaking, the variables do not 
show very high correlations. Multicollinearity does not pose a 
problem. We carried out a test for potential multicollinearity before 
estimating the regression model and found that the variance inflation 
factor in our models was below 4.5, far below the threshold of 10 
(Kutner, Nachtscheim, Neter & Li, 2005). Emerging country is 
negatively correlated with our dependent variable, while EMNEs are 
positively associated with it. One of the highest correlations is found 
between host country size and subsidiary size (0.49). This means that 
bigger countries tend to be home to bigger firms. Similarly, home 
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country size and home country concentration present a correlation of -
0.43. This may be explained by the fact that bigger countries tend to 
attract more firms (Nachum et al., 2008). The greater the number of 
competitors in the home market, the lower the probability of having 
concentrated home countries. Finally, emerging country shows a 
correlation of -0.43 with open markets. Emerging countries are often 
closer in terms of ease of entering them than advanced countries.  
Methodology 
The dependent variable is a limited variable subject to an upper 
(100%) and a lower (10%) boundary. For limited dependent variables, 
a classic ordinary least squares regression model will give biased and 
inconsistent estimates (Maddala, 1983). In this situation, a Tobit 
regression analysis is recommended (Greene, 1993). Indeed, Tobit 
estimation has been performed in prior studies with an identical 
dependent variable (Chari & Chang, 2009; Cuypers et al., 2015; Dow 
et al., 2016; Malhotra & Gaur, 2014; Pan et al., 2014). 
 
3.4. RESULTS 
Table 3.8 provides the results of our Tobit estimations (Models 1 
to 5). Model 1 only considers the influence of the control variables in 
the ownership acquired by MNEs. Model 2 introduces the effect that 
CBAs in an emerging country have on the dependent variable, to test 
Hypothesis 1. Model 3 introduces the variable EMNEs to the baseline 
model and Model 4 incorporates the direct effect of both emerging 
country and EMNEs. Finally, Model 5 introduces the interaction effect 
between emerging country and EMNEs to test Hypothesis 2. The 
likelihood ratio tests are presented at the bottom of Table 3.8. They 
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show that Model 5 is the model that best fits our data; thus, we employ 
it to comment our results.  
Table 3.8. Determinants of ownership acquired 
 Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
      
Emerging country  -19.741*  -24.056** -34.116*** 
  (10.350)  (10.651) (11.402) 
EMNEs   7.178 11.988 -21.371 
   (7.571) (7.769) (16.720) 
Emerging country x EMNEs     39.280** 
     (17.550) 
Subsidiary size -1.599*** -1.704*** -1.594*** -1.717*** -1.709*** 
 (0.552) (0.554) (0.549) (0.548) (0.538) 
Group international experience 0.714** 0.691** 0.793** 0.817** 0.811** 
 (0.348) (0.346) (0.356) (0.352) (0.346) 
Host country concentration -0.003* -0.002 -0.003* -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Home country concentration -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Host country size -0.121** -0.117** -0.120** -0.115** -0.124** 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.055) 
Home country size 0.019 0.019 0.014 0.012 0.009 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Open markets  3.755 -0.863 4.145 -1.221 -0.402 
 (3.618) (4.315) (3.625) (4.280) (4.205) 
Geographical distance -0.561 0.231 -0.899 -0.146 0.970 
 (2.890) (2.901) (2.898) (2.886) (2.867) 
Geographical distance2 -0.168 -0.230 -0.136 -0.191 -0.261 
 (0.243) (0.244) (0.245) (0.243) (0.240) 
Dummy years YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** 
_cons 37.125 41.752* 34.859 38.820* 47.944** 
 (23.566) (23.492) (23.571) (23.329) (23.226) 
sigma      
_cons 34.340*** 34.058*** 34.181*** 33.729*** 33.021*** 
 (2.416) (2.393) (2.406) (2.370) (2.319) 
N 183 183 183 183 183 
LL ratio test vs Model 1  3.67* 0.89 6.03** 10.98** 
LL ratio test vs Model 2    2.36 7.31** 
LL ratio test vs Model 3    6.03** 10.09*** 
LL ratio test vs Model 4     4.95** 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Hypothesis 1 stated that the emerging nature of the host country 
negatively influences the percentage that MNEs acquire in the 
subsidiary. Model 5 shows that emerging country has a negative and 
significant effect on ownership (= -34.116; p<0.01). This means that 
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CBAs in emerging countries are carried out with lower levels of 
ownership, giving support to Hypothesis 1. MNEs tend to acquire 
higher levels of ownership in subsidiaries that are located in advanced 
countries. 
However, it is not only the emerging nature of the host country 
that is important in the choice of ownership acquired, but also the 
origin of the MNE. Hypothesis 2 posited that MNEs that come from 
emerging countries acquire higher levels of ownership in emerging 
countries than AMNEs. Model 5 shows that the interaction term 
between emerging country and EMNEs is positive and statistically 
significant (=39.28; p<0.05). Being an EMNE positively moderates 
the negative impact that making a CBA in an emerging country has 
on the percentage of ownership acquired. EMNEs opt for a greater 
ownership percentage than AMNEs when making CBAs in emerging 
countries. This is consistent with Hypothesis 2 and we cannot 
therefore reject it.  
Figure 3.1 depicts this moderating effect by showing two lines. 
The solid line refers to AMNEs and the dotted line to EMNEs. The 
former has a negative slope, which means that AMNEs acquire lower 
ownership percentages in emerging countries than in advanced ones. 
The opposite trend is found in the case of EMNEs. The positive slope 
of the dotted line means that EMNEs opt for greater levels of 
ownership in emerging countries than in advanced countries. This 
confirms our premise that the origin of the MNE plays a significant 
role in understanding the relationship between the level of ownership 
acquired in a CBA and the level of development of the host country 
where the CBA takes place. 
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Figure 3.1. Interaction between emerging countries and EMNEs 
 
 
3.5. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
This research has analyzed entry by MNEs in the mobile 
telecommunications industry when performing CBAs. More 
precisely, we have observed that AMNEs and EMNEs behave 
differently when deciding on the ownership acquired when entering 
a foreign country. Prior studies suggest that the characteristics of the 
host country significantly determine the level of ownership acquired 
in a subsidiary. Our premise is that it is not only host country 
characteristics that are relevant, but also the characteristics of the 
home country. The latter define the conditions under which MNEs are 
accustomed to operating and therefore influence how they perceive 
the host country characteristics. Following recent studies, we noted 
that emerging and advanced countries show great differences in 
terms of their market characteristics. Thus, we differentiated home 
and host countries and distinguished between EMNEs and AMNEs. 
This classification led us to address two research questions. 
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Firstly, we analyzed how the emerging or advanced nature of the 
host country determines the level of ownership acquired by MNEs 
when making CBAs. Our results show that MNEs acquire higher 
levels of subsidiaries’ ownership when CBAs take place in advanced 
countries. Emerging countries are characterized by institutional voids 
that cause MNEs to perceive greater uncertainty surrounding CBAs. 
Due to this, they prefer to acquire a lower percentage of ownership to 
be able to leave more easily the investment if their expectations are 
unsatisfied. Moreover, this allows MNEs to maintain local investors 
that facilitate their introduction into the informal business network of 
the emerging country. Our results expand prior studies and confirm 
that the level of development of the host country is highly relevant to 
explain the ownership percentage acquired by MNEs in regulated 
industries.  
Secondly, we analyzed whether being an EMNE alters the 
relationship between the development of the host country and the 
level of ownership acquired in CBAs. AMNEs and EMNEs behave 
differently when making CBAs since they are accustomed to different 
market conditions in their home countries. In particular, we posited 
that EMNEs acquire higher levels of ownership than AMNEs when 
making CBAs in emerging countries. Our results confirmed this 
assumption. EMNEs are accustomed to operating under weaker 
market institutions in their home countries (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 
2009) and so, in comparison to AMNEs, they perceive lower 
uncertainty when making CBAs in other emerging countries. 
Advanced countries have usually stronger market systems that 
facilitate the development of economic activities. Thus, AMNEs trust 
in the market mechanisms that support their activities and perceive 
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great uncertainty when these conditions do not exist. This explains 
why they perceive emerging countries as riskier host countries than 
EMNEs do. In contrast, EMNEs have a different starting point and 
know how to operate under weaker market mechanisms. Thus, they 
do not perceive as much uncertainty as AMNEs when making CBAs 
in other emerging countries and are willing to acquire higher levels of 
ownership. Our results confirm that MNEs in regulated industries use 
their skills in dealing with governments and regulators when 
expanding abroad (García-Canal & Guillén, 2008). EMNEs are likely 
to acquire greater levels of ownership because they are more 
confident of dealing with the uncertainty of the host country than 
AMNEs. 
Our study may be of interest for target firms’ managers and 
public policy makers. From a managerial point of view, this study 
shows that the level of development of the country where the target 
company is located and the level of development of the country of the 
acquirer will determine the percentage of ownership that MNEs are 
going to acquire. The target mobile operator may anticipate which 
mobile groups are more likely to acquire higher levels of equity based 
on their location. When the mobile operator is located in an emerging 
country, the likelihood of being majority-owned by a mobile group 
that comes from an emerging country is greater. From the point of 
view of policy makers, this study shows that their decision about how 
much to intercede in the functioning system of the market will 
determine the level of ownership that mobile groups are likely to 
acquire when making a CBA. In this vein, governments from 
emerging countries that are interested in attracting investment from 
advanced economies should try to reduce the institutional voids that 
Chapter 3. Ownership in CBAs by Emerging Multinationals 
133 
foreign investors perceive. For instance, policy makers should try to 
improve the system of property rights protection and promote 
mechanisms to facilitate the introduction of foreign investors into the 
informal business network (e.g., trade associations and conventions). 
Our research is not exempt from limitations. Firstly, we 
differentiate between emerging and advanced host and home 
countries by using the IMF official classification. Even though this 
classification has been used in prior research with similar purposes, 
we cannot overlook that countries that are classified in the same 
group may differ substantially. In fact, when looking at the evolution 
of countries’ development over time, it is seen that some changed 
their status during the observed period. This means that those 
emerging (advanced) countries that are closer to the threshold may be 
more similar to advanced (emerging) countries than to other countries 
in their same category. Future research may take care of this issue by 
making more accurate classifications of countries. Secondly, we have 
controlled for prior experience in making CBAs. However, we do not 
differentiate whether this experience took place in advanced or 
emerging countries. AMNEs that have made many CBAs in emerging 
countries may have acquired enough knowledge about the 
functioning of these countries and, therefore, may perceive less 
uncertainty than other AMNEs without such experience. 
To conclude, it is important to note that this study contributes to 
prior literature in two ways. Firstly, we show that telecom MNEs face 
institutional voids in emerging markets that make them acquire 
higher levels of ownership in advanced countries than in emerging 
countries. Secondly, our results contribute to the literature by 
confirming that EMNEs and AMNEs behave differently when 
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expanding abroad because of their different perceptions of 
uncertainty derived from institutional voids in emerging markets. 
While EMNEs are used to counteracting institutional voids in their 
home countries, AMNEs find investments in emerging countries risky 
ventures. Norms and regulations are usually less developed in these 
countries, which makes business more difficult to carry out. This often 
leads to an increase in the perceived uncertainty surrounding CBAs 
made there. However, EMNEs feel much more comfortable than 
AMNEs when making CBAs in emerging countries, so they tend to 
acquire higher levels of ownership than AMNEs in these countries. 
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APPENDIX. HOST AND HOME COUNTRIES 
Host countries (82 countries) 
Angola Congo Iran Netherlands Togo 
Armenia Congo, Dem. Rep Ireland New Zealand Tunisia 
Australia Cote d'Ivoire Italy Niger Turkey 
Bangladesh Cyprus Japan Nigeria Turkmenistan 
Belarus Denmark Jordan Norway Uganda 
Benin Egypt Kazakhstan Pakistan Ukraine 
Bolivia Equatorial Guinea Kenya Paraguay United Arab Emirates 
Bosnia Estonia Korea, South Peru United Kingdom 
Botswana France Kyrgyzstan Portugal USA 
Bulgaria Gabon Laos Saudi Arabia Uruguay 
Burkina Faso Greece Luxembourg Singapore Uzbekistan 
Burundi Guinea-Bissau Macedonia Slovenia Venezuela 
Cabo Verde Guyana Malta Spain Yemen 
Central Africa Haiti Moldova Sri Lanka Zambia 
Chad Honduras Morocco Sweden  
Chile Hong Kong Namibia Switzerland  
Colombia Indonesia Nepal Tajikistan  
 
 
Home country group (35 countries) 
Australia France Japan Portugal South Africa 
Austria Gambia Kuwait Qatar Spain 
Bahrein Greece Luxemburg Russian Federation Sweden 
Belgium Hong Kong Malaysia Saudi Arabia Turkey 
Brazil India Mexico Serbia United Arab Emirates 
Denmark Italy Morocco Singapore United Kingdom 
Egypt Jamaica Norway Slovenia USA 
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4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The effect that changes in market-supporting institutions (i.e., 
institutions that “support the voluntary exchange underpinning an 
effective market mechanism”, Meyer et al., 2009: p. 63) have on firm 
performance has been widely studied in the literature (Chari and 
Banalieva, 2015; Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Dau, 2013; Park, Li, & 
Tse, 2006). However, there is a lack of consensus about the sign and 
significance of this relationship. While some studies report that 
institutional changes in favor of the market (namely, pro-market 
reforms) lead to higher performance (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; 
Park et al., 2006), other research fails to find such positive effects or 
even finds a U-shaped relationship (Chari & Banalieva, 2015; Lee, 
Peng, & Lee, 2008; Salim, 2003). Probably the main motive why 
previous evidence may not effectively explain the performance 
consequences of pro-market reforms is related to the static 
conceptualization of institutional change. This is the cause why recent 
research has searched for a more detailed explanation that 
incorporates a dynamic approach in what has been called the dynamic 
institution-based view (Banalieva, Eddleston, & Zellweger, 2015).  
Pro-market reforms can be carried out gradually in long periods 
of time or can be rapidly developed in short periods (Chen et al., 
2017). As a consequence, recent research has paid special attention not 
only to the institutional change itself but also to the speed at which 
this change takes place, emphasizing the dynamic nature of 
institutional conditions (Kim, Kim, & Hoskisson, 2010; Xu & Meyer, 
2013). This pace at which market-supporting institutions evolve has 
important consequences on firms’ strategy since it affects their 
response capabilities (Kim et al., 2010) and performance (Banalieva, 
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Cuervo-Cazurra, & Sarathy, 2018; Banalieva et al., 2015). The dynamic 
institution-based view of strategy emerges as a research stream that 
explains the influence of the speed of pro-market reforms on firm 
decisions (such as entry mode, Chen et al., 2017) and performance 
(Banalieva et al., 2015; Banalieva et al., 2018). 
Previous studies have shown that firms are heterogeneous when 
interacting with the environment, and not all firms adapt to changes 
in the same way. For example, the literature has analyzed the 
differences between family and non-family firms (Banalieva et al, 
2015) or between firms with different levels of market experience 
(Chen et al., 2017). However, little attention has been paid to the 
institutional advantages that MNEs can exploit to better counteract 
rapid institutional changes in the host countries where they operate. 
These institutional advantages come from the learning process that 
they have experienced in their home countries. First, some MNEs 
might develop institutional competitive advantages because they 
come from emerging countries where they are facing continuous 
institutional changes, so that institutional learning can help them to 
better understand and adapt to rapid institutional changes in host 
countries (Martin, 2014). Second, the experience gained from facing 
higher levels of competition in the home country -i.e. the competitive 
learning- generates new capabilities to face highly competitive 
situations (the result of pro-market reforms). This can be a source of 
institutional advantage when rapid institutional changes take place 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, Luo, Ramamurti, & Ang, 2018). Given that one of 
the reasons for the internationalization of MNEs is to exploit their 
resources and advantages in host markets, we posit in this paper that 
subsidiaries will exploit home country learning (both institutional 
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and competitive) of their parent MNE to better adapt to rapid pro-
market reforms in the host country. This constitutes a promising line 
of research that has not been previously analyzed and we aim to 
develop through this paper. 
As a consequence, the objective of this study is to expand pro-
market institutions literature, analyzing the role of institutional 
advantages from home country learning on subsidiaries’ performance 
under the lens of the dynamic institution-based view. Although we 
expect a negative relationship between the speed of change of market-
supporting institutions and subsidiary performance, not all firms 
adapt to these changes in the same way (Banalieva et al., 2015). We 
propose that subsidiaries of MNEs with origin in more competitive 
countries (where pro-market reforms have been successfully 
implemented) and in emerging countries (where pro-market reforms 
are taking place more intensively) can exploit their institutional 
advantages to better adapt to rapid institutional changes.  
We focus our empirical analysis on the worldwide mobile 
telecommunications industry from 2001 to 2017. This industry has 
experimented an exponential process of internationalization during 
the last decades. While earlier multinationals had their origin in 
advanced countries, recent mobile groups have appeared during the 
last years in emerging economies. Both of them are currently 
competing globally. 
The contribution of this article is twofold. First, under the lens of 
the dynamic institution-based view, we analyze the importance of 
home country learning to reduce the negative effect of rapid 
institutional change on subsidiary performance. We respond to the 
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call to incorporate the home country conditions in the institutional 
change research, as well as the need to deepen in the relationship 
between institutional changes and firm performance (Cuervo-
Cazurra, Gaur, & Singh, 2019). In doing so, we posit that subsidiaries 
differ in their capability to answer to rapid changes of market-
supporting institutions. MNEs that come from countries with high 
levels of competition and those that come from emerging markets 
have the chance to develop better capabilities to provide an adequate 
answer to rapid changes in the institutional environment and their 
subsidiaries can benefit from this experience. To our knowledge, our 
research is the first attempt to analyze to what extent subsidiaries can 
benefit from the institutional advantages developed by their parent 
MNEs in their home countries as a consequence of the competitive 
and institutional learning. Second, we provide additional empirical 
support for the dynamic institution-based view of the strategy. While 
prior studies have focused on emerging economies (Banalieva et al., 
2018) or subnational regions (Banalieva et al., 2015), we use a wide 
sample that includes 352 subsidiaries from 77 MNEs located in 34 
developed and 110 emerging economies from 2001 to 2017.  
4.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.2.1. The dynamic institution-based view of strategy 
The institution-based view of strategy argues that the institutional 
environment where companies compete, the ‘rules of the game’ (North, 
1990), influences firms’ choices by restricting or facilitating their activity 
(Peng et al., 2008, 2009). This institutional approach has become a 
substantial paradigm for understanding the organizational phenomena, 
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jointly to the industry-based and resource-based views (Peng et al., 
2009). 
Institutions are important for economic activity because they 
provide stability for economic exchanges by reducing uncertainty 
(North, 1990). Previous research has studied how the institutions in a 
country constitute a crucial factor that influences both the strategic 
decisions of firms and their performance (Ang, Benischke, & Doh, 2015; 
Dikova & Brouthers, 2016; Hernández, Nieto, & Boellis, 2018; Wan & 
Hoskisson, 2003). Among these institutions, scholars have kept special 
attention to the importance of market-supporting institutions that facilitate 
economic exchanges and promote an effective market mechanism 
(Meyer et al., 2009). Strong market-supporting institutions can 
contribute to more efficient transactions by reducing the costs of doing 
business (North, 1990). For instance, the existence of financial 
intermediaries facilitates the access to capital and information, which 
reduces uncertainty surrounding businesses and promotes the entry of 
new competitors. An effective judiciary system allows firms to request 
for protection of their property rights, which can promote innovative 
activities within the firm and the economy (James, Leiblein, & Lu, 2013). 
As property rights protection is enforced by the judiciary system, 
infringement is less prone to occur and it reduces the litigation costs of 
innovative firms (Lanjouw & Schankeman, 2004; Lerner, 1995). 
Moreover, market-supporting institutions condition the performance 
obtained from key strategic decisions such as diversification (Wan & 
Hoskisson, 2003), radical innovations (Fuentelsaz, Garrido, & Maícas, 
2015) and environmental strategies (Goedhuys & Sleuwaegen, 2013). 
It has also been acknowledged that the rules of the game change 
over time (Peng, 2003). Countries usually implement institutional 
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changes mainly with the aim of liberalize the market. These changes are 
usually known as pro-market reforms (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; 
Hoskisson et al., 2000; Newman, 2000; Park, et al., 2006; Peng, 
2003).19According to Dau (2012), pro-market reforms lead to national 
governance improvements and economic liberalization. First, 
governments try to reduce market imperfections through improvements 
on law and regulations, public goods and infrastructures. For instance, 
governments increase labor flexibility by reducing restrictions on 
termination of employment (Botero et al., 2004), encourage property 
rights protection by improving patent laws (Michel et al., 2013) and 
reduce uncertainty by facilitating the process of enforcing contracts in 
courts (North, 1991). Second, economic liberalization minimizes the 
government intervention on economic activities, becoming a facilitator 
instead of an active participant. For this reason, pro-market reforms 
usually bring price liberalization and reduction of industry and trade 
barriers in a country, which favors competition and entry of foreign 
investors (Dau, 2012). 
The inefficiencies in the institutional environment inhibit economic 
activity, especially in emerging countries where market-supporting 
institutions are less developed (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Hoskisson et al., 
2013; Khanna & Palepu, 1997). Weak market-supporting institutions 
restrict competition and innovation by discouraging people with ideas 
for new products and processes to enter the market and challenge 
established companies (Djankov et al., 2002; Svorny, 2000). With the aim 
of encouraging economic activity, governments from most countries 
have promoted institutional reforms aimed at creating a more market-
                                                          
19 In this paper we indistinctively use institutional changes and pro-market reforms to refer 
to variations in the level of development of market-supporting institutions that lead to 
national governance improvements and economic liberalization. 
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based economy (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Ireland, Tihanyi, & 
Webb, 2008; Kim et al., 2010; Park et al., 2006). Pro-market reforms can 
contribute to greater competition and innovation by an improvement of 
market-supporting institutions that facilitate economic exchanges. 
In spite of the above arguments, previous empirical studies show 
inconclusive evidence about the effect that pro-market reforms have on 
firm performance (Banalieva et al., 2018). Some studies that focus on 
emerging environments report that pro-market reforms lead to a better 
performance (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Park et al., 2006), while 
others fail to find such positive effects (Lee, et al., 2008; Salim, 2003). 
More recent studies report a U-shaped relationship between 
institutional reforms and firm performance (Chari & Banalieva, 2015). 
Given the absence of consensus, some studies have tried to provide a 
more complete explanation by incorporating a dynamic approach to the 
concept of institutional change. Previous research had considered 
institutional change as a static event, while pro-market reforms take time 
and are not developed in one-step (Banalieva et al., 2015). These reforms 
can be carried out gradually during a long period of time or they can be 
rapidly developed (Chen, et al., 2017). The dynamic institution-based 
view of strategy focuses on the effect that the speed of institutional 
changes has on firm choices and performance (Banalieva et al., 2015).  
According to this perspective, an institutional change implies a 
multi-stage process in which each stage derives in different institutional 
environments and institutional logics (Greenwood, Suddaby, & 
Hinings, 2002; Hoffman, 1999; Peng, 2003) and the transition from one 
stage to the next can vary in its velocity. The signaling theory indicates 
that governments, through their behavior, send signals to show their 
efforts in introducing reforms for or against the liberalization (Huang, 
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2013; Walsh, 2007). Therefore, some governments promote market-
supporting institutions quickly to send signals of efficiency in the 
market, to show the commitment of the government with market 
liberalization and to try to reduce transaction costs (Banalieva et al, 
2018). Nevertheless, other governments, that have already undergone a 
period of intensive pro-market reforms, can implement them more 
slowly due to pressures from stakeholders, or because a change of 
government mandate (Rajan & Zingales, 2003). From the dynamic 
institution-based view, the institutional change is not as important as the 
speed to which this change takes place (Banalieva et al., 2015), which can 
influence firm performance by creating an unstable environment. As 
Banalieva et al. (2015) posits, the notion of speed refers both to the 
change in the level of development of market-supporting institutions 
(distance travelled) and to the time needed to develop this change (time 
duration). In this way, this construct complements the static view of 
change in prior studies, which only focus on the final result of the pro-
market reforms and adopt a dynamic perspective, that also takes into 
consideration how quick the result has been achieved. 
4.2.2. Home Country Learning and Institutional Advantages 
Firms are heterogeneous in their ability to interact with the 
institutional environment (Chen et al., 2017) and they do not respond in 
the same way to institutional changes (Oliver, 1991). Some firms have 
resources that lead to a better adaptation (Chari & Banalieva, 2015; Kim 
et al., 2010; Xu & Meyer, 2013), thus conferring them an institutional 
competitive advantage. According to Martin (2014: 59), a firm has an 
institutional competitive advantage when “is implementing a strategy, 
featuring distinctive resources and activities enabled by its interactions 
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with the institutional environment, which generates economic value in 
excess of its competitors”.  
When institutional changes take place, firms will be forced to 
de-institutionalize norms, beliefs and practices previously legitimized 
to adapt to the new rules of the game. They need to improve 
resources, capabilities, productivity and the efficiency in the 
allocation of resources to survive as consequence of pro-market 
reforms (Oliver, 1992). The literature has shown that firms generate 
new resources and capabilities through learning and experience 
curves. An important learning source for MNEs is the home country 
learning (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2018) that can be key in the 
internationalization decisions, such as foreign direct investment 
(Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2018), and can become a source of institutional 
advantage. 
According to Cuervo-Cazurra et al. (2018), we can differentiate 
two types of home country learning for MNEs: institutional and 
competitive learning. We define institutional learning as the 
experience gained in the home country derived from facing the 
particularities of institutions, learning that is specially relevant when 
institutions are weak. Subsidiaries of MNEs that come from home 
countries with weak institutions have obtained an institutional 
learning that can be valuable to compete in host countries with 
institutional voids in comparison to subsidiaries that belong to MNEs 
from countries with more developed institutions (Cuervo-Cazurra et 
al., 2018). Some MNEs can use their exposure to weak and changing 
institutions in its home country as a source of competitive advantage 
in host countries (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008), which can derives 
in an institutional advantage (Martin, 2014). 
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In the same way, we define competitive learning as the 
experience gained in the home country due to the exposure to high 
levels of competition, which forces MNES to improve their 
competitiveness (Cuervo-Cazura et al., 2018). This competitive 
learning can confer a competitive advantage to the MNEs when pro-
market reforms take place in a host country, since they are used to 
counteract new competitors, products and consumer preferences in 
their home countries. This experience to face highly competitive 
environments is an intangible asset that can be a source of competitive 
advantage when rapid changes takes place and competition suddenly 
increase (Martin, 2014). 
As a consequence of the institutional and competitive 
environment from which MNEs come, they can possess a valuable 
experience to better adapt to rapid institutional changes in the host 
countries when new competitive conditions arise. Similar to 
experience acquired through skills-based routines (Caves, 1996; 
Dunning 1980; Kogut & Chang, 1991), which evolve through 
replication and search, institutional and competitiveness experience 
can be firm-specific resources (Perkins, 2014). The theory suggests 
that subsidiaries can benefit from the intangible resources of MNEs 
(Caves, 1996; Dunning, 1988). Subsidiaries from MNEs that possess 
institutional or competitive learning might better adapt to rapid 
institutional changes in comparison to competitors, exploiting the 
institutional competitive advantage of their MNE. 
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4.3. HYPOTHESES 
4.3.1. Speed of Institutional Change and Subsidiary Performance 
As we have previously noticed, institutions are important for 
economic activity and firm performance because they provide stability 
for economic exchanges (North, 1990). However, the institutional 
framework in which firms are immersed is complex and constantly 
changing (Peng, 2003). The complexity of institutional change and its 
impact on firm performance have attracted the attention towards the 
organizational adaptation capabilities as central research topic. The 
ability to cope with contextual forces that are often drastically altered 
has become a key determinant of firm competitive advantage (D'Aveni, 
1994). This ability is dependent on the speed of institutional change 
(Banalieva et al., 2015). Gradual institutional change allows firms to 
adjust with minimum stress (Godoy & Stiglitz, 2007; Murrell, 1992), 
while when changes happen quickly, uncertainty increases (Chari & 
Banalieva, 2015). This is a challenge for subsidiaries that seek to adapt to 
the changing rules of the game in a host country where they operate (Xu 
& Meyer, 2013). These changes in the institutional framework take place 
because governments develop pro-market reforms to reduce market 
imperfections and to attract investment and innovation to their 
countries, with the consequent increase in competition. As Dau (2012) 
explains, pro-market reforms lead to economic liberalization and 
national governance improvements. 
Economic liberalization implies that governments try to reduce 
their intervention in the market, becoming a facilitator instead of an 
active participant. Nevertheless, it has been noticed that the value of 
firms tends to decrease as market-supporting institutions rapidly evolve 
Chapter 4. Speed of Institutional Change and Subsidiary Performance 
156 
towards a market economy because of the costs associated with the 
adaptation to the new environment. As the government eliminates its 
role in establishing production and sales goals, subsidiaries must 
quickly learn to implement production objectives, to establish prices that 
maximize profits and to seek new customers (Hurt, Hurt-Warski, & 
Roux-Dufort, 2000). Given the relative absence of capacities associated 
with the new institutional environment, subsidiaries often have 
difficulties to predict demand evolution and to allocate the necessary 
resources to satisfy it (Illner, 1998; Xu & Meyer, 2013). When these pro-
market reforms take place rapidly, firms may have difficulties to adjust 
to institutional changes. Subsidiaries need to find new customers and 
suppliers immediately and they have not time to study the effects of the 
new institutional situation as change occurs (Hurt et al., 2000). 
Moreover, subsidiaries have problems to preserve their location-based 
advantages and they need to generate capabilities to adapt to the new 
landscape that require a more competitive position (McMillan & 
Woodruff, 2002; Witt & Lewin, 2007). The uncertainty and volatility 
associated with rapid pro-market reforms makes difficult for 
subsidiaries to accurately predict the key parameters of their strategic 
decision-making process in order to counteract the new competitive 
environment (Park et al., 2006; Xu & Meyer, 2013). This deficiency of 
adaptation will require investing resources to develop new capabilities 
which will negatively affect subsidiary performance. 
Also, pro-market reforms entail improvements on national 
governance. The authorities of the country develop institutions to 
impose rules and regulate the behavior of market participants (North, 
1990). An improvement of market-supporting institutions aligns rules 
and regulations with market principles, allowing rule-based 
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transactions to replace transactions based on relationships (Peng, 2003). 
As a result, subsidiaries can access market spaces previously regulated 
by the state or monopolized by firms affiliated with the state. The 
existence of restrictive rules in underdeveloped institutionally markets 
inhibits competition and innovation by discouraging people with ideas 
to develop new products and processes, as well as to enter the market 
and challenge established firms (Djankov et al., 2002). By reducing entry 
restrictions and improving property right protection, institutional 
reforms can contribute to greater competition and innovation (Chari & 
Banalieva, 2015). Rapid reforms in market-supporting institutions 
quickly eliminate transactional barriers in the economy, which suddenly 
opens up more market space for firms (Chen et al., 2017). In addition, 
high-speed market-supporting institutions reforms will promote the 
presence of technological innovations that shorten the life cycles of 
products, so products become obsolete which increase costs for firms 
(Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). In contrast, a gradual change on 
market-supporting institutions will allow subsidiaries to adapt with 
minimum stress (Godoy & Stiglitz, 2007). Old and new products can 
coexist at different prices, offering companies a wider range of market 
opportunities (Lawless y Anderson, 1996). Subsidiaries can better adapt 
to gradual changes, observe new competitors and provide answers to 
competitive pressures. 
Therefore, a rapid change of market-supporting institutions will 
reduce subsidiary performance because of the complexity to adapt to a 
sudden institutional change that will be translated into an increase of 
competition, a reduction of prices and the introduction of new products 
and innovations in the market in a short period of time. It will offer 
consumers greater choice options and, therefore, weaken the demand of 
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the subsidiaries. In the same way, performance will be reduced because 
the subsidiary will have to devote part of its resources to generate new 
capabilities in such a short period of time. From here, our first 
hypothesis is derived: 
Hypothesis 1: A high speed of institutional change in the host country 
negatively affects subsidiary performance. 
4.3.2. MNEs with origin in emerging environments 
During the last years, there has been an increase in the number of 
MNEs that come from emerging countries (emerging multinationals or 
EMNEs). These companies are accustomed to develop their activities in 
a context with underdeveloped capital and labor markets, weak legal 
infrastructure, insufficient protection of property rights and weak 
judiciary systems to enforce contracts (Contractor et al., 2014; Guillén & 
García-Canal, 2009; Meyer et al., 2009). These MNEs have emerged at a 
time of market globalization in which, despite the local differences that 
still exist, the global scope and the global scale are crucial. The MNEs 
have responded to this challenge by undertaking an accelerated 
international strategy based on external growth aimed at increasing 
their scope and exploiting their capabilities both in emerging and in 
developed countries.  
Pro-market reforms, that have taken place worldwide, have been 
especially intense during the last decades in many emerging markets 
(Banalieva et al., 2015). Recent studies have shown that EMNEs possess 
specific capabilities that allow them to better adapt to turbulent 
environments compared to multinationals from advanced economies 
(De Beule, Elia, & Piscitello, 2014; Guillén & García-Canal, 2009). The 
main reason is that they have acquired a valuable institutional learning 
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in their home country that can be used in the internationalization 
process to compete in changing environments. What would be, a priori, 
a source of competitive disadvantage (having an origin in a country with 
underdeveloped market-supporting institutions) becomes an advantage 
when EMNEs move to other countries with similar institutional 
environments (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). If experience provides 
firms a competitive advantage in the management of institutional 
changes, we should expect a greater importance of this institutional 
learning to counteract institutional changes in the most turbulent 
environments (Henisz & Delios, 2000). 
To be competitive in their home countries, EMNEs have had to 
develop capabilities to adapt to weak market-supporting institutions 
and to deal with pro-market reforms that many emerging economies 
have experienced in the last decades. As a consequence of the learning 
developed in their home countries, EMNEs can better identify the 
intentions of governments in host markets when they try to improve 
market-supporting institutions and will react quicker than other less 
experienced firms (Henisz & Delios, 2000). As result, subsidiaries from 
EMNEs can apply better strategies to face institutional changes, such as 
developing the capacity to integrate into the local market with the 
intention of obtaining information about local consumers and suppliers. 
These skills can provide EMNEs an institutional competitive advantage 
when they expand to other countries in comparison to subsidiaries from 
MNEs with origin in advanced economies (De Beule et al., 2014).  
As we had previously seen, the success of MNEs is influenced by 
the availability of intangible assets that can be transferred and shared 
among subsidiaries (Caves, 1996; Dunning, 1988). We will expect that 
subsidiaries that are controlled by EMNEs can benefit from scale and 
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scope economies when rapid institutional changes take place due to 
their experience in turbulent environments. These firms will have the 
capacity to react to institutional changes faster, so they will not suffer 
the high costs associated with the adaptation process, and therefore, 
they will have a less negative effect on their performance. Therefore, we 
propose that: 
Hypothesis 2: The origin of the parent MNE in an emerging country 
positively moderates the relationship between the speed of institutional 
change in the host country and subsidiary performance. 
4.3.3. MNEs with origin in highly competitive environments 
Previous research has shown that experience is a key element that 
may allow firms to obtain competitive advantages. Subsidiaries can 
benefit from resources and capabilities that parent MNEs have 
generated in their home countries (Tallman & Yip, 2009; Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977; Shaver, Mitchell & Yeung, 1997). Among these 
capabilities, the literature has paid special attention to competitive 
learning, that arises as a consequence of the experience derived from 
exposure to high levels of competition in the home country (Cuervo-
Cazurra et al, 2018). MNEs that face intense competition in their home 
countries both, from domestic firms and from foreign competitors, are 
used to cope with more demanding customers, whose preferences will 
be more sophisticated over time. As a result of this experience, MNEs 
learn to adapt more rapidly to changes in consumer preferences or to the 
appearance of new competitors and products that threat their 
profitability. When this experience is transferred to host markets, MNEs 
can be in an advantageous position compared to other competitors. This 
experience in highly competitive environments is especially valuable 
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when the institutional change that takes place in the host country results 
in a rapid increase of competition. 
As we have seen, when a rapid change in market-supporting 
institutions takes place, it is important for firms to emphasize efficiency, 
flexibility and rapid adaptation (McMillan & Woodruff, 2002). Firms 
must be able to quickly develop and manufacture new products or 
services that satisfy the demand of new preferences and market niches. 
Firms have to adapt quickly to operate efficiently in highly competitive 
environments (McMillan & Woodruff, 2002). MNEs that come from 
highly competitive markets (the goal to achieve with pro-market 
reforms), have previously faced the entry of new competitors, products 
and services and have developed skills and abilities to adapting and 
answering faster to increasing competitive pressures. Thus, we posit that 
those subsidiaries of MNEs with origin in highly competitive 
environments can benefit from the experience of the parent company in 
order to better adapt to the rapid pro-market reforms that increase 
competition in the host market, which confer them an institutional 
competitive advantage. Therefore, we propose that: 
Hypothesis 3: The origin of the parent MNE in a highly competitive 
market positively moderates the relationship between the speed of 
institutional change in the host country and subsidiary performance. 
4.4. SAMPLE AND VARIABLES 
4.4.1. The mobile telecommunications industry 
The empirical analysis is carried out in the mobile 
telecommunications industry.  Our data come from the GSMA 
Intelligence Database (2018). GSMA Intelligence is a source of mobile 
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operator data, analysis and forecasts. With over 26 million individual 
data points (updated daily), the service provides coverage of the 
performance of more than 1,400 operators and 1,200 MVNOs (mobile 
virtual network operator) across more than 4,400 networks, 80 groups 
and 237 countries and territories worldwide (GSMA Intelligence, 2018). 
With data retrieved from this dataset, we have built a panel of 4,397 
observations that correspond to the yearly performance obtained by 352 
subsidiaries20 (our unit of analysis) in 144 host countries from 2001 to 
2017. These subsidiaries belong to 74 MNEs from 45 home countries.21 
The dataset also provides information about several variables regarding 
the subsidiary, such as age and size, in order to complement the analysis. 
This industry is especially suitable for our research for several 
reasons. First, mobile telecommunications industry has undergone an 
exponential internationalization process during the last decades, where 
MNEs have become the key players of the industry. Moreover, these 
MNEs carry out their activity through five continents which favors our 
research proposes since it allow us a high institutional variability across 
host countries where subsidiaries compete. 
Second, it is true that internationalization in the industry started 
with FDI by MNEs from advanced economies (e.g. Deutsche Telekom 
from Germany, Orange from France, Telefónica from Spain, or 
Vodafone from the United Kingdom); however, during the last twenty 
years, MNEs from emerging countries have gained leading positions in 
the industry (e.g. América Móvil from Mexico, Bharti Airtel from India, 
                                                          
20 We identify the subsidiaries that have been controlled by MNEs with at least 10% of 
ownership in each period. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have considered the existence of FDI 
when MNEs own at least 10 per cent of the subsidiary’s equity. 
21 See the Appendix and the Table 4.2 for a detailed list of the different home and host 
countries included in the sample, respectively. 
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or Zain from Kuwait). As a consequence, the 74 MNEs included in our 
sample come from 45 home countries, 51% emerging countries and 49% 
advanced countries. This distribution of home countries is adequate to 
testing to what extent the origin in emerging countries could be a source 
of institutional learning to counteract the speed of pro-market reforms 
on the performance of the subsidiary. 
Finally, as competition takes place at national level, these 
geographical boundaries allows to better delimitate the scope of 
competition in a market. As the number of competitors in every country 
is usually limited, it is possible to quantify the number of direct rivals 
and their market shares. Moreover, the degree of rivalry is 
heterogeneous across countries which allows to test to what extent the 
origin of MNEs in countries with high levels of competition could be a 
source of competitive learning to better adapt to pro-market reforms. 
4.4.2. Dependent Variable 
The main objective in this paper is to analyze the effect of the speed 
of institutional change in the performance of the subsidiaries and the 
influence that institutional advantages developed by MNEs can have in 
this relationship. Following previous studies (Domínguez, Garrido, & 
Orcos, 2016; Jakopin & Klein, 2012; Sung, 2014), we use the EBITDA 
margin as a measure of subsidiary performance22. The EBITDA margin is 
a ratio where the numerator is the total EBITDA obtained by the 
subsidiary (total operating profit in the period before interest, tax, 
                                                          
22 We limit the extreme values at 10% to reduce the effect of possibly outliers (Barnett and 
Lewis, 1994). 
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depreciation and amortization) and the denominator is the total 
revenue.  
4.4.3. Independent Variables 
Following previous studies, we proxy market-supporting 
institutions through the Economic Freedom index developed by the 
Heritage Foundation (Fuentelsaz et al., 2015; Meyer et al., 2009). The 
Economic Freedom index documents the positive relationship between 
economic freedom and a variety of positive social and economic goals. 
The index measures economic freedom based on 12 factors, grouped into 
four categories or broad pillars of economic freedom such as rule of law, 
government size, regulatory efficiency and open markets. Each of the 
twelve items is measured on a scale from 0 to 100 (total freedom). 
Following Meyer et al. (2009), we have calculated the mean value of the 
five categories that most closely reflect the efficiency of markets and that 
have previously served to operationalize market-supporting 
institutions: business freedom, trade freedom, property rights, investment 
freedom and financial freedom (Meyer et al., 2009). In this way, we measure 
the extent to which institutions in a market support economic exchanges 
by ensuring capital and information flows, the protection of property 
rights and the entry of new participants into a market (Fuentelsaz, et al., 
2015). 
To calculate the speed of institutional change, we follow the measure 
proposed by Banalieva et al. (2015) that has been used for similar 
purposes (Chen et al, 2017). The speed of institutional change captures 
the distance between the scope of market-supporting institutions on the 
initial period and the current scope (distance travelled), as well as the 
time each country takes to achieve the new scope (time duration) 
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(Heybey & Murrell, 1999). According to Banalieva et al. (2015), the speed 
of institutional change in a country i and year t is calculated as follows: 
 
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒௜,௧ =  
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙  𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒௜,௧
𝐹𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒௜
 
 
The Actual Speed of Institutional Change in country i is defined as the 
difference between the scope of market-supporting institutions in the 
year t (t = 2001… 2017) and the scope of market-supporting institutions 
in the base year (2000)23 divided by the number of years elapsed.24 The 
Fastest Speed of Institutional Change captures the maximum institutional 
change in a country, which is obtained as the difference between the 
maximum scope of market-supporting institutions (100 in our case, 
because the Economic Freedom index ranges between 0 and 100) minus 
the scope of market-supporting institutions for each country in the base 
year. Accordingly, a higher value of the variable indicates a faster speed 
of institutional change (Banalieva et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2017). 
Emerging Origin. We employ a dummy variable to measure the 
emerging origin of the MNE that has control over the subsidiary. First, 
we identify subsidiaries that are controlled for a MNE with at least 10% 
                                                          
23 There are countries included in the sample for which the economic freedom index does 
not report data until 2004 or 2009, so we have taken those years as the base year for these 
exceptions. In the rest of cases, 2000 is the base year. 
24 For example, to calculate the Actual Speed of Institutional Change in Austria in 2007, we 
take the scope of market-supporting institutions during 2007, which reports a value of 
79.66. We subtract to this value the scope of market-supporting institutions for the base 
year, in our case the year 2000, which takes a value of 76.66. Finally, we divide this 
difference (3.06) between the years that have elapsed since the base year and the year that 
is being calculated (7). Therefore, we have that the actual speed of institutional change is 
0.437. 
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of ownership in period t.25 Second, we identify if the home country of 
the MNE is classified as an emerging country. Following previous 
studies, we use the official classification of the IMF to classify countries 
as advanced or emerging (De Beule et al., 2014). Therefore, if in period t 
the subsidiary is controlled by a MNE and the home country of this MNE 
is an emerging country, this dummy takes value 1 and 0 otherwise.  
Competitive Origin. In the same way, we employ a dummy variable 
to measure the origin in a highly competitive market of the parent 
MNEs. We consider that the home market of the MNE is highly 
competitive in period t when its Herfindahl Index is below the average 
of the Herfindahl Index in the sample in a given year, minus one 
standard deviation (mean – s.d.). Therefore, if a subsidiary in period t is 
controlled by a MNE at least at 10% and the home country is classify as 
highly competitive in that period, this measure takes value 1, and 0 
otherwise. 
4.4.4. Control Variables 
First, we control for subsidiary-level influences on performance. 
Older firms may be more profitable as they are more established in the 
market and can obtain first-mover advantages (Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1988). Thus, similarly to previous studies, we control for 
subsidiary age through the number of quarters since foundation 
(Banalieva et al., 2018). Moreover, subsidiary size generally has a positive 
effect of performance because large firms can have a more favorable 
access to capital and more efficient resources and can enjoy higher 
efficiency due to scale economies (Park et al., 2006). We measure 
                                                          
25 If two or more MNEs have control over the firm in the same period, we consider that the MNE 
with higher ownership level has the control, and therefore, we use the characteristics of the home 
country of this MNE.   
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subsidiary size by the number of millions of connections of each 
operator.26  
Second, we include country-level control variables. Similar to 
previous studies (Banalieva et al, 2015, Banalieva et al., 2018), we control 
for the scope of market-supporting institutions. This variable is calculated 
as the average of the five dimensions of the Economic Freedom index for 
country i in period t. As a country has stronger market-supporting 
institutions, we can expect a higher level of competition and lower 
performance. As a larger market may give more opportunities to 
subsidiaries, we control by population (in millions of habitants) and GDP 
(in thousands of millions of euros). Moreover, when a technological 
change happens, industry leaders may see their first-mover advantages 
weakened and new market segments emerge with new opportunities to 
generate profits. So, we control for the existence of a technological change 
in the market through a dummy variable that takes value 1 since the 
period that the 3G technology appears in the market, and 0 in the 
previous years. Also, we include the number of firms that compete in the 
market because we expected that more competitive markets show a 
lower performance (Gómez & Maícas, 2011). Moreover, given that the 
increase in demand can induce the entry of new competitors in the 
market, affecting the performance of the subsidiary, we control for 
demand growth (Park, et al., 2006). Finally, the model includes regional 
and year dummies to control for regional and time‐specific influences, 
respectively. 
                                                          
26 Connections refer to the number of SIM cards (or phone numbers, where SIM cards are 
not used), excluding cellular M2M, that have been registered on the mobile network at the 
end of the period (GSMA Intelligence, 2018). 
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Since the effects of independent variables on performance may not 
necessarily materialize immediately, we consider one year lag between 
EBITDA margin and the independent and control variables (Wan & 
Hoskisson, 2003; Lu & Beamish, 2004; Kim, et al., 2010).  
4.4.5. Descriptive analysis 
As the paper focuses on the speed of institutional change, with a 
special attention on pro-market reforms, we find important to determine 
to what extent this type of pro-market reforms have taken place in our 
sample. For this reason, Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the evolution of market-
supporting institutions, while Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 show the 
descriptive statistics and correlations for all the variables included in our 
analysis.  
Table 4.1. Evolution of market-supporting institutions (2000 to 2017) 
 2000 2017 Increase 
Total Countries 56.4 61.1 ▲ 
Advanced Countries 75.9 80.7 ▲ 
Emerging Countries 50.9 55.1 ▲ 
 
Table 4.1 present the average value of the five dimensions of the 
Economic Freedom index in 2000 and 2017 for the whole sample. We can 
observe that, on average, market-supporting institutions have been 
improved in all countries during this 18-year period. In addition, the 
table shows the same comparison by focusing only on emerging and 
advanced countries. We conduct this analysis because previous studies 
have mainly focused on emerging economies in order to analyze the 
effect of institutional changes and the speed of institutional changes on 
firm performance (Banalieva et al., 2015; Banalieva et al., 2018; Chari & 
Banalieva, 2015; Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009). However, as we can 
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observe in the table, market-supporting institutions have increased in 
around 5 points for emerging and advanced countries. Although the 
advanced countries present stronger market-supporting institutions (as 
a consequence of earlier pro-market reforms), they are also subject to 
institutional changes of similar magnitude during the period of analysis. 
Therefore, we believe that it is necessary to include these countries in the 
sample to provide a more complete evidence of the influence of the 
speed of institutional changes on subsidiary performance. 
Table 4.2 complements the descriptive analysis by offering a 
detailed comparison of the mean of the five dimensions of the Economic 
Freedom index by country in the base year and in 2017. We can observe 
that only 35 of the 144 countries in the sample show weaker market-
supporting institutions in 2017 than in 2000, which indicates that 76% of 
countries show an increase in the level of market-supporting 
institutions. With regard to the countries that weaken their market-
supporting institutions, this decrease is slightly small with only some 
exceptions (i.e. Argentina, Bolivia and Venezuela) where the 
deterioration of market-supporting institutions is pronounced because 
of the turbulent political conditions in recent years.  
Table 4.3 shows the mean value and its standard deviation, as well 
as the minimum and maximum values of all the variables. It can be 
observed that, on average, the performance of the subsidiaries included 
in the sample is 0.20, with a standard deviation of 0.42, which reflects a 
high variability. It can also be observed that the average speed of 
institutional change is positive and reaches a value of 0.005. However, 
the speed of change that countries suffer shows a high variability, as 
indicated by the standard deviation of 0.04, as well as the maximum 
(0.37) and minimum (-0.34) values. Regarding the moderating variables, 
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the emerging and competitive origin, we observe that on average, there 
are more companies controlled by MNEs with emerging origin (0.42) 
than with highly competitive origin (0.21). 
Table 4.2. Evolution of market-supporting institutions in host countries  
(2000 to 2017) 
Advanced Host Countries 
Country 2000 2017  Country 2000 2017  Country 2000 2017  
Australia 79 .8 85 .4 ▲ Hong Kong 92 .0 91 .7 ▼ Norway 72 .2 79 .8 ▲ 
Austria 76 .6 82 .0 ▲ Ireland 78 .6 82 .6 ▲ Portugal 67 .6 75 .3 ▲ 
Belgium 75 .6 81 .5 ▲ Israel 75 .6 75 .0 ▼ Singapore 86 .6 89 .4 ▲ 
Canada 74 .5 83 .7 ▲ Italy 71 .6 73 .3 ▲ Slovakia 58 .2 73 .2 ▲ 
Cyprus 69 .9 72 .6 ▲ Japan 71 .2 76 .9 ▲ Slovenia 62 .7 72 .5 ▲ 
Czech 
Republic 77 .4 76 .9 ▼ Latvia 68 .2 74 .9 ▲ Spain 71 .6 76 .0 ▲ 
Denmark 78 .6 87 .5 ▲ Lithuania 64 .2 75 .8 ▲ Sweden 72 .6 86 .3 ▲ 
Estonia 80 .0 83 .3 ▲ Luxembourg 78 .8 83 .3 ▲ Switzerland 80 .2 85 .7 ▲ 
Finland 71 .6 86 .6 ▲ Macao 70*  73 .0 ▲ United Kingdom 82 .6 88 .1 ▲ 
France 63 .6 77 .0 ▲ Malta 64 .2 72 .4 ▲ United States of America 78 .7 80 .6 ▲ 
Germany 71 .6 81 .3 ▲ Netherlands 79 .6 84 .9 ▲        
Greece 63 .6 61 .8 ▼ New Zealand 86 .7 87 .1 ▲ 
    
Emerging Host Countries 
Country 2000 2017  Country 2000 2017  Country 2000 2017  
Albania 51 .6 72 .2 ▲ Guinea-Bissau 23 .9 41 .1 ▲ Pakistan 49 .6 52 .0 ▲ 
Algeria 51 .9 45 .7 ▼ Guyana 51 .2 52 .3 ▲ Panama 69 .8 71 .7 ▲ 
Angola 31 .0 44 .3 ▲ Haiti 34 .4 40 .5 ▲ Papua New Guinea 45 .6 47 .6 ▲ 
Argentina 71 .4 51 .3 ▼ Honduras 53 .6 61 .1 ▲ Paraguay 62 .5 62 .4 ▼ 
Armenia 60 .4 72 .8 ▲ Hungary 71 .3 71 .2 ▼ Peru 65 .6 70 .0 ▲ 
Azerbaijan 40 .0 60 .3 ▲ India 36 .9 52 .2 ▲ Philippines 57 .9 61 .6 ▲ 
Bahamas 65 .0 54 .9 ▼ Indonesia 54 .2 54 .6 ▲ Poland 67 .0 72 .1 ▲ 
Bahrain 68 .5 74 .3 ▲ Iran 27 .3 32 .3 ▲ Qatar 52 .0 68 .2 ▲ 
Bangladesh 36 .4 46 .4 ▲ Jamaica 65 .4 68 .4 ▲ Romania 55 .8 68 .4 ▲ 
Belarus 40 .5 48 .6 ▲ Jordan 68 .1 67 .2 ▼ Russian Federation 47 .5 51 .5 ▲ 
Benin 55 .8 57 .3 ▲ Kazakhstan 42 .4 59 .8 ▲ Rwanda 27 .0 58 .7 ▲ 
Bolivia 64 .0 41 .1 ▼ Kenya 57 .6 53 .5 ▼ Sao Tome and Principe 41 * 53 .9 ▲ 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 35 .8 60 .0 ▲ 
Korea, 
North 14 .0 7 .5 ▼ Saudi Arabia 51 .8 60 .8 ▲ 
Botswana 64 .2 69 .1 ▲ Kuwait 66 .6 62 .1 ▼ Senegal 54 .0 53 .6 ▲ 
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Brazil 54 .2 57 .1 ▲ Kyrgyzstan 50 .0 62 .0 ▲ Serbia 52.8*  62 .2 ▲ 
Bulgaria 55 .0 69 .2 ▲ Laos 27 .2 46 .2 ▲ Seychelles 44.8*  57 .4 ▲ 
Burkina Faso 52 .0 52 .8 ▲ Lesotho 49 .2 54 .8 ▲ Sierra Leone 38 .7 47 .3 ▲ 
Cabo Verde 50 .0 62 .3 ▲ Liberia 33.8*  43 .4 ▲ South Africa 63 .2 59 .4 ▼ 
Cambodia 50 .6 52 .5 ▲ Macedonia 53.6*  70 .9 ▲ Sri Lanka 58 .2 54 .1 ▼ 
Cameroon 42 .6 45 .2 ▲ Madagascar 44 .4 52 .2 ▲ Syria 28 .0 29.8* ▼ 
Chad 42 .0 42 .6 ▲ Malawi 53 .4 51 .4 ▼ Tajikistan 44 .0 48 .0 ▲ 
Chile 73 .1 76 .4 ▲ Malaysia 60 .8 73 .5 ▲ Tanzania 48 .5 53 .0 ▲ 
Colombia 64 .8 74 .5 ▲ Maldives 43.4*  47 .7 ▲ Thailand 66 .6 62 .8 ▼ 
Congo 34 .0 39 .8 ▲ Mali 61 .0 51 .2 ▼ Timor-Leste 38*  44 .8 ▲ 
Congo, 
Democratic 
Republic 
26 .8 43 .0 ▲ Mauritania 36 .0 47 .8 ▲ Trinidad and Tobago 77 .4 62 .2 ▼ 
Cote d'Ivoire 43 .8 60 .4 ▲ Mexico 53 .6 67 .8 ▲ Tunisia 55 .6 51 .8 ▼ 
Croatia 50 .4 69 .2 ▲ Moldova 59 .0 60 .1 ▲ Turkey 71 .0 68 .0 ▼ 
Dominican 
Republic 48 .6 60 .2 ▲ Montenegro 39.7*  67 .9 ▲ Turkmenistan 30 .0 30 .5 ▲ 
Ecuador 58 .4 47 .8 ▼ Morocco 60 .2 69 .3 ▲ Uganda 49 .0 52 .0 ▲ 
Egypt 48 .0 53 .5 ▲ Mozambique 46 .6 52 .2 ▲ Ukraine 47 .0 48 .9 ▲ 
El Salvador 78 .0 65 .8 ▼ Myanmar 39 .8 37 .5 ▼ United Arab Emirates 66 .4 68 .3 ▲ 
Fiji 56 .0 60 .6 ▲ Namibia 68 .2 62 .0 ▼ Uruguay 70 .5 68 .1 ▼ 
Gabon 52 .0 48 .7 ▼ Nepal 42 .6 42 .0 ▼ Uzbekistan 32 .0 37 .9 ▲ 
Georgia 46 .8 74 .2 ▲ Nicaragua 52 .2 57 .2 ▲ Venezuela 57 .1 23 .4 ▼ 
Ghana 53 .2 61 .3 ▲ Niger 38 .6 46 .9 ▲ Yemen 41 .2 48.3*   
Guatemala 59 .4 61 .1 ▲ Nigeria 46 .0 45 .3 ▼ Zambia 62 .8 59 .9 ▼ 
Guinea 51 .2 44 .5 ▼ Oman 52 .2 67 .9 ▲ TOTAL 56 .4 61 .1 ▲ 
▲ We used this symbol when market-supporting institutions have increased their value at the end of the period, 
we employ ▼ when have decreased.  
* In these cases, the value that appears in the table does not correspond to the years 2000 or 2017. This value 
corresponds with the first or last year for which we have the corresponding data for that country. In countries 
for which we do not have information for the year 2000, this first data of market-supporting institutions hasbeen 
taken as the base data for the calculations of the measure of speed of institutional change 
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Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics (N=4,397) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Subsidiary performance 0.20 0.42 -9.97 1 
Speed of institutional changet-1 0.003 0.04 -0.34 0.37 
Emerging origint-1 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Competitive origint-1 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Subsidiary sizet-1 60.99 15.81 1 92.14 
Subsidiary aget-1 9.01 18.23 0 256.4 
Scope of institutionst-1 4.74 3.27 1 24 
Market concentrationt-1 3,970 1,476 1,324 10,000 
Demand growtht-1 601.3 1,778 0.20 18,62 
GDPt-1 0.72 0.45 0 1 
Technological changet-1 0.23 0.91 -0.28 53.13 
Populationt-1 16.59 1.62 11.43 21.01 
 
Regarding the correlations between the different variables (see 
Table 4.4), there is a positive and significant correlation between the 
performance of the current year and the lagged performance, as well as 
a negative and significant correlation between the speed of institutional 
change and firm performance. The emerging and highly competitive 
origin of the MNEs are also significantly correlated with performance, 
positive and negatively, respectively. Regarding the control variables, 
only the population has a relatively high correlation with two variables, 
firm size and number of firms. It seems reasonable that in countries with 
larger population there is scope for a higher number of firms and firms 
with higher size. A VIF analysis has been done to verify possible 
multicollinearity problems among our variables, obtaining a value 
lower than 10, which demonstrate that multicollinearity problems are 
not important here (Neter, Wasserman & Kutner, 1990). 
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Table 4.4. Correlations (N=4,397) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Subsidiary performance 1.00             
2 Subsidiary performancet-1 0.31* 1.00            
3 
Speed of institutional 
changet-1 
-0.04* 0.00 1.00           
4 Emerging origint-1 0.03* 0.01 -0.16* 1.00          
5 Competitive origint-1 -0.09* -0.02 -0.03* 0.04* 1.00         
6 Subsidiary sizet-1 0.12* 0.04* -0.01 0.01 0.021 1.00        
7 Subsidiary aget-1 0.18* 0.09* 0.02 0.07* -0.079* 0.27* 1.00       
8 Scope of Institutionst-1 0.01 0.02 0.39* -0.45* -0.045* -0.06 0.07* 1.00      
9 Market concentrationt-1 -0.02 0.01 -0.04* 0.12* -0.13* -0.30* -0.23* -0.26* 1.00     
10 GDPt-1 0.01 0.01 0.13* -0.17* 0.071* 0.42* 0.05* -0.25* -0.27* 1.00    
11 Technological changet-1 0.03* 0.01 0.12* -0.04* -0.025 0.20* 0.58* 0.21* -0.29* 0.12* 1.00   
12 Demand growtht-1 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06* 0.07* 0.006 -0.07* -0.20* -0.20* 0.17* -0.05* -0.19* 1.00  
13 Populationt-1 -0.02 -0.05* -0.12* 0.02* 0.113* 0.56* -0.01 -0.21* -0.44* 0.40* 0.01 0.04* 1.00 
 
4.5. RESULTS 
Our dependent variable, subsidiary performance, may present inertia 
over time because current values may be conditioned by the 
performance of prior periods (as shown in Table 4.4). For this reason, we 
use a dynamic panel data analysis to control for potential endogeneity 
by including a lag of the dependent variable, subsidiary performancet-1. In 
this context, prior research has shown that ordinary least squares (OLS) 
gives an estimation of coefficients that is biased. Similarly to other 
studies that have analyzed firm performance (Uotila et al., 2009; 
Fuentelsaz, Garrido & Maicas, 2015), we use the system generalized 
method of moments (GMM) as our estimation approach (Arellano & 
Bover 1995; Blundell & Bond 1998), 
Before discussing our results, possible failed specifications of the 
models are verified through several tests that are presented at the 
bottom part of Table 4.5. First, the Hansen statistic of excessive 
identification restrictions is used to prove the absence of correlation 
between the instruments and the error term. The result of the test is 
statistically non-significant, with levels of significance between 0.10 and 
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0.25 (Roodman, 2009), and, therefore, there is no overidentification (the 
instruments are valid). Second, we use the statistics developed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) to prove that the errors are uncorrelated. 
Using the Arellano-Bond family of estimators requires that the model’s 
error terms be not second-order correlated (as evidenced by the lack of 
significance for the AR(2) test. Third, the Wald Chi tests are presented to 
measure the joint significance of the variables in the models. All of 
Wald's tests support the joint importance of the coefficients. 
The results of our system GMM estimations (Models 1 to 5) are also 
provided in Table 4.5. Model 1 only considers the influence of the control 
variables in subsidiary performance. Model 2 introduces the effect that 
speed of institutional change has on the dependent variable to test 
Hypothesis 1. Model 3 introduces the variable emerging origin and the 
interaction effect with speed of institutional change that corresponds to the 
Hypothesis 2. Model 4 incorporates the direct effect of competitive origin 
in subsidiary performance and the interaction with the speed of 
institutional change that corresponds to the Hypothesis 3. Finally, Model 
5 introduces both interaction effects. The F-tests are presented at the 
bottom of the table and show that Model 4 is the model that best fits our 
data; thus, we employ it to comment our results.  
Models 1 to 5 show that the effect of control variables on subsidiary 
performance remains stable. The performance of the previous year 
(subsidiary performancet-1) presents a positive and significant effect. 
Subsidiary age and technological change also have a positive and significant 
effect, showing that oldest firms show better performance and that in 
markets where technological changes take place, the opportunities to 
obtain higher results increase. Contrary, the scope of institutions present 
a negative and significant effect. Other variables such as, market 
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concentration GDP, subsidiary size or demand growth show non-significant 
relationships. 
Hypothesis 1 states that the speed of institutional change negatively 
influences the subsidiary performance. Our results in Model 4 show that 
the higher the speed of change of market-supporting institutions, the 
lower the performance obtained by subsidiaries (=-0.771; p<0.01). This 
supports Hypothesis 1, showing that subsidiaries tend to obtain lower 
performance when institutional changes take place in short periods of 
time. 
Not all subsidiaries will adapt to the institutional changes in the 
same way. We postulate that MNEs with origin in emerging countries 
are better prepared to adopt to changes and, therefore, their 
performance is not affected so negatively by the speed of institutional 
change. Nevertheless, our results do not find support for Hypothesis 2. 
It can be observed in Models 3 and 5 that the emerging origin variable 
shows a negative and non-significant coefficient for the interaction 
between the speed of institutional change and the emerging origin of MNEs 
that controlled firms. Contrary to our expectations, subsidiaries 
controlled by MNEs from emerging countries do not adapt better to the 
changes that occur in a short period. This suggest that MNEs from 
emerging countries find difficulties to generate or transfer skills derived 
from dealing with turbulent environments and weak institutions to their 
subsidiaries.   
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Table 4.5. Determinants of subsidiary performance 
 Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Subsidiary performancet-1 0.418*** 0.418*** 0.421*** 0.413*** 0.416*** 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.108) (0.105) (0.107) 
Speed of institutional changet-1  -0.399*** -0.153 -0.771*** -0.550** 
  (0.146) (0.176) (0.248) (0.223) 
Emerging Origin   0.026  0.027 
   (0.027)  (0.025) 
Speed of institutional changet-1 * 
Emerging Origin 
  -0.816  -0.751 
   (0.506)  (0.523) 
Competitive Origin    -0.054** -0.055** 
    (0.022) (0.021) 
Speed of institutional changet-1 * 
Competitive Origin 
   1.542** 1.558** 
    (0.608) (0.609) 
      
Subsidiary sizet-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Subsidiary aget-1 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Scope of institutionst-1 -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Market concentrationt-1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDPt-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Technological changet-1 0.340*** 0.333*** 0.336*** 0.315*** 0.318*** 
 (0.092) (0.091) (0.092) (0.090) (0.091) 
Demand growtht-1 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.018 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Populationt-1 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.008 0.009 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Dummy years Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Dummy region Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.047) (0.048) 
_cons -0.487** -0.509** -0.555** -0.430* -0.476* 
 (0.237) (0.236) (0.258) (0.239) (0.259) 
N 4397 4397 4397 4397 4397 
F-Test vs Model 1  7.50*** 10.98** 20.49*** 29.25*** 
F-Test vs Model 2   2.94 18.61*** 26.24*** 
F-Test vs Model 3     20.59*** 
F-Test vs Model 4     2.63 
Wald Chi 494.54**
* 
499.83**
* 
515.76**
* 
486.14**
* 
493.67**
* 
AR (2) -0.88 -0.89 -0.89 -0.90 -0.90 
Hansen Test 5.49 5.74 5.72 6.05 6.04 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Figure 4.1. Moderating effect of the control by MNEs with competitive 
origin in the relationship between subsidiary’s performance and the 
speed of institutional change 
 
However, results from Model 4 support Hypothesis 3 since the 
interaction between the speed of institutional change and the competitive 
origin of MNEs is positive and significant (β=1.542; p<0.05), confirming 
that subsidiaries controlled by MNEs with origin in environments that 
are highly competitive enjoy institutional advantages compared to the 
rest of subsidiaries. A graphical illustration of this result is provided in 
Figure 4.1. As the figure shows, although the overall trend is negative, 
subsidiaries controlled by MNEs from highly competitive environments 
benefit more from rapid institutional changes compared to the rest of 
subsidiaries. 
4.6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This research seeks to advance in the incipient study of 
institutional dynamism. Specifically, this study analyzes the influence 
of the speed of change of market-supporting institutions in the 
subsidiary performance and the moderating effect of institutional 
advantages that subsidiaries can exploit. Drawing on the dynamic 
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institution-based view, we argue that when institutional changes take 
place in a short period of time, the level of competition suddenly 
increases, as well as the need to generate new capabilities to cope to 
the new institutional landscape. The quick increase in competition 
usually goes hand by hand with the introduction of new products and 
technologies, and a possible decrease of the market share, which will 
imply a deterioration of subsidiary performance. Similarly, the 
reorganization and new allocation of resources that is needed to 
generate the required skills to adapt to the new compete landscape 
will damage performance. Our results confirm that, in countries 
where the speed of change in market-supporting institutions is 
higher, subsidiaries obtain worse performance than in countries 
where the pace of change is slower. 
Nevertheless, subsidiaries may have developed institutional 
advantages that allow them to better adapt to the new compete 
landscape because of the MNEs’ home country learning, at least under 
certain circumstances. Our results show that not all subsidiaries adapt 
equally to changes that take place in short periods of time. 
Subsidiaries that are controlled by MNEs with origin in highly 
competitive environments will benefit from the institutional 
advantages that these MNEs have developed. These companies will 
have the capacity to better adapt to the increase of competition or to 
the development of new technologies, that are usually consequence of 
pro-market reforms. As MNEs from highly competitive environments 
have previously faced pro-market reforms, they have the experience 
to counteract the competitive threats derived from rapid institutional 
changes in their host markets. However, contrary to our expectations, 
subsidiaries controlled by MNEs from emerging countries will not 
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enjoy institutional advantages. A possible explanation for this 
unexpected result may be that MNEs from emerging countries are 
currently developing institutional learning and it takes time to 
process it. Therefore, they have not yet had time to internalize it. 
Although the literature has theorized that emerging MNEs obtain 
institutional advantages compared to MNEs from advanced 
economies when they operate in countries with poor market-
supporting institutions (Martin, 2014), it is possible that some of the 
MNEs included in the sample are still developing those institutional 
advantages. The lack of time to internalize the institutional learning 
by the MNE can make it still being developed and the subsidiaries 
have not been able to benefit from it. So, we can conclude that 
institutional learning seems to need more time to be internalized by 
parent MNEs and transferred to their subsidiaries and, therefore, is 
not currently enjoyed. 
From a theoretical point of view, the main contribution of this 
research has been the integration of the home country learning 
literature in the literature of institutional dynamism. In this way, we 
try to respond to the call of Cuervo-Cazurra et al. (2019), to deepen in 
the analysis of the dynamic institution-based view, focusing on the 
analysis of the subsidiary performance. In addition, we respond to the 
need to give more relevance to the home country in the international 
business research, demonstrating how some subsidiaries benefit from 
institutional advantages. 
Our study has several implications from a public and managerial 
point of view. Governments, regardless of their current scope of 
market-supporting institutions, must consider the negative influence 
that rapid changes in market-supporting institutions have in the 
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performance of the subsidiaries. A slower variation of the institutional 
level will lead to better possibilities of adaptation and building 
capacities and, therefore, the subsidiary performance would not be 
harmed. It creates a more attractive institutional environment for 
foreign investors. In addition, other subsidiaries should try to develop 
institutional competitive advantages that benefit them in case of rapid 
institutional changes. In this sense, if there is no option to develop 
their own institutional advantages, they will have to assess the 
possibility of give control in favor of a MNE that enjoys institutional 
advantages from their origin in a high competitive market. It will 
allow it to better adapt to institutional changes from rapid pro-market 
reforms. 
Our study is not without limitations that open new research 
avenues. First, although this research has been developed in the 
mobile telecommunications industry, it would be interesting to extent 
the empirical analyses to other industries. Because of mobile 
telecommunications industry has suffer from a deregulation and 
liberalization when pro-market reforms have taken place, it would be 
interesting focus the future research in unregulated industries. 
Second, we have considered the experience of MNEs that derives 
from home country learning. However, this may not be the only 
experience that can benefit subsidiaries when rapid institutional 
change takes place. It is possible that the accumulated experience of 
the subsidiaries (if they have been previously controlled by other 
MNEs) can also benefit them in this process. More studies are 
necessary at this point. Finally, the effective transfer of knowledge 
from the parent company to subsidiaries can even depend on the 
mechanism that has been used in their international expansion (e.g. 
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greenfield vs. acquisition). For this reason, it would be interesting to 
analyze to what extent the institutional advantage of subsidiaries to 
counteract rapid institutional changes can depend on the entry mode 
that their multinational has selected. In this way, future research 
would be able to integrate decision and performance considerations 
from the dynamic institution-based view. 
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El artículo 18 del Acuerdo de 20 de diciembre de 2013, del Consejo de 
Gobierno de la Universidad de Zaragoza exige que, en caso de optar a la 
mención de “Doctor internacional”, parte de la tesis doctoral sea redactada 
en una de las lenguas habituales para la comunicación científica en su campo 
de conocimiento, distinta a cualquiera de las lenguas oficiales en España.  
Por este motivo, los capítulos 1, 2, 3 y 4, que incluyen los capítulos 
principales de la tesis doctoral, han sido redactados en inglés. La normativa 
impone, asimismo, la necesidad de incluir un resumen y conclusiones en 
castellano cuando la mayor parte de la tesis haya sido elaborada en inglés. En 
cumplimiento de la normativa aplicable, el Capítulo 5 de esta tesis doctoral 
incluye un resumen y conclusiones en castellano. 
5.1. RESUMEN DE LA TESIS DOCTORAL  
El propósito de este capítulo es ofrecer una síntesis de la tesis 
doctoral, a la par que dar cuenta de sus principales conclusiones e 
implicaciones. Como se ha descrito en los capítulos anteriores, la tesis 
analiza la toma de decisiones de las multinacionales en las 
adquisiciones transfronterizas, así como del resultado de las 
subsidiarias, en un entorno cada vez más cambiante.  
La tesis se compone de cuatro capítulos, además de este 
resumen. El primero de ellos, Capítulo 1, tiene un propósito 
introductorio y su objetivo es contextualizar y presentar los diferentes 
objetivos de investigación, así como identificar las principales teorías 
empleadas y caracterizar la industria donde se va a llevar a cabo. Los 
tres capítulos restantes, Capítulos 2, 3 y 4, son los encargados de 
desarrollar los diferentes estudios empíricos que dan respuesta a los 
objetivos de investigación propuestos. Por un lado, en los Capítulos 2 
y 3 se analizarán diferentes determinantes en las decisiones sobre el 
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nivel de propiedad de adquisiciones transfronterizas, mientras que el 
Capítulo 4, tratará de explicar la influencia que la velocidad del cambio 
institucional tiene sobre el resultado de las subsidiarias y el 
importante papel que tiene para las empresas multinacionales 
(EMNs) el aprendizaje adquirido en el país de origen. 
 Resumen del Capítulo 1 
El Capítulo 1 constituye la introducción de la presente tesis 
doctoral. Las EMNs se han convertido en un actor fundamental de la 
economía global, aumentando significativamente su presencia en 
salidas de inversión extranjera directa (UNCTAD, 2018). Este evento 
ha atraído la atención de un gran número de investigadores a lo largo 
de los años (Dunning, 2001; Kim y Hwang, 1992; Ramamurti, 2004; 
Rugman, 2005) que han intentado analizar tanto el comportamiento 
estratégico durante los procesos de internacionalización (Arregle, 
Miller, Hitt y Beamish, 2013; Delios y Beamish, 1999), como el 
desempeño obtenido por las EMNs y sus subsidiarias (Chan, Isobe y 
Makino, 2008; Geringer, Beamish y DaCosta, 1989). Sin embargo, 
sigue habiendo cuestiones sin resolver en la literatura que han tratado 
de ser abordadas en nuestro estudio. 
A lo largo del capítulo introductorio se presenta el contexto 
teórico y empírico en el que se asienta la tesis doctoral. Con el fin de 
abordar el estudio de la estrategia seguida por las multinacionales, así 
como del resultado de las subsidiarias, los tres capítulos centrales de 
esta tesis doctoral hacen uso de las literatura sobre estructura óptima 
de propiedad, ventajas del pionero, teoría dinámica institucional y el 
aprendizaje en el país de origen, Gracias a ello, la tesis aporta nuevas 
explicaciones y evidencias a ciertas cuestiones que continúan siendo 
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debatidas en la literatura y ayuda a mejorar nuestro conocimiento 
sobre este tópico. La industria mundial de las telecomunicaciones 
móviles es el contexto en el que las propuestas establecidas son 
testadas. La selección de esta industria viene justificada por su gran 
importancia, por su presencia a nivel mundial y por su adecuación a 
los objetivos de los trabajos de investigación incorporados en esta 
tesis. 
 Resumen Capítulo 2 
El Capítulo 2, “Ownership in Cross-Border Acquisitions and 
Entry Timing of the Target Firm”, aborda el primero de los trabajos 
de investigación de la tesis. Dicha investigación analiza en qué 
medida una entrada más temprana por parte de la empresa objetivo 
influye en la decisión de las EMNs sobre las decisiones de adquisición 
de propiedad en las entradas en nuevos mercados. Nuestro a priori es 
que el orden de entrada puede influir tanto en el momento inicial de 
la adquisición como en el momento posterior de la misma. 
Las adquisiciones transfronterizas han recibido gran atención 
por parte de la literatura como uno de los mecanismos clave de 
internacionalización en los últimos años (Bauer et al., 2018; Cuypers, 
Ertug y Hennart, 2015; Fuad y Gaur, 2019; Lahiri, Elango y Kundu, 
2014; Powell y Rhee, 2016). Una de las decisiones más importantes que 
deben tomar las empresas cuando se enfrentan a una adquisición 
transfronteriza es el nivel de propiedad adquirido, ya que este tiene 
implicaciones en términos de control, riesgo, compromiso de recursos 
(Anderson y Gatignon, 1986) y supervivencia (Li, 1995). Para 
seleccionar el nivel adecuado de propiedad, las EMNs deben 
equilibrar los beneficios esperados y los costes derivados de los 
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diferentes niveles de propiedad (Chari y Chang, 2009), evaluando la 
contribución de la adquisición a la generación de ventajas 
competitivas, así como los riesgos que genera. Estos riesgos aumentan 
en contextos donde evaluar el valor potencial proporcionado por la 
adquisición es más complejo. A diferencia de las adquisiciones 
nacionales, las EMNs que se expanden mediante adquisiciones 
transfronterizas tienen que afrontar niveles más altos de 
incertidumbre, debido a posibles diferencias en las estructuras 
económicas, sociales, políticas y culturales respecto a sus países de 
origen (Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath y Pisano, 2004). Esta incertidumbre 
deriva tanto ex ante como ex post (Chari y Chang, 2009). La 
incertidumbre ex ante está relacionada con las asimetrías de 
información entre la empresa adquirente y la adquirida y los 
problemas de selección adversa que de ella derivan, mientras que la 
incertidumbre ex post responde a problemas de riesgo moral y 
oportunismo relacionados con la actitud de los gerentes en las 
decisiones posteriores a la adquisición. Ambos tipos de incertidumbre 
dificultan que las EMNs evalúen adecuadamente el potencial de 
creación de valor en las adquisiciones transfronterizas y reducen los 
incentivos para adquirir altos niveles de propiedad en la empresa 
objetivo de la adquisición (Chari y Chang, 2009). 
La identificación de factores que influyen en la incertidumbre 
que enfrentan los adquirentes ayuda a las EMNs a mejorar su proceso 
de toma de decisiones. Algunos estudios previos han identificado 
varios factores externos e internos que influyen en el porcentaje de 
propiedad adquirido por las EMNs (Xie, Reddy y Liang, 2017). Así, 
Malhotra y Gaur (2014) demuestran cómo la distancia geográfica 
influye tanto en la incertidumbre ex ante como ex post. De manera 
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similar, otros autores demuestran que la distancia ambiental favorece 
o disminuye este nivel de incertidumbre (Dow, Cuypers y Ertug, 2016; 
Liou, Chao y Yang, 2016). También se han considerado otros factores 
externos, como el riesgo del país (Chari y Chang, 2009), las presiones 
institucionales (Chan y Makino, 2007) o las influencias políticas (Pan 
et al., 2014). La literatura también ha analizado el papel de factores a 
nivel de EMN, como la experiencia internacional en diferentes 
entornos (Powell y Rhee, 2016) o la adopción del inglés como idioma 
externo para la presentación de informes en la empresa (Jeanjean et 
al., 2015). Sin embargo, estos estudios previos se han centrado 
principalmente en las características de los mercados de origen y de 
destino, así como en los atributos de la empresa adquirente, 
ignorando en el estudio uno de los agentes clave que también influye 
en el nivel de incertidumbre: la empresa objetivo. Excepto por un 
estudio (Chari y Chang, 2009), la influencia de las características de la 
empresa objetivo en la decisión sobre el nivel de propiedad adquirido 
no ha sido explorada previamente, lo que justifica un análisis más 
detallado de esta dimensión.  
Las empresas objetivo poseen atributos que pueden afectar a la 
incertidumbre ex ante y ex post del proceso de adquisición y que, por 
lo tanto, influyen en los incentivos de las EMNs para adquirir un 
mayor o menor nivel de propiedad. En contextos en los que existen 
ventajas del pionero, los primeros entrantes obtienen un mejor 
rendimiento que los entrantes tardíos (Lieberman y Montgomery, 
1988, 1998). El momento de entrada en el mercado de la empresa 
objetivo puede actuar como una señal del potencial futuro para ser 
rentable, reduciendo así la incertidumbre, por lo que conlleva una 
mayor predisposición por parte de las EMNs para adquirir niveles de 
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propiedad. Hasta ahora, este análisis del momento de entrada de la 
empresa objetivo apenas se había tenido en cuenta en el estudio de los 
niveles óptimos de propiedad en las adquisiciones transfronterizas. 
Además, la literatura previa habitualmente ha adoptado un 
punto de vista estático, centrándose en la propiedad inicialmente 
adquirida por las EMNs. Por el contrario, nuestra primera 
investigación insiste en la importancia de considerar las adquisiciones 
transfronterizas como procesos dinámicos que comienzan con la 
selección de la empresa objetivo y la negociación del nivel inicial de 
capital a adquirir, y continúa con el período posterior a la adquisición, 
durante el cual la EMN debe integrar la nueva filial en su estructura 
organizativa (Shimizu et al., 2004). Después de la adquisición inicial, 
donde la incertidumbre ex ante y ex post pueden considerarse factores 
clave para determinar la propiedad inicialmente adquirida, la 
percepción por parte de las EMNs del potencial de la empresa objetivo 
para generar valor puede cambiar como consecuencia del 
aprendizaje. Por lo tanto, las EMNs pueden adaptar sus niveles de 
propiedad en función de la nueva información percibida. Por ejemplo, 
Inkpen y Beamish (1997) postulan que las adquisiciones de propiedad 
parcial generalmente se convierten en adquisiciones de propiedad 
total a medida que las EMNs obtienen un mejor conocimiento de las 
condiciones ambientales locales y disminuye la dependencia de los 
socios. De manera similar, otros estudios han mostrado que las 
empresas completan las adquisiciones de forma secuencial (Xu, Zhou 
y Phan, 2010). En este sentido, algunos estudios recientes han 
comenzado a analizar la posición cambiante de las EMNs al 
desarrollar adquisiciones transfronterizas en el compromiso de 
recursos, con el fin de gozar de una mayor flexibilidad estratégica 
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(Putzhammer, Puck y Linder, 2019).  
Dado que las EMNs enfrentan niveles de incertidumbre inicial ex 
ante y ex post, prefieren ingresar mediante modos de entrada con bajo 
compromiso. Una vez que han adquirido experiencia e información 
del nuevo mercado y de sus socios, pueden decidir aumentar dicho 
compromiso (por ejemplo, establecer una subsidiaria de propiedad 
total), disminuirlo o incluso terminar la relación (Petersen, Welch y 
Welch, 2000). Aunque algunos estudios recientes han arrojado luz 
sobre este tema (Li y Li, 2010; Puck, Holtbrügge y Mohr, 2009; 
Putzhammer et al., 2018; Santangelo y Meyer, 2010; Swoboda, Olejnik 
y Morschett, 2011), hasta el momento no se ha considerado el papel 
del momento de entrada de la empresa objetivo como señal del 
rendimiento potencial que puede afectar a las variaciones de 
propiedad en el momento posterior a la entrada. 
El objetivo de esta investigación es analizar el efecto del 
momento de entrada de la empresa objetivo en el nivel de propiedad 
adquirido por las EMNs cuando llevan a cabo una adquisición 
transfronteriza, integrando la literatura de nivel de propiedad con la 
literatura sobre ventajas del pionero a través de una perspectiva 
dinámica. Primero, proponemos que, a medida que aumenta el 
tiempo transcurrido entre la entrada del pionero y la de la empresa 
objetivo (el tiempo de anticipación) la propiedad inicialmente 
adquirida sobre el objetivo por parte de la EMN será menor. Segundo, 
con el objetivo de incorporar una perspectiva dinámica en el estudio, 
analizamos el efecto de dicho momento de entrada de la empresa 
objetivo en las variaciones del nivel de propiedad después de la 
adquisición inicial. Finalmente, dado que las ventajas del pionero se 
erosionan con la edad del mercado y con la introducción de nuevas 
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tecnologías (Gómez, Lanzolla y Maícas, 2016), esperamos que estos 
factores moderadores debiliten la relación entre el momento de 
entrada y la propiedad adquirida inicialmente, así como en las 
variaciones de propiedad que se producen posteriormente. 
Nuestro análisis se lleva a cabo en la industria de las 
comunicaciones móviles. La muestra extraída de la GSMA 
Intelligence (2018), presenta la evolución trimestral en la estructura de 
propiedad de 59 filiales en las que participaron 36 EMN como 
resultado de 90 adquisiciones transfronterizas en 50 países durante el 
periodo 2000 a 2016. En consecuencia, tenemos un total de 90 
observaciones de la propiedad inicial adquirida y 2.231 observaciones 
que se refieren a la propiedad de las EMN en cada una de las filiales 
para cada período posterior a la adquisición inicial. El análisis se lleva 
a cabo en dos etapas. Dadas las características de censura que 
presentan las variables independientes, nivel de propiedad adquirido 
y variación en el nivel de propiedad, para la primera etapa se emplea 
un modelo de regresión Tobit. Para la segunda etapa del estudio, que 
presenta estructura de datos de panel, se utiliza un modelo de 
regresión Tobit de efectos aleatorios. 
Nuestros resultados muestran que, en contextos donde existen 
ventajas del pionero, las EMNs adquieren niveles más bajos de 
propiedad en aquellas empresas que ingresaron más tarde en el 
mercado. Cuanto mayor sea el tiempo transcurrido entre la entrada 
del pionero y la entrada de la empresa objeto de la adquisición, mayor 
será la incertidumbre para las EMNs, lo que conlleva una reducción 
en el nivel de propiedad inicialmente adquirido. Nuestros hallazgos, 
además, demuestran que las EMNs tienden a incrementar más sus 
niveles de propiedad después de la adquisición inicial en aquellas 
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subsidiaras que entraron más temprano en el mercado. 
No obstante, la relación negativa entre el momento de entrada 
de la empresa objetivo y la propiedad no es independiente de las 
circunstancias. Nuestros análisis muestran que la introducción de 
nueva tecnología por parte de la empresa objetivo puede ayudar a 
reducir la incertidumbre sobre los entrantes tardíos, haciendo que los 
niveles de propiedad adquiridos sobre estos sean superiores tanto en 
el momento inicial como en el momento posterior a la adquisición. Sin 
embargo, encontramos que la edad del mercado sólo influye en el 
nivel de propiedad adquirido sobre los entrantes tardíos en el 
momento posterior a la adquisición y no resulta relevante en el 
momento inicial. 
Resumen Capítulo 3 
El Capítulo 3, “Ownership in Cross-Border Acquisitions by 
Emerging Multinationals”, es el segundo estudio empírico de la 
tesis doctoral. Este trabajo analiza las diferentes estrategias de 
adquisición que siguen las EMNs en función del nivel institucional 
del país de destino, dándole un papel fundamental al aprendizaje 
institucional en el país de origen de la multinacional. 
Como hemos mencionado previamente, cuando las EMNs 
entran en un nuevo país a través de una adquisición transfronteriza, 
una decisión clave es el porcentaje de propiedad que deben adquirir 
sobre la empresa objetivo (Chari y Chang, 2009). De acuerdo con la 
literatura previa, la elección de los niveles de propiedad adquirida 
está determinada por factores como el compromiso de recursos, el 
control esperado por la EMN sobre la empresa objetivo, o los riesgos 
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y el rendimiento de la adquisición (Anderson y Gatignon, 1986; Delios 
y Beamish, 1999). La teoría de costes de transacción sugiere 
tradicionalmente que la incertidumbre del entorno incrementa la 
dificultad del comprador extranjero para buscar, negociar y valorar a 
los socios en el mercado (Williamson, 1981). 
Cuando se encuentran en contextos de mayor incertidumbre, las 
EMNs prefieren adquirir niveles de propiedad más bajos para gozar 
de flexibilidad que permita responder mejor a posibles cambios en el 
entorno (Yiu y Makino, 2002). Algunos estudios empíricos han abierto 
un debate sobre cómo varía la estrategia de propiedad de las EMNs 
dependiendo de si se expanden a países avanzados o emergentes, 
caracterizados por presentar diferentes niveles de incertidumbre 
(Liou, Chao y Yang, 2016). Los países emergentes se caracterizan por 
exhibir intermediarios financieros poco desarrollados y una 
regulación del mercado de valores débil, que aumenta la 
incertidumbre percibida para hacer negocios en estos países (Khanna 
y Palepu, 1997). Como resultado, las EMNs suelen adquirir un mayor 
porcentaje de propiedad cuando ingresan en países avanzados, donde 
el nivel de incertidumbre tiende a ser más bajo que en dichos países 
emergentes (Delios y Beamish, 1999; Yiu y Makino, 2002). 
Algunos estudios previos se han centrado principalmente en 
analizar las condiciones institucionales de los países receptores como 
determinante de la incertidumbre. Sin embargo, las condiciones 
institucionales del país de origen también son relevantes a la hora de 
explicar la estrategia de propiedad en los procesos de adquisición 
transfronteriza (De Beule, Elia y Piscitello, 2014). Las investigaciones 
recientes sugieren que, cuando se expanden en el extranjero, las 
estrategias y el desempeño de las EMNs con origen en países 
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emergentes (EMNEs) son diferentes de las que utilizan las EMNs de 
países avanzados (EMNAs) (De Beule et al., 2014; Guillén y García-
Canal, 2009). Las EMNEs se enfrentan a instituciones débiles y a un 
subdesarrollo económico en sus países de origen (Cuervo-Cazurra y 
Genc, 2008), por lo que se espera que manejen la incertidumbre mejor 
que las EMNA. Como consecuencia, la incertidumbre que perciben 
las EMNs en el país receptor dependerá del nivel de desarrollo de sus 
países de origen. Por lo tanto, las características del país anfitrión son 
relevantes para explicar las estrategias de propiedad de las EMNs, 
pero la inclusión de las características del país de origen también es 
necesaria para comprender completamente estas estrategias. A pesar 
de esto, según nuestro conocimiento, los estudios anteriores han 
subexplorado la interacción de las características de los países de 
destino y de los países de origen en la decisión de elección del nivel 
de propiedad y es por ello que esta investigación trata profundizar en 
esta línea. 
Además de las características del país de origen y del país 
anfitrión, la estrategia de propiedad seguida por las EMNs puede 
estar condicionada por las características de la industria en la que 
también tienen lugar los procesos de adquisición transfronteriza. Los 
estudios previos han analizado las estrategias de internacionalización 
en diferentes contextos, tales como industrias intensivas en I + D 
(Chari y Chang, 2009; Prashantham y Birkinshaw, 2015; Qian, Li y 
Qian, 2018), la industria hotelera (Romero-Martínez et al., 2019) o la 
industria de los neumáticos (Rose e Ito, 2009). Nuestra investigación 
se centra en una industria regulada, la industria de las 
telecomunicaciones móviles, que tiene características especiales que 
la convierten en un contexto interesante donde analizar las estrategias 
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de propiedad seguidas por las EMNs. 
Por ello, el objetivo de nuestro segundo estudio empírico es 
doble. Primero, analizar el porcentaje de propiedad adquirido por las 
EMNs cuando llevan a cabo procesos de adquisición transfronteriza 
en países emergentes o avanzados y, posteriormente, analizar en qué 
medida la estrategia de propiedad en los países emergentes difiere 
entre las EMNEs y las EMNAs.  
El análisis empírico se realiza en el contexto de la industria de las 
comunicaciones móviles. La muestra incluye un total de 183 
adquisiciones transfronterizas realizadas durante el periodo 2001-
2016. Las 53 EMNs que llevaron a cabo estos procesos de adquisición 
provenían de 35 países de origen y se expandieron a 82 países. De 
estas 53 EMNs, prácticamente la mitad tenían su origen en países 
emergentes (26 EMNEs) mientras que el resto tenían su origen en 
países avanzados (27 EMNAs). Dada la naturaleza censurada de la 
variable dependiente, el nivel de propiedad adquirido, se emplea para 
el análisis un modelo de regresión Tobit. 
Nuestros resultados muestran que, efectivamente, la naturaleza 
de los países de destino emergentes donde las instituciones son más 
débiles representa mayores niveles de incertidumbre para las EMNs 
y, por tanto, están dispuestas a adquirir menores niveles de propiedad 
cuando las adquisiciones transfronterizas se producen en estos países. 
No obstante, si las adquisiciones son llevadas a cabo por EMNEs, el 
aprendizaje institucional derivado de la experiencia les otorgará 
mayor confianza. Esto repercutirá en la adquisición de mayores 
niveles de propiedad en las adquisiciones transfronterizas llevadas a 
cabo en países emergentes frente a los niveles adquiridos por las 
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EMNAs. 
 Resumen Capítulo 4 
El Capítulo 4, “Speed of Institutional Change and Subsidiary 
Performance: The Impact of Home Country Learning”, es el último 
de los estudios empíricos de esta tesis doctoral. Dicho trabajo 
profundiza en la importancia del aprendizaje de las EMNs en el país 
de origen cuando las subsidiarias se enfrentan a rápidos cambios 
institucionales. 
El efecto que los cambios en las instituciones que apoyan el 
mercado (market-supporting institutions, Meyer et al., 2009: p. 63) tienen 
sobre el desempeño de la empresa ha sido ampliamente estudiado en 
la literatura (Chari y Banalieva, 2015; Cuervo-Cazurra y Dau, 2009; 
Dau, 2013; Park, Li y Tse, 2006). Sin embargo, hay una falta de 
consenso sobre el signo y la importancia de esta relación. Si bien 
algunos estudios sostienen que los cambios institucionales a favor del 
mercado (es decir, reformas pro-mercado) conducen a un mayor 
rendimiento (Cuervo-Cazurra y Dau, 2009; Park et al., 2006), otras 
investigaciones no logran encontrar tales efectos positivos o, incluso, 
encuentran una relación en forma de U (Chari y Banalieva, 2015; Lee, 
Peng y Lee, 2008; Salim, 2003). Probablemente, el principal motivo por 
el cual la evidencia previa no puede explicar de manera efectiva las 
consecuencias que las reformas a favor del mercado tienen en el 
resultado, sea la conceptualización estática del cambio institucional. 
Por ello, algunas investigaciones recientes han buscado una 
explicación más detallada que incorpore un enfoque dinámico 
(Banalieva, Eddleston y Zellweger, 2015). 
Las reformas pro-mercado pueden llevarse a cabo gradualmente 
Chapter 5. Resumen y Conclusiones (Spanish Summary) 
208 
durante largos períodos de tiempo o pueden desarrollarse 
rápidamente en períodos cortos (Chen et al., 2017). Como 
consecuencia, la investigación reciente ha prestado especial atención 
no solo al cambio institucional en sí, sino también a la velocidad a la 
que se produce este cambio, haciendo hincapié en la naturaleza 
dinámica de las condiciones institucionales (Kim, Kim y Hoskisson, 
2010; Xu y Meyer, 2013). El ritmo al que evolucionan las instituciones 
a favor del mercado tiene importantes consecuencias en la estrategia 
de las empresas, ya que afecta a sus capacidades de respuesta (Kim et 
al., 2010) y a su desempeño (Banalieva, Cuervo-Cazurra y Sarathy, 
2018; Banalieva et al., 2015) La visión dinámica de las instituciones 
surge como un flujo de investigación que trata de explicar la 
influencia que la velocidad de dichas reformas pro-mercado tiene en 
las decisiones de las empresas (como el modo de entrada, Chen et al., 
2017; y el desempeño, Banalieva et al., 2015; Banalieva et al., 2018). 
Además, los estudios anteriores han demostrado que las 
empresas son heterogéneas cuando interactúan con el entorno y no 
todas las empresas se adaptan a los cambios de la misma manera. Por 
ejemplo, existen diferencias entre empresas familiares y no familiares 
(Banalieva et al., 2015) o entre empresas con diferentes niveles de 
experiencia en el mercado (Chen et al., 2017). Sin embargo, se ha 
prestado poca atención a las ventajas institucionales que las EMNs 
pueden explotar y transferir a las subsidiarias para contrarrestar 
mejor los rápidos cambios institucionales en los países anfitriones 
donde operan. Estas ventajas institucionales provienen del proceso de 
aprendizaje que han experimentado en sus países de origen. En 
primer lugar, algunas EMNs pueden desarrollar ventajas 
competitivas institucionales porque provienen de países emergentes 
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donde enfrentan continuos cambios institucionales. El aprendizaje 
institucional puede ayudarles a comprenderlos y a adaptarse mejor a 
los rápidos cambios institucionales en los países anfitriones (Martin, 
2014). En segundo lugar, la experiencia adquirida al enfrentar 
mayores niveles de competencia en el país de origen, es decir, el 
aprendizaje competitivo, genera nuevas capacidades en las EMNs 
para enfrentarse a situaciones altamente competitivas. Estas 
capacidades puede ser una fuente de ventaja institucional cuando se 
producen cambios institucionales rápidos que repercuten en un 
repentino crecimiento de la competencia (Cuervo-Cazurra, Luo, 
Ramamurti y Ang, 2018).  
Dado que uno de los motivos de la internacionalización de las 
EMNs es explotar sus recursos y ventajas en los mercados de acogida, 
nuestra investigación propone que las filiales explotarán el 
aprendizaje en el país de origen (tanto institucional como 
competitivo) de su matriz para adaptarse mejor a las rápidas reformas 
a favor del mercado en el país anfitrión. Esto constituye una línea 
prometedora de investigación que no ha sido analizada previamente 
y nuestro objetivo es desarrollarla a lo largo del capítulo 4. 
Como consecuencia, el objetivo de este último estudio es ampliar 
la literatura de las instituciones pro-mercado, analizando el papel que 
las ventajas institucionales derivadas del aprendizaje en el país de 
origen tienen sobre el resultado de las filiales bajo una visión dinámica 
basada en las instituciones. Aunque esperamos una relación negativa 
entre la velocidad de cambio en las instituciones (market-supporting 
institutions) y el resultado de las subsidiarias, no todas las empresas 
se adaptan a estos cambios de la misma manera (Banalieva et al., 
2015). Proponemos que las filiales de EMNs con origen en países 
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altamente competitivos (donde las reformas pro-mercado se han 
implantado con éxito) y en países emergentes (donde las reformas 
pro-mercado se están llevando a cabo con mayor intensidad) pueden 
explotar sus ventajas institucionales para adaptarse mejor a los 
rápidos cambios institucionales. 
El análisis empírico se lleva a cabo en la industria de las 
comunicaciones móviles. Nuestros datos provienen de la GSMA 
Intelligence (2018). Con los datos obtenidos de la base de datos, hemos 
construido un panel de 4.397 observaciones que corresponden al 
resultado anual de 352 subsidiarias (nuestra unidad de análisis) en 
144 países de destino, pertenecientes a 77 EMNs, para el periodo 
comprendido entre 2001 y 2017. 
Nuestros resultados muestran que, tal y como esperábamos, 
cuando los cambios en las instituciones que favorecen la actuación del 
mercado se producen en un corto periodo de tiempo, el resultado de 
las filiales se ve afectado negativamente. Sin embargo, no todas las 
filiales se ven perjudicadas de la misma manera. Nuestros hallazgos 
muestran que aquellas subsidiarias cuya matriz tiene origen en países 
altamente competitivos poseen ventajas competitivas institucionales 
que les permiten adaptarse mejor a los cambios rápidos y su resultado 
se ve menos afectado. Sin embargo, no encontramos apoyo para el 
supuesto de subsidiarias con matriz en países emergentes y, que a 
priori, podrían estar disfrutando igualmente de ventajas competitivas 
institucionales que las favorecieran en ese mismo entorno cambiante. 
5.2. IMPLICACIONES PRÁCTICAS DE LA TESIS 
La tesis doctoral presenta resultados interesantes que 
contribuyen de forma relevante a la literatura sobre el nivel de 
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propiedad en las adquisiciones, la visión dinámica de las instituciones 
y el aprendizaje en el país de origen de la multinacional. Más allá de 
las contribuciones a la literatura académica, los resultados de la tesis 
son relevantes para el mundo profesional. La tesis presenta 
importantes implicaciones prácticas que podrían dividirse en tres 
secciones: implicaciones para los gerentes de las EMNs, implicaciones 
para los gerentes de las empresas objetivo, e implicaciones para los 
poderes públicos e instituciones. 
 Implicaciones para los gerentes de las EMNs 
Como se ha podido observar a lo largo de la tesis doctoral, una 
de las principales decisiones que los gerentes de las EMNs toman 
cuando llevan a cabo adquisiciones transfronterizas está relacionada 
con la elección del nivel de propiedad a adquirir.  Esta decisión es 
compleja dado que el proceso de adquisición se encuentra rodeado de 
incertidumbre. Sin embargo, hemos podido comprobar que, 
efectivamente, existen determinados factores que pueden ayudar a los 
gerentes de las EMNs a evaluar dicha incertidumbre, con el fin de 
decidir qué nivel de flexibilidad es más adecuado para cada 
circunstancia.   
Concretamente, tal y como se ha confirmado en el Capítulo 2, el 
momento de entrada de la empresa objetivo es un factor relevante 
para predecir la incertidumbre asociada a los procesos de adquisición 
transfronteriza y, por tanto, ayuda a reducir las asimetrías de 
información entre la empresa adquirente y la empresa objeto de la 
adquisición. En este sentido, observando el momento de entrada de la 
empresa objetivo, los directivos de la empresa adquirente pueden 
situarse en una mejor posición para evaluar los activos y las 
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capacidades de la empresa deseada y para tomar mejores decisiones 
de inversión. En primer lugar, la existencia de ventajas del pionero 
hará que una empresa objetivo que haya entrado en el mercado antes 
resulte más atractiva, los niveles de incertidumbre percibida por los 
directivos se reducirán y podrán adquirir mayores niveles de 
propiedad. Sin embargo, tendrán que considerar otras variables en su 
decisión, como son, el grado de desarrollo del mercado y el carácter 
innovador de la empresa objetivo. En los mercados maduros, donde 
las ventajas del pionero pueden estar erosionadas, invertir en un 
participante tardío no será tan arriesgado para la multinacional. De 
igual forma, el atractivo de la filial que entró más temprano al 
mercado también se reducirá si un participante tardío muestra un 
perfil innovador. Cuando la empresa objetivo introduce una 
innovación clave, puede llegar a reemplazar la tecnología que originó 
las ventajas de ser pionero y el momento de entrada de la futura filial 
se volverá menos importante en la decisión de propiedad.  
Además, ingresar con niveles más bajos de propiedad permite a 
las EMNs obtener flexibilidad estratégica para revisar su posición de 
riesgo en el futuro y ajustar el nivel de propiedad de la subsidiaria. 
Por esta razón, es muy importante que las EMNs verifiquen la 
existencia de ventajas de ser pionero después de la adquisición de una 
nueva subsidiaria para adaptar el compromiso de recursos a la 
rentabilidad esperada que deriva de la existencia de estas ventajas. 
Además, tal y como hemos comprobado en el Capítulo 3, los 
directivos tendrán que adaptar sus decisiones de inversión en función 
de si están pensando en establecerse en países emergentes o en países 
avanzados. Una adquisición en un país emergente llevará asociados 
mayores niveles de incertidumbre y, por tanto, en estos entornos las 
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inversiones deberán ser más flexibles. Es decir, deberán adquirir 
menores niveles de propiedad. También deberán tener en cuenta el 
nivel de aprendizaje institucional que hayan obtenido en su país de 
origen antes de desarrollar las estrategias para entrar en estos países 
emergentes. En este sentido, los gerentes de EMNs que sean 
originarias de países emergentes podrán asumir mayores inversiones 
sobre la empresa objetivo que aquellos que lideren empresas con 
origen en países avanzados. 
 Implicaciones para los gerentes de las empresas objetivo 
Como se ha podido observar a lo largo del Capítulo 3 de la tesis 
doctoral, tanto el nivel de desarrollo del país donde se ubica la 
empresa objetivo como el nivel de desarrollo del país del adquirente 
influirán sobre el porcentaje de propiedad que las EMNs van a 
adquirir. En este sentido, las empresas objetivo pueden anticipar qué 
empresas tienen mayores posibilidades de adquirir niveles superiores 
de capital en función de su localización. Cuando el operador móvil se 
encuentre en un país emergente, la probabilidad de ser 
mayoritariamente propiedad de un grupo móvil que proviene de un 
país emergente será mayor. En este sentido, podrán focalizar sus 
intereses en aquellas empresas para las que resulten más atractivos. 
Por otro lado, como hemos visto a lo largo del Capítulo 4, las 
filiales extranjeras tendrán que hacer frente a cambios institucionales 
en los países en los que operan, que pueden ser más o menos rápidos. 
Tras el desarrollo del análisis, se ha demostrado que disponer de 
determinadas capacidades puede ayudar a las filiales a que ese 
cambio institucional no les afecte tan negativamente cuando se 
produzca de manera rápida. Por ello, las empresas subsidiarias 
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deberán buscar ventajas competitivas institucionales que les 
proporcionen una mejor adaptación a los cambios que les beneficien 
en caso de cambios institucionales rápidos. Si no tienen la opción de 
desarrollar sus propias ventajas institucionales, tendrán que evaluar 
la posibilidad de atraer a alguna EMN para ceder parte de su control 
y, así, poder optar a gozar de las ventajas institucionales que dichas 
empresas posean. Concretamente, deberán tratar de atraer la 
inversión de empresas cuyo origen sea el de un país altamente 
competitivo, lo que facilitará su adaptación a cambios institucionales 
que se deriven como consecuencia de reformas rápidas que 
favorezcan la actuación del mercado. 
 Implicaciones para los poderes públicos e instituciones 
La importancia que las instituciones tienen dentro de la actividad 
empresarial ha sido ampliamente reconocida no solo dentro del 
ámbito académico, sino también por organismos como la OCDE. La 
importancia de las instituciones en la actividad de las empresas ha 
llevado a la literatura sobre estrategia empresarial a considerar que 
son el tercer pilar de la estrategia (Peng et al., 2009). Más 
concretamente, se ha reconocido que el nivel de desarrollo 
institucional del país de origen puede influir en el uso de diferentes 
estrategias por parte de las empresas (Hennart, 2012).  
El Capítulo 3 de la tesis doctoral refleja que el nivel institucional 
del país puede influir en el funcionamiento de los mercados e influye 
en el nivel de propiedad que las EMNs adquieren cuando realizan una 
adquisición transfronteriza. En este sentido, los gobiernos de los 
países emergentes interesados en atraer inversiones de las economías 
avanzadas deberían tratar de reducir los vacíos institucionales que 
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perciben los inversores extranjeros. Por ejemplo, los responsables 
políticos deberían tratar de mejorar el sistema de protección de los 
derechos de propiedad y promover mecanismos para facilitar la 
introducción de inversores extranjeros en la red comercial informal 
(por ejemplo, asociaciones comerciales y convenciones). 
Además, una de las recomendaciones más frecuentes por parte 
de la literatura sobre dirección internacional y, en general, de la 
literatura económica, suele ser introducir mejoras en las instituciones. 
Se argumenta que unas instituciones que fomenten el libre mercado 
pueden favorecer el intercambio de recursos, ayudar a incrementar la 
competencia e inducir la aparición de innovaciones y de nuevos 
productos. Sin embargo, durante el Capítulo 4 de esta tesis doctoral 
queda reflejado que, tan importante como un buen diseño 
institucional, es la velocidad a la que se implementan las reformas 
institucionales por parte de los gobiernos y los poderes públicos.  
Los gobiernos, independientemente del grado institucional que 
deseen alcanzar (fundamentalmente en aquellas instituciones 
favorecen la actuación del mercado), deben considerar la influencia 
negativa que un cambio brusco en las instituciones puede tener en el 
resultado obtenido por filiales extranjeras. Un cambio institucional 
muy rápido repercute en la inversión inmediata de recursos para 
generar nuevas capacidades, así como en el repentino crecimiento de 
nuevos competidores. Por ello, una variación del nivel institucional a 
un ritmo más lento permitirá una mejor adaptación, así como la 
creación de capacidades, favoreciendo que el resultado de las 
subsidiarias no se vea perjudicado. En este sentido, si los gobiernos 
desean crear un entorno institucional más atractivo para los 
inversores extranjeros, deberán centrarse en fomentar reformas 
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institucionales suaves, que favorezcan la adaptación para las 
empresas subsidiarias. 
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